

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Control

Precedence/Priority

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1 ZCZC
GRS	2 GRS
CLASS	3 CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4
DESKBY	5
FM FCO	6 FM FCO 161650Z SEP
PRE/ADD	7 TO IMMEDIATE ROME
TEL NO	8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9 INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS
	10 PRIORITY EC POSTS, PRIORITY BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, DAMASCUS,
	11 TUNIS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW
	12 LEBANON
	13 1. I told the Italian Foreign Minister today 16 September that,
	14 following our useful meeting with Cheysson in Athens, at which it
	15 was clear that the three of us were very much in agreement about
	16 Lebanon and the MNF, and following also Mr Luce's visit to Beirut
	17 which had confirmed our own assessments, I wanted to propose a
	18 <u>coordinated programme of diplomatic approaches</u> aimed at helping
	19 <u>a peace settlement to evolve.</u> Andreotti welcomed the idea, and
	20 <u>I gave him a piece of paper</u> in the form of a a draft COREU with
	21 detailed proposals. An amended <u>version of the paper</u> , worked out
///	22 jointly with the Italian Political Director, <u>is in MIFT.</u>
//	23 2. Andreotti argued that the French would have nothing to do
/	24 with this idea if it was put out by COREU on the political
	25 cooperation net, and I subsequently agreed with him that it might

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File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution <i>ME Standard</i>
Drafted by (Block capitals) R O Miles		
Telephone number 233 6048		
Authorised for despatch <i>Oliver Miles</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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1 <<<<
 2 be better to go for action by the three European MNF contributors,
 3 and not to try to carry the others with us.
 4 3. Bullard subsequently gave the text in MIFT to the French
 5 Ambassador. He explained that I was inclined to accept
 6 Andreotti's proposal of limiting action to the three, and
 7 therefore asked de Margerie to ignore the first paragraph.
 8 de Margerie asked one or two questions of detail, but said that
 9 in general the proposal seemed to be compatible with what he
 10 knew of his Government's position. He would let us have French
 11 comments as soon as possible: Bullard has since spoken by
 12 telephone to Andreani to alert him: [I was not able to reach
 13 Cheysson as I should have liked to do.]
 14 4. Copy addressees should treat this telegram as being for
 15 their own information only at this stage.

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 17 HOWE
 18 NNNN

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Classification and Caveats

Priority (to be Deskey)

CONFIDENTIAL

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ZCZC 1 ZCZC
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 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL
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 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE ROME
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE PARIS
 10 PRIORITY EC POSTS, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, DAMASCUS, TUNIS,
 11 WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW

12 MIPT : **LEBANON : DRAFT COREU**

13 1. Following their talks in London today, and ~~following~~ *after*
 14 consultation with France, the Foreign Ministers of Italy and
 15 the United Kingdom, recalling their conversations with
 16 M Cheysson in Athens on 12 September, are instructing their
 17 Ambassadors in the capitals concerned:

- 18 a) to make approaches in the terms of paragraph 2 below;
- 19 b) to ^{delay} ~~day~~ doing so until tomorrow, 17 September, so as to
 20 permit partners to associate themselves with these approaches
 21 if they so wish.

/// 22 2. The following are the lines on which the two/three
 // 23 Ambassadors will speak to the various parties, taking as a
 / 24 basis the seven points adopted by Foreign Ministers of the
 25 Ten in Athens on 12 September:

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File number		Dept NENAD		Distribution <i>M.E. Standard</i>	
Drafted by (Block capitals) RO Miles					
Telephone number					
Authorised for despatch <i>JM 16/9</i>					
Comcen reference		Time of despatch			

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2 To the Americans:

3 a) Syria's objectives are not necessarily incompatible
4 in all respects with the interests of the West.

5 b) The presence of the MNF is based on the assumption that
6 the Lebanese Government enjoys the support of the great
7 majority of the people. President Gemayel must have the
8 confidence to negotiate, but not the over-confidence to refuse
9 concessions.

10 c) Italy the UK and France intend to maintain their military
11 commitment at their respective present levels. They are concerned
12 that deeper involvement of any part of the MNF, for example
13 at Suq el-Gharb, could lead to escalation.

14 To the Lebanese:

15 a) We will continue our support within present limits.

16 b) We believe there must be internal reconciliation, even if
17 some legitimate objectives (eg full deployment of the Lebanese
18 Army) have to be renounced for the time being. Progress may be
19 gradual, but efforts should be sustained.

20 To Israel:

21 a) Israel should withdraw fully, to create the conditions
22 for Syrian withdrawal and Lebanese internal reconciliation.

23 b) Israel should press her friends in the Phalange and the
24 Lebanese Druze to accept a political compromise, and should cut
25 off military assistance and supplies to them.

26 To the Saudis:

27 a) Appreciation and backing for Saudi mediation efforts, with
28 the offer of practical help in these.

29 b) Explore the idea of an Arab contribution to a peace
30 force for Lebanon in due course.

/// 31 To Syria:

// 32 a) Syrian interests would be best served by a political
/ 33 settlement, providing a basis for the withdrawal of all foreign
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forces

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2 forces (not however excluding the possibility of UN observers).

3 b) Syria should moderate the political demands of her Lebanese
4 clients, and cut off military assistance and supplies to them.

5 c) Syrian forces should draw back, especially from confron-
6 tation with Israeli forces.

7 To the Arab League (Klibi):

8 What are the prospects for an Arab peace force?

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Catchword

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