

CONFIDENTIAL

19062 - 1

ZZ UKREP BRUSSELS

GRS 740

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 200900Z SEP 83

TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECY)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 501 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, TUNIS, TEL AVIV,
ROUTINE ATHENS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG,

LEBANON MNF: MEETING WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER AND ITALIANS

1. PROGRAMME FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION. ROME TELNOS 448 AND 449

RECORD OUTCOME OPOFFICIAL DISCUSSION AD REFERENDUM ON 19

SEPTEMBER. THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS APPROVED THE

PROGRAMME. THERE ARE FOUR POINTS FOR MINISTERIAL DECISION:

A) OBSERVERS: UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 842 POINTS OUT SOME OF THE
DIFFICULTIES ABOUT CHEYSSON'S IDEAS. DEPLOYMENT OF OBSERVERS
OUTSIDE BEIRUT CAN ONLY FOLLOW A CEASEFIRE, AND SECRETARY-GENERAL
WOULD NEED SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION TO ACT OUTSIDE BEIRUT OR TO INCREASE THE NUMBER
ABOVE 50 AS LONG AS RUSSIANS MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT POSITION.
FIFTY ARE PROBABLY NOT ENOUGH TO DEPLOY ON ALL THREE MAIN ROUTES
OUT OF BEIRUT. CHEYSSON'S POSITION MAY HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY
LEBANESE REQUEST FOR FRENCH AND ITALIAN OBSERVERS FOLLOWING A CEASE-
FIRE IN THE SHOUF (ROME TELNO 450, NOW REPEATED TO YOU).

RECOMMENDATION: SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD INVITE CHEYSSON TO
EXPLAIN HOW HIS IDEAS ABOUT THE BETTER USE OF OBSERVERS IN
BEIRUT COULD BE PRESENTED NOW, AND ARGUE THAT THEIR USE OUTSIDE
BEIRUT IS REGRETTABLY BLOCKED AT PRESENT BY LACK OF A CEASEFIRE AND
SOVIET OBSTRUCTION IN NEW YORK.

B) PUBLIC STATEMENT: FRENCH IDEA. WE SUGGESTED AIM SHOULD BE
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT (NOT
PHALANGE AGAINST ADVERSARIES), AND THAT BEST TIME FOR STATEMENT
WOULD BE AFTER A CEASEFIRE.

RECOMMENDATION: WILL NEED VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

REPEAT TIMING POINT AND SUGGEST FRENCH COULD DRAFT A STATEMENT FOR

1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

19062 - 1

UK AND ITALIAN COMMENTS.

C) THE US ANGLE: CHEYSSON HAS TAKEN UMBRAGE AT SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD GET US ON BOARD FOR PROPOSED ACTION BY THE THREE (PARIS TELNO 839). ITALIAN VIEW IS THAT US SHOULD BE INFORMED. US HAVE SHOWN SCANT REGARD FOR OUR CLEAR RESERVATIONS ABOUT MILITARY ESCALATION AT SUQ AL-GHARB. WASHINGTON TELNO 2654 SETS OUT LIKELY US VIEWS. BUT LITTLE SERIOUS US OBJECTION LIKELY NOW THAT CHEYSSON PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTION OF MNF PRESENCE HAS BEEN DILUTED TO SOME VISIBLE DE-ESCALATION AFTER A CEASEFIRE. RECOMMENDATION: ARGUE THAT WITH US IN LEAD IN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A CEASEFIRE AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT (WHATEVER WE MAY THINK OF THEIR TACTICS), IT IS REASONABLE FOR THEM TO EXPECT OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS TO KEEP THEM IN TOUCH ABOUT PROPOSED ACTION, IF ONLY TO ENSURE THAT WE ARE NOT CUTTING ACROSS SOME PLANNED US MOVE. THREE SHOULD THEREFORE JOINTLY INFORM REPEAT INFORM US OF PROPOSED ACTION AND LISTEN TO, IF NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT US COMMENTS. THE OPERATION OF INFORMING THEM COULD PERHAPS BE COMBINED WITH THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO THEM BY THE THREE IN WASHINGTON (SEE BELOW).

D) PROCEDURE: APART FROM HOW TO APPROACH AMERICANS, DECISION NEEDED ON WHO SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN OTHER CAPITALS. A POSSIBLE DIVISION OF LABOUR WOULD BE (A) FRENCH: SAUDIS, ISRAELIS, UN. (B) ITALIANS: LEBANESE, SYRIANS, (C) UK: US AND ARAB LEAGUE. AGREE WITH FRENCH THAT DEMARCHE IN WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT SHOULD BE A RROIS. IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO POSTS ELSEWHERE WHETHER A JOINT OR SEPARATE DEMARCHES WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE, AND WHO SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. TEL AVIV TELNO 234 EXPRESSES THE VIEW THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE LIKELY TO BRUSH ASIDE CALLS FOR A COMPLETE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. MR MOBERLY HAS SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO USE POINTS (B) AND (C) ADDRESSED TO THE AMERICANS IN OUR APPROACH TO THE ISRAELIS AND OTHERS AS WELL: THIS IS SENSIBLE, BUT DOES NOT CALL FOR FORMAL REVISION OF THE TEXT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY WISH TO SUGGEST THAT THE DEMARCHE TO THE ISRAELIS SHOULD CALL FOR ISRAEL TO AFFIRM HER WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW, BUT THAT INSTRUCTIONS MIGHT GIVE AMBASSADORS AT TEL AVIV SOME FLEXIBILITY ON HOW THE POINT

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

19062 - 1

IS MADE.

3. SITUATION REPORT: SEE WASHINGTON TELNO 2673.
ON 19 SEPTEMBER THERE WAS HEAVY FIGHTING AROUND SUQ AL GHARB
WHICH DRUZE MILITIA AND THEN OTHERS HAVE ENTERED.

AT ONE POINT THE LEBANESE ARMY APPEARED LIKELY TO
BE DRIVEN OUT OF THE TOWN. THE US INTERVENED TO SUPPORT THE
LAF WITH NAVAL SHELLING. PRINCE BANDAR RETURNED TO DAMASCUS
BUT THERE IS NO (NO) CONFIRMATION OF LEBANESE REPORTS THAT A CEASE-
FIRE IS IMMINENT, ALTHOUGH OUR CHARGE AT DAMASCUS HAS REPORTED BY
PHONE THAT RUMOURS OF A CEASEFIRE ARE STRONG THERE.

HOWE

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
LIMITED

NENAD
MED
DEFENCE D
PUSD
NEWS D
UND
NAD
WED
FINANCE D
SED

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
MR STREETON
MR ADAMS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

COPIES TO
SIR R ARMSTRONG } CABINET OFFICE
MR GOODALL
MOD DS11

3
CONFIDENTIAL