

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

PS
PS/MR WCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON.
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NENAD
ED/MED
ED/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

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PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

MT

*Si J. Thomson is trying to
get enough votes for a Security
Council resolution on observers - which
the Soviet Union will either have to
let through or veto.*

A-2C-4/10

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 032240Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 986 OF 3 OCTOBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, ROME, DAMASCUS, JEDDA.

ROUTINE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 983: LEBANON

1. AT MY OWN REQUEST I CALLED ON MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE THIS AFTERNOON. I SAID I WAS NOT DISSATISFIED WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS REPORTED, IN MY T.U.R., THOUGH I HAD HOPED THAT PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP THERE IN FAVOUR OF UN COVER FOR THE OBSERVERS AS SHAH NAWAZ HAD DONE SEVERAL TIMES IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION. THE RIGHT COURSE IN MY OPINION WAS TO CONTINUE TO MOBILIZE THE NON-ALIGNED ON THE COUNCIL SO AS TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS AND SYRIANS THAT IF THEY CONTINUED TO OPPOSE UN COVER THEY WOULD NEED TO EXERCISE A SOVIET VETO. I BELIEVED THE SOVIETS WOULD BE VERY RELUCTANT TO DO THIS, THOUGH OF COURSE THEY WOULD DO SO IF THEIR RELATIONS WITH DAMASCUS DEPENDED UPON IT. DE NANTEUIL AGREED. THE SOVIETS WERE OPPOSED BOTH IN PRINCIPLE AND BECAUSE OF THE SYRIANS. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ARGUING THEM ROUND AS M. CHEYSSON HAD NAIVELY BELIEVED. BUT THEY MIGHT MOVE WHEN THEY SAW

CHEYSSON HAD NAIVELY BELIEVED. BUT THEY MIGHT MOVE WHEN THEY SAW THE VOTES WERE AGAINST THEM.

2. I SAID WE SHARED A COMMON ANALYSIS. IF WE LET THINGS DRIFT WE WOULD LOSE THE NON-ALIGNED. ACCORDINGLY THERE NEEDED TO BE A WESTERN-LED CAUCUS IN THE COUNCIL TO MOBILISE MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR A UN OBSERVER FORCE. I PROPOSED THAT M. DE NANTEUIL SHOULD LEAD THIS. I SAID THAT I HAD AN OPEN MIND ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO INCLUDE THE AMERICANS. THEY WERE READY TO TAKE A LOW PROFILE AND IT MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVE WITH THE NON-ALIGNED TO OMIT THEM. WE SHOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO KEEP THEM CLOSELY INFORMED AND THE BEST THING MIGHT BE TO HAVE A SEPARATE MNF CONTRIBUTORS GROUP INCLUDING THE ITALIANS. WE SHOULD OMIT THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SO AS TO PRESERVE HIS IMPARTIALITY IN THE PRESIDENCY. WE COULD DO THIS READILY SINCE WE KNEW THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS WITH US. M. DE NANTEUIL SAID WE COULD RELY ON TOGO AND ZAIRE. THAT BEING SO WE AGREED THAT WE NEEDED A MINIMUM OF TWO VOTES FROM PAKISTAN, MALTA AND GUYANA. I BELIEVED WE COULD ACHIEVE THIS IF WE ACTED QUICKLY. GUYANA HAD ASSURED ME THAT ONCE FREE OF THE PRESIDENCY HE WOULD SUPPORT.

3. DE NANTEUIL'S ONLY QUESTION WAS WHETHER I HAD CONSULTED ANYONE ELSE. WHEN I TOLD HIM 'NO' HE SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY RECOMMEND THE SCHEME TO PARIS AND HOPED TO HAVE AN ANSWER BY TOMORROW MORNING.

4. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED AS PROPOSED. I WOULD EXPECT TO ACCEPT THE FRENCH VIEW AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TO INCLUDE THE AMERICANS FORMALLY IN THE STEERING GROUP. ON THE BASIS OF A CONVERSATION WITH HER ON FRIDAY I AM PRETTY CONFIDENT THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK WOULD NOT TAKE IT AMISS IF SHE WERE OMITTED.

WE WOULD OF COURSE KEEP HER CLOSELY INFORMED. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY PRECISELY WHAT THE OUTCOME MIGHT BE. I INTEND TO RECOMMEND AS A FIRST STEP THAT WE SHOULD BACK A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE DRAFT IN M.I.F.T. WHICH I HAPPEN TO KNOW IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. DELEGATION. BUT IF NECESSARY WE CAN GO FOR SOME ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM, SUCH AS AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

THOMSON

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