

CONFIDENTIAL



I have told the F.C.O. that
I think the message needs Foreign and Commonwealth Office
to be much more lucid.
They will look at it again.

London SW1A 2AH

A.J.C. $\frac{21}{10}$

31 October 1983

Dear John,

Lebanon: Message from President Reagan

Thank you for your letter of 27 October. I
enclose a new draft message to President Reagan.

Since we submitted the original draft, there have
been two new developments: King Hussein has shown us a
copy of his personal message to President Reagan which
puts forward the idea of a timetable for withdrawal of
Foreign forces from Lebanon (I enclose a copy of ease
of reference). Secondly, at the meeting of the
Foreign Ministers of the four MNF contributors in Paris
on 27 October, Sir Geoffrey Howe sketched out a version
of the same idea.

Sir Geoffrey thinks that this would be a good
opportunity to put a slightly fuller version of the same
ideas to the Americans, and the reply to President Reagan
is drafted accordingly.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR II (Revised)

MESSAGE

DRAFT: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
President Reagan

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: Lebanon/MNF

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

1. Thank you for your message of 24 October. As you know, I entirely agree that we cannot let the outrageous attacks on the Multinational Force deflect us from our task. We must continue our efforts to enable the legitimate government of Lebanon to pursue a peaceful solution in the reconciliation talks.

2. As agreed in the meeting which Geoffrey Howe and George Shultz attended in Paris, we shall be putting what pressure we can on all participants in the Geneva talks. If a more broadly-based Lebanese government can be constructed, that will be a major step forward.

3. As Geoffrey Howe also mentioned in Paris, we have been giving some thought to the longer-term. We need to agree on a strategy which, *guides promoting reconciliation* ~~as well as efforts to push the reconciliation along~~, also embraces the withdrawal of foreign forces, including eventually the MNF. King Hussein, who as ever is willing to do all he can to help, has suggested that one tactic might be to negotiate a

Enclosures—flag(s).....

framework for the phased withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces to pave the way for a reunited Lebanon, with the MNF itself pulling out once a government of national unity has established its authority. These elements could form a package.

4. I do not underestimate the difficulties of negotiating such a framework. But there is certainly some scope for using the withdrawal of the MNF as a lever, with the offer of a co-ordinated programme of reconstruction aid as an additional incentive. The Israelis have hinted clearly that they would not necessarily insist on the simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian forces provided their own minimum security requirements could be met. While I put no faith in Syrian assurances, they have repeatedly stated their readiness to withdraw after the departure of Israeli forces, and they might find themselves under pressure in the new circumstances to do so. We should put them to the test. Full implementation of the Israel/Lebanon agreement is obviously a difficulty for them, as it will be for any more broadly based Lebanese government likely to emerge as a result of the Geneva negotiations. It seems sensible to leave that aspect on one side for the time being and concentrate on the security arrangements which Israel reasonably demands for her northern border.

5. These are only preliminary thoughts. I know that your people have already worked long and hard on the Lebanon problem and there are no easy answers. But I

think that this is the right time, whether or not the Geneva talks get underway, to look in more detail at the kind of package which might attract all the leading players and which would allow eventually for the reunification of Lebanon and the withdrawal of our forces.



B. above

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1983

LEBANON: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN

Thank you for your letter of 25 October. The Prime Minister was doubtful about sending the reply to President Reagan's message which you recommended because she considered that the first paragraph did not accurately describe the role of the Multi National Force. The second paragraph is, of course, now out of date. I should be grateful if you could let me have a revised draft reply.

A.R.

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 October 1983

Dear John

Prime Minister.

Agree message?

A.F.C. 25/10

Lebanon: Message from President Reagan

Thank you for your letter of 24 October.

/a /
The Foreign Secretary believes that President Reagan's message of 24 October to the Prime Minister calls for a brief reply. I attach a draft in the form of/telegram to Washington. Sir Geoffrey does not think that the reply need go into the substantive issues, which can be addressed at the meeting of MNF Foreign Ministers.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

LEBANON
1st 2nd PK4

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
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6 FM FCO 241530Z OCT 83
7 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 REPEATED INFORMATION IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS
10 PRIORITY TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, TUNIS, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK
11 LEBANON/MNF: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN
12 1. US Embassy delivered the following message to the Prime
13 Minister from President Reagan today, 24 October: begins -
14 Dear Margaret, There is no doubt that the perpetrators of the
15 latest bombings in Beirut have attempted once more to undermine
16 our collective will and sense of purpose as we work to support the
17 legitimate government of Lebanon in its efforts to secure a more
18 stable and peaceful future.
19 Despite our sorrow at the great loss of life, I want to assure
20 you that the United States remains firmly committed. The United
21 States will not be dissuaded by acts of violence committed by
22 those who are seeking to prevent Lebanese political reconciliation
23 and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over territory at
24 present controlled by foreign forces.
25 Our common goals are still attainable: we believe that we can

Prime Minister

See overleaf.

AR 25/6

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/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword achieve
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution Lebanon MNF
Drafted by (Block capitals) E G M CHAPLIN		
Telephone number 233 4856		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats		Page
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achieve them if we stand united and work closely together in
the face of these new provocations.
I believe that our Foreign Ministers should meet to discuss
matters concerning the MNF. I have asked Secretary Shultz
to call his counterparts in the MNF governments to see if a
meeting time and place can be arranged promptly. Sincerely,
Ron.
ENDS
2. Please pass the following reply from the Prime Minister:
BEGINS
Dear Ron, Thank you for your message of 24 October.
3. I entirely agree that we should not let the outrageous
attacks on the Multinational Force deflect us from our efforts
to help restore peace and stability in Lebanon. We have said
so publicly.
4. Geoffrey Howe is ready to attend a meeting of MNF Foreign
Ministers as soon as one can be arranged. I understand that
plans are now being made for a meeting in Paris on 27 October.
5. We need to consider not only the future of the MNF but
also how we can push forward the process of reconciliation,
which is the only basis for long-term stability in that country.

This was not the objection

with best wishes

*Yours ever
Dagwood*

~~TOP~~

HOWE
NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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