

GRS 440

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DESKBY 021100Z

FM DUBLIN 020940Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 021100Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 324 OF 2 NOVEMBER 1983

MY TELNO 314: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: CALL ON THE TAOISEACH

1. I CALLED ON THE TAOISEACH ON 1 NOVEMBER AND ASKED HOW HE SAW HIS FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. HE SAID THAT SUMMITS IN THE PAST HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO SPEND TOO MUCH TIME DISCUSSING THE COMMUNIQUE. THIS WAS NOT GOING TO BE NECESSARY THIS TIME. FURTHERMORE, THE NEW IRELAND FORUM HAD NOT CONCLUDED ITS CONSIDERATIONS. HE SAW THE SUMMIT, THEREFORE, AS AN IDEAL OPPORTUNITY FOR HIMSELF AND MRS THATCHER TO EXCHANGE IDEAS IN A RELAXED WAY WITHOUT CONSTRAINT. HE WAS PRIMARILY CONCERNED AT THE ALIENATION OF THE MINORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND - IN PARTICULAR THEIR ALIENATION FROM THE SECURITY FORCES. BUT HE WAS ALSO NATURALLY VERY CONCERNED AT THE POLITICAL ADVANCE OF SINN FEIN. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE ANSWERS TO THESE PROBLEMS WERE, BUT THEY MUST BE DISCUSSED. HE GAVE NO IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD CLEAR-CUT IDEAS UP HIS SLEEVE. NEITHER OF US MADE ANY REFERENCE TO THE SUGGESTIONS WHICH LILLIS HAS PUT FORWARD. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE DIRECTLY ON HIS MIND.

3. HE ASKED ME WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT ABOUT THESE MATTERS. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS. I WAS SURE THAT SHE WOULD WANT TO LISTEN CAREFULLY TO ANY IDEAS HE PUT FORWARD. I THOUGHT SHE WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO TALK ABOUT SECURITY MATTERS AND PERHAPS SHE WOULD WISH TO ASK WHETHER HE SAW A WAY FORWARD THROUGH THE SDLP JOINING THE ASSEMBLY AND SOMEHOW BEING MORE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH DECISION-MAKING IN THE PROVINCE. HE SAID HE FELT THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME REVERSAL IN OUR PREOCCUPATIONS, IN THAT HE WAS NOW MORE CONCERNED WITH SECURITY THAN POLITICS, CONTRARY TO THE IRISH TRADITION. HE DID NOT COMMENT DIRECTLY ON MY REFERENCE TO THE ASSEMBLY. HE DID SAY THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT FACT ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICS WAS THAT IN THE SDLP WE HAD HAD A MINORITY PARTY WHICH WAS NOT COMMITTED TO NATIONALIST IDEAS SIMPLICITER (UNDERLINED), BUT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NO CHANGE WITHOUT CONSENT. IT WAS VITAL TO PRESERVE THIS. MEANWHILE, THE FORUM WAS EMPHASISING THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE UNIONIST POSITION.

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4. HE SAID

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4. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED THAT THE IRISH PRESS HAD MADE SUCH A FUSS ABOUT HIS STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES OPERATION IN GRENADA WAS CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW. HE HAD, HE FELT, TAKEN THE SAME VIEW AS MRS THATCHER. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESS ALWAYS REGARDED IRISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS SENSITIVE. HE SAID WRYLY THAT PERHAPS THE TROUBLE WAS THAT THEY WERE BOUND TO CRITICISE HIM WHEN HE EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH MRS THATCHER. WE AGREED THAT HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NOT WISH TO SPEND THEIR TETE-A-TETE ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS, WHICH WOULD BE LEFT TO THE 2 FOREIGN MINISTERS OR FOR DISCUSSION AT LUNCH.

5. SEE MIFT FOR DISCUSSION OF COMMUNITY TOPICS.

GOODISON

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R I D

PROTOCOL. D.

HO/NEWS. D.

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/PUS

SIR. J. BULLARD

COPIES TO:

SIR. R. ARMSTRONG } CABINET
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FRAME GENERAL
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FM DUBLIN 021000Z NOV 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 021100Z
TELEGRAM NUMBER 325 OF 2 NOVEMBER 1983
INFO UKREP BRUSSELS, ATHENS
INFO SAVING ALL OTHER EC POSTS

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MIPT (NOT TO ALL): ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: CALL ON THE TAOISEACH

1. WHEN I CALLED ON THE TAOISEACH ON 1 NOVEMBER HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM ATHENS. HE HAD FOUND MR PAPANDEOU SYMPATHETIC PERSONALLY AND UNDERSTANDING OF IRELAND'S PROBLEM. HE THOUGHT THAT PAPANDEOU WOULD MAKE A VERY CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO CONCLUDE THE POST-STUTTGART NEGOTIATION IN ATHENS. DR FITZGERALD HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE FRENCH HAD IN THE PAST BEEN INCLINED TO LEAVE PROBLEMS FOR SOLUTION BY THE SUCCEEDING IRISH PRESIDENCY AND THAT WE COULD NOT LET THE MATTER DRAG ON. HE FELT THE GREEKS, NOTABLY VARFIS, WERE BUSINESS-LIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE IN THEIR APPROACH.

2. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE REGARDED THE IRISH PROBLEM AS SIMPLY THE QUESTION OF THE SUPER LEVY ON MILK OR REFORM OF THE CAP AS A WHOLE. HE SAID THAT THE SUPER LEVY WAS HIS ONLY MAJOR CONCERN. OF COURSE, HE WAS NOT IN FAVOUR OF A STRICT FINANCIAL GUIDELINE IMPOSED AS A MATTER OF LAW, BUT NEITHER WERE THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBER STATES. HE WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO TALK TO THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT MILK. HE BELIEVED THAT AN EARLY SETTLEMENT WAS POSSIBLE, BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PRIMARY CONCERNS OF EACH OF THE MEMBER STATES. HE SYMPATHISED WITH OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE SIZE OF OUR CONTRIBUTION. MILK WAS VITAL TO HIM. I REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAD OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THE SUPER LEVY TOO.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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