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- OO ATHENS
- OO ROME
- OO NEW DELHI
- PP AMMAN
- PP BEIRUT
- PP CAIRO
- PP DAMASCUS
- PP JEDDA
- PP TEL AVIV

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 21 1983
AMMAN
OFFICE OF THE
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LEBANON

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 DESKBY 220900Z UKREP BRUSSELS  
 FM WASHINGTON 220910Z NOV 83  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 3516 OF 21 NOVEMBER  
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, OTHER E.C. POSTS, NEW DELHI (FOR  
 SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)  
 INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, TUNIS,  
 JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 1960: LEBANON/HMF

1. MINISTER TOOK MURPHY AND PELLETREAU CAREFULLY THROUGH THESE  
 POINTS THIS EVENING AND GAVE THEM A COPY OF THE AMENDED DRAFT  
 STATEMENT. HE STRESSED THAT OUR INITIATIVE WAS INTENDED TO PRODUCE  
 A STATEMENT THAT WOULD ADD TO THE PRESSURE ON THOSE ON THE GROUND  
 TO REACH A COMPROMISE. WE SEEMED TO SHARE THE SAME OBJECTIVES.  
 OUR DIFFERENCES WERE OVER TACTICS.



2. MURPHY WAS CLEARLY UNHAPPY THAT WE HAD NOT FELT ABLE TO TAKE MORE ACCOUNT OF SHULTZ'S VIEWS. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT AN E.C. STATEMENT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL AT THIS POINT: THAT WAS THE MAIN POINT OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US. HE ACCEPTED THAT RUMSFELD'S COMMENTS (MY TELNO 3508) HAD NOT REACHED US IN TIME TO INFLUENCE THE REVISED DRAFT, BUT HOPED THAT HIS VIEWS, PARTICULARLY ON UNIFIL AND INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL, COULD BE REFLECTED IN OUR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR E.C. PARTNERS. PELLETREAU ADDED THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOW HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT LINE TO TAKE IN PUBLIC IF AN E.C. STATEMENT WERE MADE AND, INDEED, WHETHER THEY SHOULD TRY TO LOBBY AGAINST A STATEMENT.

3. THOMAS SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE FOR THE AMERICANS TO DECIDE. BUT WHETHER OR NOT THEY MADE APPROACHES TO OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, HE URGED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT REVEAL THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH THEM (YOUR TELNO 519 TO ATHENS) IN ADVANCE. PELLETREAU FULLY ACCEPTED THIS: THE U.S. TOO WOULD BE EMBARRASSED BY AN HINT THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE SEEN AND COMMENTED ON OUR TEXT, STILL LESS ENDORSED IT.

4. IN RESPONSE TO OUR ARGUMENTS ON THIS SUBSTANCE, MURPHY SAID THAT SYRAIN OBJECTIONS TO THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WERE NOT IN HIS VIEW CONFINED TO THE SIDE LETTER. IN ADDITION TO OBJECTIONS OF PRINCIPLE THEY HAD AT VARIOUS STAGES IN DISCUSSION WITH U.S. OFFICIALS OBJECTED TO ALMOST EVERY LINE OF THE AGREEMENT. KHADDAM HAD RECONFIRMED MANY OF THESE OBJECTIONS TO RUMSFELD ON 19 NOVEMBER, STRESSING THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT AS A WHOLE. WE WENT OVER THIS GROUND AT SOME LENGTH WITHOUT NARROWING THE GAP BETWEEN US ON THE ULTIMATE PROSPECTS FOR THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT OR ON ITS HANDLING NOW AS A MATTER OF TACTICS. MURPHY ALSO DISPUTED THE SUGGESTION THAT THE ISRAELI BOTTOM LINE WAS PROBABLY AN AGREEMENT RESTRICTED TO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND THE LEBANESE; THIS WAS CERTAINLY NOT THE LINE THE ISRAELIS WERE TAKING WITH THE AMERICANS.

5. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT TIMING, THOMAS SAID THAT THE TEN HAD NOT YET DECIDED TO ISSUE A STATEMENT OR, IF THEY DID SO, WHETHER OR NOT TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION WITH THE PARTIES. BUT IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WOULD WANT TO COMMENT ON THE SERIOUS SITUATION IN LEBANON. WE HAD THEREFORE TAKEN THIS INITIATIVE OURSELVES IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO RESULT IN A MORE BALANCED AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH THAN IF WE LEFT IT TO OTHERS TO PRODUCE A FIRST DRAFT.

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