

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 December 1983

Dear John,

A.S.C. $\frac{14}{12}$
L.A.

Visit of President Gemayel to London, 13-15 December 1983

/ In preparation for President Gemayel's visit tomorrow,
/ I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister, together with a
/ copy of the programme. I also enclose a suggested press
/ line, personality notes on President Gemayel and the Lebanese
/ Ambassador, a note on the other main political figures in
/ Lebanon and a map. You will have seen Beirut telno 713
/ (copy also enclosed) on President Gemayel's present strategy.

We have been told that the President would like to be accompanied at the plenary session and the lunch by (in protocol order) the Lebanese Ambassador General Ahmed Al-Hajj, Mr Farouk Jabre (the President's diplomatic adviser) and Col Muhammad Al-Khalil (a staff officer and expert on the Multinational Force).

We hope to dispose of any discussion President Gemayel may want of bilateral issues during the meeting with Sir Geoffrey Howe at 1145. The one exception to this is the possible Lebanese request for the sale of RAF Hunters, which President Gemayel may wish to raise over lunch in the presence of the Defence Secretary.

I am sending a copy of this letter and the brief to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

GP 590

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BEIRUT 121350Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 713 OF 12 DECEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,
JEDDA, TEL AVIV AND CBFC

INFO SAVING COMMANDER BRITFORLEB

LEBANON: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S VISIT

SUMMARY

1. EXTERNALLY, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS CAUGHT BETWEEN THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS: INTERNALLY HE CONTROLS ONLY ABOUT 10 PER CENT OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY AND IS THE VICTIM OF RELENTLESS SELFISH PRESSURES FROM LEBANON'S WARRING FACTIONS. NEVERTHELESS HE AND FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM PERHAPS HAVE SOME CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO PLAY THEIR TRUMPLESS HAND. IF WE PROPOSE TO KEEP BRITFORLEB HERE WE SHOULD GIVE THEM BROAD ENCOURAGEMENT DURING THEIR FORTHCOMING VISIT.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S CURRENT STRATEGY SEEMS TO BE
- (A) TO SQUEEZE BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS OVER IMPLEMENTATION/ABROGATION OF THE 17 MAY ACCORD BY SEEKING A FORM OF WORDS THAT AVOIDS THE ISSUE WHILE OFFERING TO RESPECT THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONCERNS OF EACH INTRANSIGENT NEIGHBOUR.
 - (B) TO PURSUE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BY PERSUADING THE SYRIANS TO LIFT THEIR VETO ON JUMBLATT AND KARAME ATTENDING GENEVA II AND PRESSING AHEAD WITH DISCUSSIONS FOR FORMING A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY IN WHICH ALL TRENDS WOULD BE REPRESENTED. (PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS AND KEY FIGURES ARE BEING KEENLY LOBBIED NOW.)
 - (C) TO DO A DEAL WITH THE KATAEB, PSP AND AMAL OVER SECURITY WITHIN THE NON-OCCUPIED AREAS, UNDER WHICH THE WEAK BUT POLITICALLY NON-CONTROVERSIAL INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE WOULD BE INTRODUCED INSTEAD OF THE ARMY INTO SENSITIVE AREAS IN THE SHOUF AND THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS. THIS WOULD PROVIDE NOMINAL GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF THESE AREAS WITHOUT THE NEED TO TRY (YET) TO DISARM THE MILITIAS ACTUALLY IN CHARGE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/2

CONFIDENTIAL

2. ON (C) THE PRESS THINKS SALEM HAD FRUITFUL DISCUSSIONS IN DAMASCUS LAST WEEK WITH PSP AND AMAL REPRESENTATIVES. THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN OBSERVED BETTER IN RECENT DAYS. COLONELS NASSIF AND KASSIS (LEBANESE ARMY REPRESENTATIVES) ARE SUPPOSED TO BE RETURNING TO DAMASCUS FOR MORE TALKS SOON. BERRI IS FAVOURABLE IF OUTSTANDING DEMANDS CAN BE MET. BUT JUMBLATT APPEARS SCEPTICAL (DAMASCUS TELNO 403). THE ISF CARRY NO CLOUT AND DISSIDENTS IN THE SENSITIVE AREAS MAY WRECK THE PLAN. BERRI HAS MEAGRE AUTHORITY IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS. MEANWHILE THE AIRPORT, AND SCHOOLS IN EAST BEIRUT, REMAIN SHUT AND VIOLENCE PROLIFERATES. THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE AT THE BANK HAS NOT MANAGED TO MEET NOW FOR 10 DAYS.

3. ON (A) AND (B) THE PRESS REPORT A GENERALLY FAVOURABLE ATTITUDE BY SYRIA. KHADDAM IS REPORTED TO HAVE RESTATED SYRIA'S DEMAND FOR THE ABROGATION OF THE 17 MAY AGREEMENT, BUT TO HAVE BEEN PLEASED BY SALEM'S READINESS TO CRITICISE US MILITARY ACTIONS WHILE CONCEDED SYRIA PRIVILEGED RELATIONS AS A NEIGHBOUR. I MAY LEARN MORE WHEN SALEM RETURNS FROM DAMASCUS VIA RIYADH TODAY. FROM WHAT BERRI TOLD ME ON FRIDAY THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE HOPING THAT THE FORMULA AT (C) ABOVE WILL IN DUE COURSE BE SUSCEPTIBLE OF APPLICATION IN THE SOUTH IN A WAY THAT WILL AVOID PROVOKING SHIA DISSIDENTS INTO CHALLENGING GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

4. THE CHANCES OF ALL THIS GOING AS PLANNED SEEM REMOTE. BUT (C) REPRESENTS A BETTER WAY FORWARD THAN TRYING NOW TO CLEAR THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS OR THE SHOUF WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY (MY TELNO 709): WE OUGHT TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO MOLLIFY THE SYRIANS AND TO MAKE PROGRESS ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. (WE MUST NOT HOWEVER ALLOW THEM TO THINK THAT THE EASY OPTION OF DISCUSSING THE COMPOSITION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY - THE LEBANESE REVEL IN SUCH WHEELING AND DEALING - CAN BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE HARD BUSINESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IMPLICIT IN GENEVA II.) IN GENERAL THERE SEEMS LITTLE ALTERNATIVE FOR GEMAYEL TO THE STRATEGY IN PARA 1.

MIERS

BT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED

NENAD

MED

DEFENCE DEPT

PUSD

NEWS DEPT

UND

NAD

WED

SED

ECD(E)

FINANCE DEPT

PROTOCOL DEPT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

COPIES TO:

MOD DS11

MR GOODALL)CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)OFFICE

SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: C W LONG, NENAD
DATE: 13 DECEMBER 1983

PS

cc: PS/Mr Luce
Sir J Leahy
Mr Egerton or
News Dept.

LEBANON: VISIT OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL

1. I submit a brief for use by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State for Defence during the discussions with President Gemayel on 14 December. I submit also a draft covering letter to Mr Coles.

C W Long

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO LONDON 13 - 15 DECEMBER 1983

Points to Make

1. Glad that British contingent of Multinational Force welcomed by all. Have been able to extend original 3 month commitment. But cannot remain indefinitely.

SECURITY SITUATION

2. President Gemayel will be aware of anxiety here about safety of British soldiers. Public need to be reassured that the risks to which they are exposed are worth taking. This requires continuous evidence that the presence of the Multinational Force as a whole is still helping, not hindering reconciliation process. Redeployment may be needed. Further help from UN forces may also be necessary.

RECONCILIATION

3. Most important therefore to restore momentum of national reconciliation process. Encouraging progress at Geneva under President Gemayel's chairmanship, but stagnation since. We would like to see Geneva talks reconvened at earliest opportunity. What are President Gemayel's plans for this? Are there plans to form a national government of unity? When?

WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES

4. Syria clearly has key role. She sees Israel/Lebanon agreement as harmful to her interests. We were encouraged that all parties at Geneva had apparently agreed on a formula to get round this problem. But public statements since then (eg Gemayel's own in Washington) have given an opposite signal. How will President Gemayel play this with Syrians? Outcome of visit to Damascus by Foreign Minister Salem (8 December)? Plans for meeting with President Asad?

MNF

5. All MNF contributors share common objectives, and have given strong public support to restoration of Lebanese independence,

territorial integrity and full withdrawal of all foreign forces. But we do not (not) fully agree (for example) with American methods. Misguided to use pressure tactics in an explosive situation. Only patience, negotiation and steadiness can succeed. Level of violence must be lowered: Christian militias must set example. Lebanese Government must come to terms with opposition parties; and neighbours as they (not Americans) think fit.

6. MNF to stay? Multinational Force can only contribute usefully while steady progress towards reconciliation is being made. If prospects of early progress vanish, we shall have to reconsider presence of our contingent. Believe other contributors share this view. If MNF becomes identified with one side only, or is sucked into hostilities, its early withdrawal would be required.

7. Bilateral issues. Hope to strengthen bilateral relations in other fields (eg commercial links) as conditions return to normal in Lebanon.

8. (Defensive: Financial Protocol/Soft Credit). Regret no concessional finance available, but short and medium-term credit cover available from ECGD - little yet taken up.

9. (Defensive: Reconstruction aid). We are committed to contributing with EC partners to reconstruction in Lebanon within limits of our resources. What are Lebanon's priorities?

10. (Defensive: Sale of RAF Hunters to Lebanese airforce). No aircraft available for sale immediately. Fully committed for training purposes, or sales elsewhere. Some may become available in due course.

11. (Defensive: PLO in Tripoli). On humanitarian grounds we support orderly evacuation of PLO under UN flag to avoid further casualties. But do not want to build up status of Arafat.

Background

1. Sitrep on latest developments in Lebanon attached (Annex A).
2. National Reconciliation. President Gemayel has nearly completed his round of talks with American, European and Arab leaders. He has seen President Mitterrand, King Fahd, Signor Craxi and President Reagan. Plans are in hand to reinstate the postponed visit to Damascus as soon as President Asad's health allows. But Gemayel is no nearer completing the terms of the mandate given him at the first session of the Geneva National Reconciliation talks (31 October - 4 November): 'to undertake the necessary contacts to end the Israeli occupation'. The stumbling block remains the 17 May Israel/Lebanon agreement which the United States and Israel wish to see implemented but which Syria and the Lebanese opposition want set aside if not abrogated. Gemayel apparently aims to seek a form of words which avoids the question of implementation/abrogation while offering to respect the political and security concerns of Syria and Israel.
3. Geneva Process. There are signs that the modest gains made at Geneva are beginning to slip away. President Gemayel and the Christians appear to be taking the view that further efforts at reconciliation should await withdrawal of foreign forces. But Gemayel is pressing ahead with consultations on the formation of a new government of national unity. The hardline Christians (Phalange) have denounced the formula agreed at Geneva reaffirming Lebanon's Arab identity. There has been a corresponding hardening of Druze and Muslim attitudes: Jumblatt's suspicions of Gemayel and the actions of the Lebanese Army and the Multinational Force were evident from his recent call on Mr Luce (28 November). The loss of confidence is reflected on the ground: the Lebanese Army has been increasingly involved in clashes with the Druze and Muslim militias. Gemayel apparently aims to arrange for the weak but uncontroversial Internal Security Forces to take on security in the Shouf and the southern suburbs of Beirut where the Army is unacceptable. The Airport remains closed under threat of Druze shelling and the Quadripartite Ceasefire Committee has not met since 2 December due to the kidnapping of hostages by both Christian and Shia militias.

Despite some progress towards reconciliation (apparent consensus on Druze and Shia ideas for constitutional reform reached in the Commission preparing Geneva II, and the Druze decision to release the remaining Christians held in Deir al Kamar), there has been a loss of momentum. Prospects for reconvening the Geneva talks by the end of December are poor; aside from the political constraints, the Geneva site, which is the only one acceptable to all parties, will be unavailable.

4. US/Israeli Attitudes. President Gemayel came away with little from his recent meeting with President Reagan (1-2 December) except for promises of increased military and economic assistance. He apparently made no attempt to convince the Americans that the Agreement should be left on one side (without abrogation or amendment), allowing himself instead to be associated with a US statement that the agreement was still the "best and most viable basis" for Israeli withdrawal. He was told that he should negotiate direct with the Syrians to expedite their withdrawal, attempt to extend his authority outside the Beirut area and pursue national reconciliation. The Americans seem to have accepted the Israeli argument that a move away from the 17 May agreement will be interpreted as a sign of weakness. President Reagan did not press Mr Shamir for modification of the agreement or withdrawal of the side letter making Israeli withdrawal contingent on simultaneous Syrian withdrawal during the Israeli Prime Minister's visit (23-30 November). The Americans believe that a tough line with Syria and steadfast support for Gemayel will enable Gemayel to wean the Druze/Muslim opposition away from Syria, into a Government of National Unity. But plans to develop US/Israeli strategic cooperation, announced on 29 November, have upset the moderate Arabs and hardened the attitude of Syria and the Lebanese opposition.

5. Syrian Attitudes. At Geneva I the Syrians showed some flexibility, indicating informally that they might be prepared to accept the setting aside of the 17 May agreement (without formal abrogation) and the working out of new Israeli/Lebanese security arrangements. Much now hangs on President Gemayel's meeting with President Asad. Contacts continue: the Lebanese Foreign Minister Dr. Salem most recently had talks in Damascus with his Syrian

opposite number on 8 December. But Syria will not accept implementation of the 17 May agreement and the recent US air strikes on Syrian positions in Lebanon appear to have hardened her attitude. The Syrians' ability to switch the fighting on and off at will, demonstrated most recently by the sudden drop in violence after talks among the factions in Damascus on 9 December, further strengthens Asad's hand.

6. Multinational Force. MNF Foreign Ministers met in the margins of the NATO ministerial in Brussels on 8 December. Little impact made on US views, but all agreed to give priority to urging all Lebanese parties to work for national reconciliation and to achieve the withdrawal of all foreign forces. It was also decided to improve consultation on political (although not military) matters, and to work towards the eventual replacement of the Multinational force by some kind of UN force. All MNF contributors face public disquiet at home. The US is reportedly considering ways of safe-guarding the marines, perhaps by stationing them on the 6th Fleet off shore or by moving them south of Beirut. The Italians have announced their intention to reduce their contingent by roughly half (from 2000 to 1100). The French have tried to persuade President Gemayel to propose a reduction in their contingent, during a visit to Beirut on 12 December by M Gutmann, Secretary General of the Quai. Gemayel's response was that this was the worst possible moment to reduce MNF contingents, which would be misread as a signal of lessened support for Lebanon and add to the burden of the Lebanese Army. Gutmann agreed that the matter should be shelved 'until next year'.

7. UK/Lebanon trade. Exports to Lebanon last year £70m., with low market share, mostly consumer goods and supply with no projects. Exports up 24% in first 6 months of this year. Imports negligible. Short and medium-term ECGD credit (up to £30 million) available, though ECGD reconsidering in light of recent deterioration. Lebanese have pressed for a financial 'protocol'. Most see this as code word for concessional finance/aid - of which none available. If and when prospects for trade improve, we may have to consider a purely cosmetic protocol if Lebanese government attach particular importance to it. Our main competitors (US, France, Italy) have all

offered loans, some on "soft" terms for defence purchases and civil projects. British firms are competing for two major reconstruction projects: the supply of generators for the Zouk B power station (NEI Parsons, worth £50m) and design, construction and equipping of a hospital (John Laing, worth £55m). Neither contract is likely to be awarded until a degree of political stability is restored. The Lebanese economy has been surprisingly resilient in recent years. Reserves are still strong, but the currency has weakened recently as optimism about the future has faded, and as the recession in the Gulf has begun to affect Lebanon's principal export earnings.

8. Reconstruction aid. There is no aid programme for Lebanon (which by normal development criteria does not qualify for ODA assistance). But HMG have pledged £2 million for aid for reconstruction. This remains provisionally pledged to an EC project for a water pipeline from Damour (5 miles south of the capital) to Beirut. The project has been delayed by the recent fighting. It is not yet known how much of the £2 million will be required for the project during this year's Community aid framework.

9. Sale of RAF Hunters. Earlier this year the Lebanese authorities approached us to seek supply of Mark 9 Hunters for their Air Force from the RAF. They were told that the RAF had no such aircraft available, although there were (and still are) a number of Mark 6A Hunters available for sale which would meet their requirements. Cabinet decided in September that the balance of argument lay against sale because of the delicate state of ceasefire negotiations and the danger of adding to the risks facing the British contingent of the MNF. It was left that if the Lebanese raised the matter again they should be stalled pending further ministerial discussion. Since then the Lebanese have continued their search for Hunters, approaching Qatar and Chile, but have not given up the prospect of obtaining Hunters direct from the RAF. President Gemayel raised the issue at an eve-of-visit press conference on 12 November. But the arguments against remain valid.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
13 December 1983

LEBANON: SITREP 1200Z 13 DECEMBER 1983

Military Situation

Beirut/Shouf. French member of MNF killed in Muslim West Beirut this morning when French Army convoy fired upon. Usual sporadic clashes between Lebanese Army and Druze in Shouf and between Lebanese Army and Shia militia in South Beirut. Otherwise generally quiet with reduced level of violence maintained following 9 December agreement to strengthen ceasefire. Lebanese Army representatives to return to Damascus soon for further ceasefire talks. Ceasefire Committee has not met since 2 December due to continued dispute over hostages. Another meeting planned for today. Airport remains closed.

South Lebanon remains tense. Israeli authorities yesterday reported to have summoned about 2,000 Lebanese and Palestinians formerly held in Ansar detention camp to warn them against hostile activity. Israelis are holding 30 people suspected of attacks on Israeli troops and arrested a further 8 at Palestinian refugee camp south of Sidon on 11 December. Isolated protests continue against detention.

PLO/Tripoli

Tripoli port reportedly cleared of ordnance by Lebanese authorities in preparation for evacuation of PLO loyalists. Lebanese authorities say 400 members of the internal security force and 300 men drawn from a local force will oversee operation. Arafat has apparently asked Syria and Saudi Arabia for air cover. The co-ordinating committee supervising the evacuation visited Damascus 11 December; received assurances that Syria would not disrupt operation. US has reiterated its support despite continued Israeli refusal to give guarantees of safe passage. But four Greek ships due to carry out evacuation have apparently still not left for Tripoli: Greeks still seeking guarantees.

VISIT TO UK BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL OF LEBANON: 13 - 15 DECEMBER

- 13 December pm : Arrive Heathrow.
- 14 December 1145 : Meeting with Foreign Secretary and Minister of State, Mr Luce, FCO.
- 1215 : Plenary with Prime Minister, followed by lunch with Prime Minister, Defence Secretary and Mr Luce.
- 1445 : Audience with HM the Queen.
- 1700 : Meeting with leaders of the Opposition, Rt Hon Neil Kinnock, MP, and Rt Hon Dennis Healey, MP.
- 1745 : Meeting with British-Lebanese Parliamentary Group.
- 15 December 1015 : Meeting with Rt Hon David Steel, MP.
- 1100 : Meeting with Rt Hon Dr David Owen, MP.
- 1300 : Meeting with press.

CALL BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, 14 DECEMBER

Press Line

1. Plenary session with Prime Minister, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Defence Secretary, followed by working lunch.
2. Discussion focussed on present situation in Lebanon. Full account by President Gemayel of efforts being made by Lebanese Government to carry forward reconciliation process begun at Geneva and to restore the government's authority throughout the country. The President also made clear importance he attached to HMG's support for the Lebanese government and to the peacekeeping role of the British contingent with the Multinational Force.
3. Prime Minister told President Gemayel that HMG would continue to support the Government of Lebanon in the essential task of reconciliation and in its efforts to restore Lebanese Sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

GEMAYEL, SHEIKH AMIN

President of the Republic of Lebanon
Born 1942. Son of Pierre Gemayel
Maronite

Studied Law at the Jesuit Université Saint Joseph, Beirut. Practised as a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Metn 1970. Re-elected 1972. Until 1982 a member of the Kataib Politbureau and a member of the Party's Standing Committee for Co-ordination with the Syrians. Director of the Party's Financial and Commercial Affairs. He ran an elaborate Research Organisation 'The House of the Future'.

A moderate and cautious man who tried to counter the militant influence of his late brother Bashir. A sort of 'Maronite Fabian', but his approach is conservative rather than radical. An astute politician who nurses his constituency carefully and takes out insurance on all sides. He has always kept his links with the Palestinians and the more sortable elements of the National Movement and was careful to see that he was not regarded as implicated in the murder of Suleiman Frangieh's son Tony in 1978. These are not necessarily the marks of a resolute man and in terms of political will he is still largely an unknown quantity.

A civil man with an agreeable and reasonable personality. He will listen to an argument before countering it. Does not instinctively begin by attacking the opposing attorney.

An effective orator. Speaks excellent French. His English is quite good but he has been rather shy about using it.

Married with two children. His wife, Joyce, is an attractive and charming woman who speaks good English as well as excellent French.

Major General Ahmed Al-Hajj

Born about 1924. Sunni Muslim.

Educated at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in Paris. Also holds degree in Political Science and Economics from University of Lebanon.

Entered Lebanese Military Academy, 1948 (of which he was Commandant in 1969.) Has held several important military positions, including Head of the Military Office at the Presidential Palace and Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Promoted Major General 1980. Last full-time military post was as Director General of the Internal Security Forces (a para-military force under the authority of the Minister of the Interior.) His only post abroad was as Military Attache at the Lebanese Embassy in Buenos Aires in the early 1970s.

A serious man, dedicated to the service of his country and one of Lebanon's best generals. It was largely due to his reputation for strictly fair dealing that the ISF avoided accusations of sectarian bias and was therefore able to operate in areas where the Lebanese armed forces were not acceptable to the local population.

Pleasant if somewhat severe manner with an underlying sense of humour. Married with 3 grown-up daughters. He and his wife speak French and English. He also speaks Spanish.



LEBANON: LEADING PLAYERS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND MILITIAS

POLITICIANSA. Participants at Geneva talks

- Opposition: (i) Walid Jumblatt. Druze. Leader of PSP (Progressive Socialist Party).
- (ii) Suleiman Franjeh. Maronite. Former President. Long-standing ally of Syria and sworn enemy of the Gemayel family.
- (iii) Rashid Karamé. Sunni. Former Prime Minister. Elder statesman of Tripoli, currently supervising PLO evacuation.
- (iv) Nabbih Berri. Shia. Leader of AMAL.
- Others : (v) Saeb Salam. Former Prime Minister. Leading exponent of Sunni 'establishment' view, and head of Rassemblement Islamique, a Sunni political organisation.
- (vi) Camille Shamoun. Maronite. Former President. Political rival of the Gemayels but in weakened position following liquidation of his militia.
- (vii) Pierre Gemayel. Maronite. Leader of the Phalange (Kata'eb) party.

B. Not represented at Geneva

- (viii) Raymond Eddé. Maronite. Preferred candidate for presidency of Muslim left. Opposed to the Gemayels, now living in self-exile in Paris.
- (ix) Hussein Mussawi. Radical Shia. Leader of breakaway Islamic AMAL based in Northern Bekaa, among chief suspects for recent suicide bomb attacks on US, French and Israeli troops.

PARTIES/MILITIAS


- (i) Kata'eb (also known as Phalange).
 Leader: Pierre Gemayel.
 Militia: Lebanese Forces (led by Fadi Frem).
 Most powerful political group in Lebanon. Membership predominantly Maronite. Close links with government and Lebanese Army.
- (ii) AMAL.
 Leader: Nabih Berri.
 Shia Militia and political grouping with widespread

/support



support amongst Lebanese Shia but losing some ground to fundamentalists.

- (iii) Islamic AMAL
Leader: Hussein Mussawi.
Favours creation of Islamic Republic in Lebanon.
Cooperates closely with Iran Revolutionary Guards based in Northern Bekaa. Attracting increased support from Lebanese Shia.
- (iv) Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
Leader: Walid Jumblatt
Druze militia and political organisation.
- (v) National Liberal Party
Leader: Camille Shamoun
Predominantly Maronite. Favours de-centralisation.
- (vi) National Salvation Front (NSF)
Coalition composed of Jumblatt, Franjieh and Karamé which together with Nabbih Berri's Amal constitutes main opposition at Geneva talks.



General Staff Map Section, GSGS 11045, Edition 32-GSGS July 1983

cf Sue Goodchild

GR 80

RESTRICTED

PS/NO 10 DOWNING

Street

RESTRICTED
DESKBY 130930Z
FM BEIRUT 130830Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 717 OF 13 DECEMBER 1983

DISTRIBUTION SELECTIONS
FILE COPY

MIPT: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S VISIT

1. LIST OF THOSE ACCOMPANYING THE PRESIDENT TO WHOM WE HAVE ISSUED VISAS IS AS FOLLOWS:

FAROUK JABRE

COLONEL MOHAMAD ADNAN EL KHALIL

SAIFEDDINE FEHMI

SAMI JOSEPH SFEIR

RAFIC CHELELA

MISS LAMA SAID HASSAN

BASSAM BECHARA BEYROUTHY

IBRAHIM JALKH

ELIAS ROBERT HELOU

ANTOINE HABIB DALATI

AGOP KEVORK TARKHONIAN

2. JABRE AND KHALIL ARE MENTIONED IN MY TUR. RAFIC CHELELA IS A SENIOR OFFICIAL AT THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND ANTOINE DALATI IS THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL PHOTOGRAPHER. I SUSPECT THAT THE REMAINDER ARE SECRETARIES OR BODYGUARDS.

PALMER
LIMITED
NENAD
MED
NEWS D
PROTOCOL D
PS
PS/MRLUCE
SIR J LEAHY
MREGERTON

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~2307022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/7/4

14th December 1983

Dear Sir,

LEBANON

I understand that you have asked for a note on events in the Lebanon yesterday. Following unsuccessful attacks from Syrian positions in the Metn Area on two US F-14 reconnaissance aircraft, a swift US response was mounted from two US ships which are understood to have fired about 50 rounds against pre-planned Syrian targets at Dahr al Baida. The US action is believed to have taken place at about 1530 hours local time, and its effectiveness is not yet known.

Also yesterday, Israeli ships shelled Tripoli from which the Arafat PLO forces hope to be evacuated. They are understood to have fired on both Syrian and Fatah loyalists targets. In a separate incident in Beirut, a French member of the MNF was shot in the course of patrolling and subsequently died.

Off-duty members of the British contingent were withdrawn onto HMS FEARLESS last night, and the same is planned for tonight.

*Yours ever
NHR*

(N H R EVANS)

A J Coles Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WITNESS LONDON SW1

14 DEC 1983



CONFIDENTIAL

LEBANON

A few questions for Gemayel:

1. When will Geneva talks resume? Will Syrians allow Jumblatt to attend? What are Gemayel's present relations with the Syrians? How does he see time scale? We will not withdraw precipitately but obviously cannot stay for ever. Has US/Israeli agreement made his life more difficult?
2. How does he intend to deal with the problem of the 17 May agreement? Will the Americans persuade the Israelis not to insist on it?
3. Who is behind the car bombings? Shi'ite militia on their own? Syrian Government? Iranian Government? Qaddafi? Does the Lebanese Deuxieme Bureau have any firm intelligence?

The Cases 14/12

14/12

19/12
 Israelis - shelling
 Tripoli

LEBANON: SITREP 10 00Z 14 DECEMBER

1 Beirut/Shouf. Quiet night 13/14 December. Usual sporadic small arms fire in Southern Beirut suburbs this morning. Airport remains closed but signs that agreement may soon be reached to re-open. Ceasefire committee failed to meet again yesterday (13 December); another meeting planned for today. 50 members of BRITFORLEB embarked on HMS Fearless night of 13/14 December; Commander BRITFORLEB has discretion to do this while threat to BRITFORLEB remains high. Reports that Druze siege of Deir al Kamar to be lifted 15 December: evacuation of 20,000 Christian refugees likely to take 4 to 5 days; majority are homeless and will go to reception centres in Christian East Beirut. Five-thousand residents will remain. Details of evacuation still under discussion. Unconfirmed suggestions that Israelis or Italian members of MNF may guarantee safe passage.

2 US shelling of Syrian Positions in Shouf. On 13 December two US ships shelled Syrian positions approximately 20 miles north-east of Beirut after two unarmed US F14s carrying out reconnaissance in the Metn area came under fire from Syrian SAM and anti-aircraft fire. No details of Syrian casualties or damage.

3 Kuwait bombings (13 December). Death toll has risen to 6 with over 60 injured (no American or French casualties). Iran has denied responsibility. US Secretary of State Shultz has said that the Kuwait and Beirut suicide bombings are linked. He refused to speculate about possible retaliation.

4 South Lebanon. Attacks continue on Israeli troops. Three wounded in roadside explosion South of Sidon on 13 December.

5 PLO/Tripoli. Israeli gunboats shelled Tripoli port 13 December. PLO loyalists returned fire. No casualties reported on either side and little apparent damage, although PLO claim one Israeli

/ship

CONFIDENTIAL



ship was hit (denied by Israelis). Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Levy quoted yesterday as saying Israelis would not give blessing to evacuation but would not interfere. US have reiterated support for evacuation without interference. PLO rebels have reportedly warned of new hostilities if Arafat and loyalists have not left by 21 December. Greek search for guarantees of safe passage continues.

CONFIDENTIAL