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FM U K MISSION NEW YORK 232003Z DEC '83

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO.1723 OF 23 DECEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME

ROUTINE MOSCOW TEL AVIV CAIRO DAMASCUS BEIRUT THE HAGUE.

Prime Minister

Constructive

MY I P T : LEBANON : ROLE OF UN FORCES.

Dmb

28/12

1. I TAKE UP WITH SOME DIFFIDENCE THE REQUEST IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELNO.923 FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WE MIGHT BUILD ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REMARKS. I AM NOT IN TOUCH WITH ANY POLICY MAKERS EXCEPT FOR YOU. FOR BETTER OR WORSE THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS NOT, AT LEAST ON THIS QUESTION, A POLICY MAKER. BUT HE IS A SHREWD OBSERVER AND LIKE THE REST OF US IN THE INNER CIRCLE IN NEW YORK HEARS A GREAT DEAL DAILY ABOUT THE ATTITUDES OF A WIDE VARIETY OF GOVERNMENTS.

mt

*Note: par's
comment accords
with view*

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL DOES NOT SEE ANY SIGN OF THE RUSSIANS OR SYRIANS BUDGING ON THE PROPOSITION THAT HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY CANVASSED FOR A UN PRESENCE IN THE CHOUF, THE BEKAA OR IN THE BEIRUT AREA. VAN DER STOEL SHARES THIS ANALYSIS, SEE MIPT. NOBODY IN THE INNER CIRCLE HERE WOULD SHARE CHEYSSON'S SUSPICION (PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELNO.924) THAT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN TRIPOLI AND SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF THE UN FLAG BETOKENS A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH.

MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE WITH WHOM I HAVE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION GIVES NO SUPPORT FOR THE CHEYSSON VIEW. (THE SOVIET POSITION IS ENTIRELY EXPLAINABLE IN TERMS OF THE TACTICAL HANDLING OF THE SYRIANS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL.) THE SOVIET REBUFF TO THE FRENCH REPORTED IN PARIS TELNO.1198 IS UNSURPRISING : THE FRENCH ARE RIGHT TO THINK THEY WILL NEED TO BE MORE 'IMAGINATIVE'. WE ARE STUCK WITHOUT A PROSPECT OF PROGRESS IF THE PRESENT PROPOSITIONS ARE MAINTAINED. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SEES NO WAY (RIGHTLY) OF GETTING ROUND THE SYRIAN/SOVIET ROADBLOCK IN TERMS OF UN PROCEDURES OR MANOEUVRES.

*Then we
should
bring it
into the open*

3. THE CONCLUSION IS THAT WE HAD BETTER TRY ANOTHER ROAD. THE SIGNPOST TO IT IS THE UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT IN THEORY THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD LEAVE THE LEBANON. IF THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS COULD MUTUALLY AGREE TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS, PROBABLY IN TWO STAGES, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT IT WOULD BE VETOED BY EITHER THE RUSSIANS OR THE AMERICANS. A FORMAL CAMP DAVID TYPE OF AGREEMENT IS OF COURSE OUT OF THE QUESTION. BUT THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS HAVE THROUGH DEVIOUS CHANNELS REACHED AGREEMENT IN THE PAST AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOW POSSIBLE (PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE SYRIAN VICTORY OVER ARAFAT) FOR THEM TO DO IT AGAIN. THIS IS WHERE THE UNITED NATIONS CAN PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE: NOT IN BRINGING THE AGREE

MENT ABOUT BUT IN PROVIDING THE GLUE TO MAKE IT STICK. I HAVE PARTICULARLY IN MIND THE PRECEDENT OF UNDOF IN GOLAN WHICH SHOWS THAT IF THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS REALLY WANT IT THEY CAN REACH A LASTING AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THE ROLE OF A UN FORCE. THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS VASTLY MORE COMPLICATED BUT THE PRINCIPLE STILL APPLIES

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THERE COULD ALSO BE A NEED FOR UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR WITHDRAWALS THOUGH SYRIAN SUSCEPTIBILITIES ABOUT OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OF ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO BE OBSERVED. PART OF THE PACKAGE DEAL WOULD BE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF AND A ROLE FOR UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE BEIRUT AREA. THIS WOULD BE UNWELCOME TO GEMAYEL BUT HE WOULD HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO LUMP IT IF IT WAS PART OF THE SYRIAN/ISRAELI DEAL. IT MIGHT WELL LEAD TO AGREEMENT OR RECONCILIATION. A SCHEME ON THESE LINES WOULD MEET A BASIC AMERICAN REQUIREMENT IN KEEPING THE SOVIETS PRETTY MUCH ON THE SIDELINES.

4. THE TEN UNDER AN ACTIVE FRENCH PRESIDENCY COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN PERSUADING THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS INTO SUCH A DEAL. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MIGHT BE PREPARED TO HELP UP TO A POINT. BUT SINCE MY SYRIAN AND ISRAELI COLLEAGUES ARE EACH UNSUITED TO SUCH A NEGOTIATION HE MIGHT HAVE TO GO TO THE AREA OR MEET EMISSARIES ELSEWHERE. ONCE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE APPROACHING AGREEMENT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BOUNCE THE PARTICIPANTS INTO FINAL AGREEMENT THROUGH SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION. IRRESPECTIVE OF THIS, A NEGOTIATION OF THE SORT SUGGESTED WILL NEED SECURITY COUNCIL RATIFICATION. THIS WOULD BE EASIEST DURING THE NEXT THREE MONTHS SINCE THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL DURING APRIL AND MAY WILL UNFORTUNATELY BE IN THE HANDS OF UKRAINE AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE THREE INTERVENING MONTHS THE PRESIDENTS WILL BE NICARAGUA, PAKISTAN AND PERU. ON THE QUESTION OF LEBANON, NICARAGUA WOULD PROBABLY BEHAVE REASONABLY AND THE OTHER TWO COULD BE HELPFUL.

5. IF AND WHEN WE FINALLY REACHED THE STAGE OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, THE THREE WESTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS (PERHAPS ALONG WITH EGYPT) WOULD HAVE A CRUCIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN ANY FINAL NEGOTIATIONS ON A TEXT. AT THIS STAGE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DEFINE EXACTLY WHAT THE CONTENT OF THE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE. BUT THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 895 (TO FCO ONLY) REMAINS IN MY VIEW, A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE BALANCE WHICH WE MIGHT SEEK TO ACHIEVE.

THOMSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED

MEMAD

MED

DEFENCE DEPT

FUSD

NEWS DEPT

UND

NAD

WED

SED

ECD(E)

FINANCE DEPT

PROTOCOL DEPT

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/FUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR EGERTON

MR JENKINS

COPIES TO:

MOD DS11

MR GOODALL) CABINET
SIR R ARMSTRONG) OFFICE

SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 December 1983

Role of UN Forces in Lebanon

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of UKMIS telegram 1723 of 23 December. In paragraph 2 of that telegram it is recorded that "the Secretary General sees no way (rightly) of getting round the Syrian/Soviet roadblock in terms of UN procedures or manoeuvres". The Prime Minister has commented on this passage: "Then we should bring it into the open".

DB

Peter Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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