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FROM: J W GRICE  
DATE: 1 December 1987

- Sp*  
1. SIR PETER MIDDLETON  
2. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

cc Chief Secretary  
Financial Secretary  
Economic Secretary  
Sir T Burns  
Sir G Littler  
Mr Cassell  
Mr Lavelle  
Mr Monck  
Mrs Lomax  
Mr Odling-Smee  
Mr Peretz  
Mr Sedgwick  
Mr R I G Allen  
Mr Bottrill  
Mr Hibberd  
Miss O'Mara  
Mr Riley  
Mr Pike  
Mrs Ryding  
Mr Cropper  
Mr Tyrie  
Mr Call

*Prime Minister*

*You may like to see  
this internal Treasury paper.  
The covering minute has some  
interesting points. Paragraph 27  
of the main paper discusses the  
forecast for MO. →*

*JW  
10/12.*

Mr George (B/E)  
Prof. Griffiths (No.10)  
Mr Lankester (Washingt  
File: MAMC F1

MONTHLY MONETARY ASSESSMENT: NOVEMBER 1987

This note reports the discussion at Sir Peter Middleton's regular meeting on monetary conditions on 1 December. Attached is the usually Monthly Assessment. There is a special annex on the behaviour of MO.

Sir Peter Middleton's meeting

2. Mr Cassell began the discussion by noting that the exchange rate and domestic monetary indicators were giving conflicting testimony about monetary conditions. Domestic indicators certainly made little case for lowering interest rates:

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(i) M0 was growing strongly, as it had been for some months, and could be above its target range by Budget time;

(ii) growth in both M4, and more especially M3, had accelerated in October, the main reason being the unsterilised intervention which had taken place. The forecasts suggest that there may be some further acceleration to come; equity issues have collapsed in the wake of the Stock Market fall, and companies may turn to the banking system for finance. By January, M4 and M3 might be about 17 per cent and 23½ per cent, respectively, above their levels 12 months earlier. Against this, the willingness of the private sector to hold liquidity had probably increased after the equity price fall;

(iii) recent indicators of activity were stronger than expected at the time of the Autumn Statement. On the other hand, the combined effect of a higher exchange rate, lower share prices and, offsetting, lower interest rates was probably contractionary. On balance, the Autumn Statement money GDP forecast for 1988-89 was probably still close to central. This would be above the MTFS path, mainly due to higher inflation.

3. But the exchange rate had been strong. The effective rate had risen about 1¼ per cent since the last Assessment (2 November) and on an oil-price adjusted basis, the rise was over 2½ per cent. It was possible that we might soon encounter the familiar problems of having to counter upward pressure on sterling, especially against the deutschemark. If so, there was a strong case for cutting interest rates quickly, rather than adding further liquidity via intervention. But any such interest rate cuts ought equally to be quickly

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reversed if the pressures on sterling themselves reversed.

4. Mr George saw little evidence of any downward pressure in inflation for the present. Since the last Assessment, most of the indicators suggested that activity before the equity price fall (19 October) was even stronger than we believed and the contractionary effect of the equity price fall itself was open to question. The immediate issue, however, was how to respond to upward pressure on the pound. This could come about quickly, particularly if the Bundesbank acted to cut its discount rate on Thursday. He agreed with Mr Cassell that market tactics would suggest early reductions in UK interest rates, rather than further heavy intervention, assuming the aim remained to keep the rate below 3.00 DM.

5. Sir Terence Burns took the same view about tactics in the event of upward pressure on the sterling/mark cross rate. But he noted that a stable rate against the mark had been consistent with a rising effective rate index, because of the falling dollar. If the dollar continued to fall, it was possible that the effective rate would remain strong, even if the pound eased away from 3 deutschemarks.

6. Other points to emerge in discussion were:

a. building societies' prospects appeared to have improved after the equity price fall. Both their retail deposits and their share of lending had improved;

b. there was a striking divergence in the sectoral purchases of gilts. Between June and October, the overseas sector had purchased some £5 billion net of public debt, whilst the non-bank private sector had been net sellers over this period. Institutions seemed, rather, to have preferred to buy equities.

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7. There followed a discussion of the policy of paying particular attention to sterling's rate against the deutschmark. The discussion focussed on the effectiveness of the policy in reducing inflation and its credibility. The main points were:

- (i) it was not necessary for sterling to rise against the mark in order to generate downward pressure on inflation. As in the last month, a falling dollar would lead to a rising effective rate with no change in the sterling - mark cross rate. The dollar probably still had some way to fall;
- (ii) the more <sup>difficult</sup> test of policy, however, would be posed not by any imminent upward pressure on sterling, but by the need to react to downward pressure if sentiment reversed. It would then be crucial to prevent any substantial fall against the mark to maintain the credibility of policy and downward pressure on inflation;
- (iii) although a stable cross rate against the mark should ultimately generate pressures towards lower inflation, the lags in the process were unclear. If outside perceptions of inflation were more pessimistic than warranted, then labour costs may rise excessively in the interim. This would make the eventual adjustment to lower inflation all the more painful;
- (iv) the credibility of the policy was therefore critical. But it was difficult to demonstrate resolve to prevent an excessive fall against the deutschmark when the actual pressures were the other way;
- (v) the fact that the economy was very liquid must increase the risk of a rapid fall in the exchange

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rate if confidence weakened.

8. Summing up, Sir Peter Middleton said that the basis for policy was a prolonged linkage of sterling to the deutschemark. The present situation was one of high liquidity, but where any inflationary consequences were checked by the high exchange rate. The outcome was not likely to be an immediate sharp decline in inflation, but the MTFs in any case allowed for a gradual reduction. There seemed to be two conclusions from this. First, every opportunity had to be taken for strengthening the credibility of the policy. Secondly, particularly given the liquidity of the economy, policy action would have to be swift and determined if the exchange rate started to fall.

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J W GRICE

## MONTHLY MONETARY ASSESSMENT : NOVEMBER 1987

Summary Assessment

Monetary conditions have tightened over the last month. The exchange rate has risen by about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent and, with oil prices falling, the oil adjusted rate has risen still further. Monetary growth tended to accelerate in October, especially M3, which of the broad aggregates was most affected by intervention. But this needs to be seen in the context of increased demand for liquidity in the wake of the equity price fall. The fall in share prices and latest rise in sterling - though partially offset by a one point reduction in interest rates - is, on balance, likely to be contractionary.

Main Points

At world level, the net effect of equity price falls and interest rate reductions has probably been disinflationary. Weak commodity prices suggest that inflationary pressures in the world economy are largely absent (paras 3, 5).

The 12 month growth rate of M0 in November fell back to 4.9 per cent, from 5.6 per cent in October and the growth rate is projected to fall further in December. (paras 25-27 and Annex I).

M4 grew by  $15\frac{3}{4}$  per cent in the year to October, an acceleration of about  $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent compared to September. For M3, the acceleration was greater - from  $19\frac{1}{2}$  per cent to  $22\frac{1}{4}$  per cent in the same respective months. Intervention effects probably explain most of this rise (paras 30, 42).

The exchange rate index rose from 74.6 to 76.4 mainly reflecting the weaker dollar. This occurred despite falling oil prices; the oil adjusted index rose by about  $3\frac{1}{4}$  per cent over the month. Nor were interest rates directly helpful; sterling's differential against the overseas basket declined from about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to  $2\frac{1}{4}$  per cent (paras 19-21).

Equity prices trended lower, declining a further 9 per cent. They now stand 36 per cent below the July peak. Institutional liquidity ratios have recovered from the low levels of the third quarter but are by no means exceptionally high (paras 49-52).

An Annex discusses the behaviour of M0. By the time of the next Budget it may be  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent or so above its target range. (Annex I).

## A. External Developments

The sharp falls in share prices since mid-October on all the world's major stock exchanges (table 3) ended the long bull market since 1982. Disappointing US trade figures, increases in interest rates in the US and Germany, and policy tensions among the G7 were factors which initially undermined confidence. But P/E ratios had risen to heights that were probably unsustainable, and an adjustment was likely to come sooner or later.

2. The authorities in most countries responded to the fall in share prices by easing monetary policy. **Short-term interest rates** declined by about 1½ percentage points in the US and by about a point in Germany (table 2). These declines reversed the rises in September and early October, and will act to offset to some extent the effects of the share price falls on aggregate demand. During the last week in November the German rate fell by a further quarter of a point, whereas the US rate rose by half a point. However the net effect is likely to be to reduce the growth of demand and activity in 1988. The Autumn Statement and the OECD's provisional forecast both put real growth at around 2 per cent next year.

3. The **dollar** fell markedly against all major currencies during November (see table 2(b)). At the end of the month, the effective exchange rate was 9 per cent below its Louvre Accord level and 4 per cent lower than a month earlier.

4. The 12 month rate of **consumer price inflation** in the G5 has risen from under 1 per cent at end of 1986 to 3 per cent in September (table 1). However this rise is largely attributable to the fact that the effects of last year's falls in oil and other commodity prices have largely worked through. Underlying inflationary pressures do not seem to have grown. Unit labour costs in manufacturing have fallen over the past year in the US, Japan and France, and have hardly risen in Germany. GNP price deflators have not accelerated significantly.

5. The behaviour of **commodity prices** (table 3(b)) is consistent with the judgement that inflationary pressures remain relatively weak. In real terms, they are barely any higher overall than on average in 1986.

## B. Activity and Inflation

6. Recent labour market indicators and CBI survey results have been particularly buoyant. Table 4 summarises recent indicators of **activity and inflation**. The Q3 GDP(O) estimate published on 19 November is a little above the Autumn Statement forecast. Retail price inflation was slightly higher than expected in October but is expected to fall back again in the last two months of 1987. Few indicators relevant to the period following the share price fall have been published as yet. Those that have show no signs of having been influenced by recent developments, though this is not unexpected given the likely lags between financial developments and economic activity.

### Recent indicators of activity

7. Preliminary estimates show a  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent rise in the output-based measure of **GDP** between the second and third quarters, with similar growth rates (all in the range  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to  $1\frac{3}{4}$  per cent) for the production, service and construction industries. Monthly figures for production industry output show a  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent fall in manufacturing output in September, after sharp rises totalling almost 2 per cent in July and August. The November **CBI survey** of manufacturers (conducted after the share price fall) continues to show buoyant order books and output expectations. After adjustment for seasonal variation, responses on both export order books and output expectations has risen sharply in November, and are only slightly below earlier peak figures seen in July and August respectively.

8. **Retail sales** continue to show strong growth, with a provisional  $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent increase in October. In the three months to October sales were nearly 3 per cent higher than in the previous three months. Private housing starts are provisionally estimated to have fallen 5 per cent in September, after a similar rise in August. Despite having recovered in part from a sharp second quarter fall, housing starts remain below peak first quarter levels. **Business capital expenditure** is provisionally estimated to have fallen back 5 per cent in the third quarter after relatively buoyant outturns in the first half of 1987. Little should be read into this downturn given the volatility of the series and the contrasting message on investment prospects coming from CBI and other business surveys.



Business spending on stocks is provisionally shown to have risen sharply in the third quarter.

9. Unemployment fell by 58,000 in October, a somewhat larger fall than in previous months. Overtime working rose strongly in September; it is now higher than the previous peak level of June. Vacancies rose 15,000 in October, significantly faster than in recent months.

#### Inflation

10. The outturn for retail price inflation in October was 4.5 per cent, compared to the 4.2 per cent in September. Although some rise had been expected in October, it turned out slightly higher than expected. RPI inflation is expected to fall sharply in November, as the large mortgage rate increase in November 1986 drops out of the year on year comparison.

11. The twelve month increase in the producer price index (excluding food, drink and tobacco) in October was 4.8 per cent, up 0.1 per cent from the (revised) estimate for September. CBI survey responses on manufacturers' price expectations - adjusted for seasonal variation - have drifted upwards through 1987 in line with the published figures for output price inflation. The November survey showed a further small rise, though the balance of respondents expecting to raise prices remains, as yet, significantly lower than in the previous peak year of 1984. Producer input prices (also excluding FDT) rose by 7.7 per cent in the year to October, down from 10.7 per cent in the year to September. This fall in the annual increase reflects a diminishing influence from the rapid increase in input prices last Autumn, together with a small fall in the level of input prices in the latest month.

12. Underlying growth in average earnings in September remained at  $7\frac{3}{4}$  per cent for the sixth successive month. Private sector settlements in the 1986-87 pay round just ended averaged around  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent lower than the outturn for the previous round. However, both manufacturing and service sector settlements have drifted upwards since the end of 1986.

13. The annual rate of house price inflation (measured by the Halifax index) rose to 16.2 per cent in November, compared to

14.5 per cent in October, after six successive months at around 14½ per cent. The DoE index for the third quarter showed a rise of 15 per cent over a year earlier, compared with 14.1 per cent in Q2. While the latest figures show an increase in house price inflation, the stock market crash will not yet have been reflected in the London figures and it is too early to say whether house price inflation has started to rise again. The Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors have reported falling sales and some over-priced properties in and around London recently, but an extremely buoyant market in the provinces. While the evidence is still very weak, some reduction in house price differentials between London and the rest of the UK could be expected following the stock market falls. The DoE housebuilding land price index increased by 48 per cent in the year to 1987 H1, the highest growth rate since the early 1970's property boom.

#### Projections for Money GDP

14. It has become increasingly clear that stronger than expected real activity would lead to an overshoot of the Budget forecast for 7½ per cent growth in **money GDP** in 1987-88. This was recognised in the Autumn Statement forecast, which showed a revised projection of 8½ per cent growth.

15. The fall in share prices and consequent policy response will affect economic prospects through 1988. Relatively little influence on activity or inflation is expected this year. The Autumn Statement forecast, which took account of the fall in share prices and the first half-point reduction in interest rates, assumed that, on balance, these factors would prove contractionary. This, coupled with some independent deceleration of real activity after above trend growth this year, was projected to yield 7¼ per cent money GDP growth in 1988-89 following 8½ per cent growth in 1987-88.

16. Prospects have not been fully re-assessed following the second half-point reduction in interest rates and the recent rise in sterling (the sterling effective index is currently about 5 per cent higher than As projections). However, it seems likely that, on balance, the combination of a 30 per cent fall in share prices, 10 per cent reduction in the level of interest rates (from 10 to 9 per cent), and 5 per cent appreciation of sterling remains

contractionary. Together these factors might be expected to lead to lower money GDP in 1988-89 than assumed in the Autumn Statement forecast. But against this, recent indicators of activity have proven stronger than expected. Overall, the Autumn Statement forecast probably remains close to a central one.

### C. Public Sector Finances and the Fiscal Stance

17. Table 5 gives the main indicators of the fiscal stance. The PSBR in October was a surplus of £1.0 billion, as compared with a forecast of a surplus of £1.2 billion. However, net privatisation proceeds were £0.6 billion lower than forecast, as a result of some of the proceeds from the BP sale expected in October being delayed until November. This brings the PSBR for the first seven months of 1987-88 to £0.5 billion, which is £3.1 billion below the Budget profile. Of this difference, central government own account borrowing is around £2.3 billion below profile - Table 6 gives details. Local authorities' borrowing is about £0.5 billion below, and public corporations' borrowing about £0.4 billion below, profile. Comparison of the outturn so far this year with the previous year is affected by significant changes in the level and pattern of privatisation proceeds. If privatisation proceeds are excluded, borrowing in April to October has been around £3 billion lower than for the same period in 1986-87.

18. The October outturn for the PSBR does not cast any major doubt on the internal October forecast of a PSBR surplus of about £1 billion for 1987-88 as a whole. Thus last month's assessment of the **fiscal stance** in 1987-88 still stands, subject to the provision that any use of the BP buy-back option will increase the PSBR. Since most investors will wait until close to the expiry date of the option before selling shares to the Bank, the extent of the Bank's liability remains unknown, although the maximum £1½ billion is unlikely to be reached given the Kuwaiti's increased share holding recently. In any case, the PSBR appears to be turning out considerably tighter than envisaged at Budget time, even after allowing for the automatic tightening associated with higher than expected activity, and so fiscal policy would not appear to be contributing directly to the higher than expected growth of output.

#### D. UK Exchange Rate and External Accounts

19. The **sterling index**, which rose by  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent during October as the dollar fell in the wake of the stock market fall, has risen a further  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, to  $76\frac{1}{2}$ , since the beginning of November as the dollar has continued to weaken. Against the Deutschemark the rate has been relatively steady, rising to just over 2.99 from 2.98 at the beginning of November.

20. The rise in the sterling index in November occurred despite a further slight narrowing of the interest rate differential against the world basket, to  $2\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. UK three month **interbank rates** have fallen by nearly  $\frac{1}{2}$  percentage point since the beginning of November. Over the same period US and German rates have fallen by a similar amount but Japanese rates have been relatively steady and French rates have risen by  $\frac{1}{2}$  percentage point, even after the recent concerted  $\frac{1}{4}$  point reduction in European rates.

21. A further fall in the Brent spot oil price over the past month may have helped to remove some of the upward pressure on the DM/£ rate which was evident in September and October. The Brent price has fallen by nearly \$1 a barrel since early November, to around \$17 $\frac{3}{4}$  a barrel, largely in response to an easing of Gulf tension and excessive supplies in stock and in transit to North America and Europe. As a result the **oil adjusted reference ratio** has risen by a further  $3\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. However given the weakness of the dollar over this period, which implies a larger fall in the oil price in sterling than in dollar terms, the conventional oil adjusted reference ratio may understate the downward effect on inflation of oil price and exchange rate movements in November.

22. In the absence of strong upward pressure on sterling against non-dollar currencies, spot and forward market **intervention** in November amounted to \$ 180 million.

23. The October **trade figures**, published on 24 November, showed a current account deficit of £282 million compared with a deficit of £17 million in September. The rise in the deficit reflects some fall in export volumes while import volumes were little changed. The underlying upward trend in non-oil import volumes remains faster than the upward trend in exports.

## E. Domestic Monetary and Financial Market Developments

(see Tables 10 to 26)

24. The development of domestic monetary indicators needs to be seen in the light of the sharp fall in equity prices. This will have had two related effects. First, the fall in private sector wealth and the implied increase in company borrowing costs will have reduced demand for goods and services in money terms. Secondly, there is likely to have been some upwards shift in liquidity preference, or perhaps more generally away from equities towards assets such as gilts and property, as well as money. This is liable to last at least until the equity market looks less fragile, the implication being that the volume of liquidity which will be willingly held has probably risen appreciably.

### Narrow Money

25. M0 developments since the last assessment are much as expected, with buoyant notes and coin growth continuing in November, albeit at a slower pace than the rapid growth of recent months. The annual growth rate of M0 in October and November was about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  percentage points above what was anticipated at Budget time (see chart 7), providing further evidence that activity is currently well above the Budget projections. With interest rates falling by a further  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent during November, leaving them below the Budget projection, the overshoot of M0 growth is expected to increase over the rest of the financial year, despite some moderation in the pace of M0 growth in Q1 1988. Annex I examines in more detail the likely factors responsible for the current overshooting of M0 growth relative to the Budget projections and the outlook for the rest of 1987-88, together with an assessment of the implications for monetary conditions. Broadly, most of the overshoot can be accounted for by the increased level of real activity compared to what was expected at Budget time. Some of this excess is probably cyclical, but a part of it may represent improved supply side performance, which in principle might have allowed us to set the target range  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent or so higher. This may be an important consideration in a presentational context because by the 1988 Budget M0 might be about

$\frac{1}{2}$  per cent above the top of its target range.

26. **M0** (seasonally adjusted) rose by 0.3 per cent in November, and the 12 month growth rate fell back to 4.9 per cent, from 5.6 per cent in October. The fall in the 12 month rate reflects both the brisk growth of M0 in November 1986 and erratic movements in bankers' balances a year ago. The annualised growth rate of notes and coin (and M0) in the latest 3 months was about  $7\frac{1}{4}$  per cent, compared to 8 per cent in the 3 months to **October**.

27. The **forecast** assumes very buoyant growth of M0 in December - partly reflecting seasonal influences - although the 12 month growth rate falls back to about  $4\frac{1}{4}$  per cent, reflecting the exceptional growth of M0 in December 1986. But the twelve month rate of M0 is forecast to rise rapidly during Q1 1988, exceeding the target range in February, as the falls in the level of M0 during Q1 1987 drop out of the 12 month comparisons. The overshoot compared with the Budget projections is expected to rise steadily from its current  $1\frac{1}{2}$  percentage points in November to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  points in March.

28. **NIB M1** rose by £0.2 billion (£1.5 billion seasonally adjusted) in October and the annual growth rate rose to 12.0 per cent, from 6.1 per cent in September, the low September figure reflecting the upward distortion of the TSB sale on NIB M1 in September 1986. Interest-bearing sight deposits rose by £2.5 billion in October - the largest increase since March, although it is likely any effects of the BP sale (see below) will have been concentrated in IB sight deposits. Together with the £0.2 billion increase in NIB M1, this gives a £2.7 billion (£4.1 billion seasonally adjusted) increase in M1, with the 12 month growth rate jumping up to nearly  $24\frac{1}{2}$  per cent in October, from  $20\frac{1}{4}$  per cent in September.

#### Broad Money

29. Broad money growth in October was the highest since March and 12 month growth rates of all the broad aggregates rose, partly reflecting the effects of the TSB share sale on the broad aggregates a year ago. The demand for money is likely to have been boosted

by sterling's firmness during October and possibly, to a lesser extent, by the stock market falls inducing a portfolio shift towards liquidity. The sterling supplied by the authorities through the record level of intervention during October does not seem to have led to any loosening of monetary conditions, as the fall in short rates during October suggests that the increased supply of sterling was being held willingly.

30. **M4** rose by £5.2 billion (1.8 per cent) in October and the 12 month growth rate rose to 15¾ per cent, from 15 per cent in September. **M3** rose by £5.5 billion (3.1 per cent) whilst its 12 month growth rate rose sharply to 22¼ per cent, from 19½ per cent in September.

31. With respect to the **M4 components**, holdings of M3 by the private sector excluding building societies rose by £4.1 billion, compared to an average of £2.0 billion over the previous twelve months. Bank deposits may have been inflated by several factors connected with the BP sale: the CG payment to BP of £1.5 billion for part of the share issue (which took place late on 30 October, BP placing most of this on deposit); a build-up of deposits by underwriters prior to paying £1.5 billion early in November; and possibly an earlier build-up of deposits by potential BP investors not reversed by the end of the month. In addition, recorded reserves rose by £3.9 billion in October and much of this is likely to have fed through into M3 (see para 42). There is no firm evidence that the October money figures are affected by the stock market crash, although the unit trusts may have been building up liquidity in anticipation of withdrawals (see para 50). Private sector retail deposits with the building societies rose by £1.1 billion in October, while their wholesale deposits were unchanged.

32. With respect to the **M3 components**, apart from the £4.1 billion increase in M3 by the non-bank non-building society private sector, building societies increased their bank deposits by £1.4 billion - the largest increase on record - which largely explains the higher M3 flow than of M4 in October. Some of this increase in building society bank deposits may have been in

anticipation of withdrawals for the BP sale, which in the event did not occur, although the societies have been accumulating liquidity fairly steadily over the past year, their bank deposits rising by an average of £0.4 billion per month in the year to September.

33. Building society **retail inflows** in October were, at an estimated £750 million excluding interest credited, the highest so far this year. This can be attributed largely to seasonal factors, although whether in the light of equity market developments such factors apply as in former years is open to question. The much vaunted boost to societies from the flight from, and continued unattractiveness of, equity and unit trusts (plus the short term return of funds set aside for BP) probably figured somewhat (possibly £150 million) in the October figures, but the major benefit has been felt in the first three weeks of November when over £720 million was taken by the 15 largest societies. Societies also borrowed heavily (£535 million) in October on the wholesale markets. Most of this will represent packages set up prior to the falls in equity prices to cope with heavy expected outflows from the BP sale, although some borrowing may also have occurred in expectation of a lifting in the 20 per cent limit on non-retail funding by societies close to that limit. The period since the stock market falls has seen fairly heavy redemptions by societies of wholesale liabilities.

34. As a result of these factors, societies ended the month with a substantial (£700 million) build up of liquid assets, especially bank deposits. Societies also made net disposals of £¼ billion gilts. In market conditions favouring gilts investment this was unexpected, particularly since it is rumoured that at least two large societies were net purchasers. A number of factors may underlie this, including the following:

- Some societies may have been profit-taking from substantial investment over the summer following the rise in gilts prices with the October base rate cut.
- Selling to provide extra cover against BP related outflows.



- The prospective redemption of the 12/87 gilt and the movement to XD status of £2.6 billion of 1988 gilts in October and November will have triggered selling since societies hold predominantly short dated gilts and tend to sell those prior to such events. Societies did not fully reinvest the proceeds within October.

35. The M3 and M4 forecasts are tentative because of uncertainties over the monetary effects of the shake-out in equity prices and the BP sale. It is assumed that the fall in equity prices will have an expansionary effect on broad money as liquidity preferences increase, with the counterpart being substitution into bank borrowing from equity finance by companies. It is assumed that the expansionary effect of the BP sale in October will unwind in November. On these assumptions annual growth rates of M3 and M4 are forecast to remain unchanged in November at 22 per cent and 15½ per cent respectively.

#### Credit

36. Bank and building society lending rose by £4.1 billion (1.3 per cent) in October, compared with an average of about 1½ per cent over the previous 12 months. The annual growth rate of lending is estimated at 19.2 per cent in October, compared to 20.0 per cent in September.

37. Sterling bank lending grew by 1.5 per cent in October and at an annual rate of nearly 23 per cent, compared to 23½ per cent in the 12 months to September. One known special factor - the unwinding of a temporary loan made in September - will have depressed the October lending figure of £2.9 billion by £½ billion. Allowing for this special factor, bank lending was at its average rate of increase in October compared to the previous twelve months. However, foreign currency lending rose sharply (by £3.5 billion) compared to an average rise of £1 billion over the previous 12 months. It is likely that at least some of this increase in foreign currency borrowing by the private sector represents either speculative or hedging activity, with the private sector increasing its net currency bank borrowing and switching into sterling (a counterparty being

the EEA) on the expectation of sterling's appreciation.

38. Within sterling bank lending, advances increased by £2.8 billion, lending to GEMM's rose by £0.4 billion and lending via monetary sector holdings of commercial bills fell by £0.5 billion - the latter possibly reflecting the unattractiveness of fixed rate bill finance to companies when rates are falling. Returns from the London and Scottish retail banks show that of their total sterling advances of £1.7 billion, lending for house purchase rose by £0.7 billion - much in line with recent months - while other personal lending (£0.2 billion) was the smallest rise since February. Of the CLSB banks' total foreign currency advances of £1.5 billion, most was accounted for by hotels and catering (£0.7 billion - largely for overseas investment) and by unit trusts, insurance companies and pension funds (£0.8 billion - possibly reflecting hedging activity).

39. When account is taken of seasonal factors, **building societies' mortgage lending**, of £1.5 bn unadjusted, continued its slow recovery in October as the final boost of August's return to price competitiveness with the banks was felt. Lending may have been somewhat restrained in early October as the possibility of a loss of funds to the BP sale induced caution. But the possibility of a change in the limit on non-retail funding may have encouraged societies to avoid further losses of market share, as evidenced by their willingness to indulge in substantial wholesale borrowing (see para 33) and to sell their less liquid non-mortgage assets.

#### Other Broad Money Counterparts

40. A PSBR surplus of £1.0 billion was **underfunded** by £1.8 billion, largely reflecting a £3.9 billion recorded increase in the reserves and CG debt sales of £1.3 billion overseas, with no change in public sector debt sales to the non-bank private sector. Cumulative underfunding has been £3¼ billion in 1987-88 so far. The building societies made large (£¾ billion) disposals of gilts in October (see para 34). Hence, the **public sector contribution to M4** was,

at £1.1 billion, less expansionary than to M3. The cumulative public sector contribution to M4 is £2½ billion in 1987-88 so far. The M4 **externals** were expansionary by £3.3 billion and **ENNDL's** of the banks and building societies were contractionary by £0.6 billion.

41. Public and banking sector **external transactions** were expansionary by £3.4 billion in October, largely reflecting the £3.9 billion recorded increase in the reserves. The effect of the intervention on broad money growth is examined below.

Intervention and the External Counterpart of M3 in October

	£ billion
Recorded change in reserves*	3.9
Change in the Forward book*	0.9
Total Intervention	<u>4.8</u>
External Counterparts to M3	3.4
"Usual" external counterparts	-0.3
Abnormal external counterparts	<u>3.7</u>

\* Including swaps and off-market transactions

42. The effect of the intervention on M3 in October, as measured by the "abnormal external counterparts", was less than the total intervention itself. Part of the explanation will have been that some of the sterling sold by the EEA will have been taken up by overseas residents and banks - which switched out of foreign currency in October and into sterling assets (see para 43) - and hence will not have added to M3. On the other hand, it seems likely that the counterparties to the swaps carried out by the EEA - namely buying sterling spot but selling it forward, which reduces recorded intervention compared to the total - were largely banks, which switched out of sterling to the extent of £2.7 billion in October. The spot sterling sold by the banks to the EEA as part of the swap will not have reduced M3. Hence it seems likely that most of October's intervention has fed through directly into M3.

43. Apart from the overseas sector increasing its net sterling bank deposits (by about £2 billion) in October, it also made a further net purchase of over £1½ billion of gilts and Treasury bills. Between June and October, the overseas sector has made net purchases of £5 billion of public sector debt, in contrast to the private sector which has been a net seller of gilts and TB's over the period.

44. The £NNDL's counterpart to M4 was contractionary by £0.6 billion in October, reflecting the large wholesale funding of the building societies during the month. The £NNDL's counterpart to M3 was expansionary in October by £0.1 billion.

#### M5

45. M5 grew by £5.3 billion (1.7 per cent) in October and at an annual rate of 15 per cent, compared to 14½ per cent in September. The lower annual growth rate of M5 compared to M4 is explained by a £1 billion fall in private sector holdings of local authority debt and tax instruments over the past twelve months.

#### Money Markets and Interest Rates

46. **Money market rates** started November at 9.4 per cent across the yield curve, falling to about 9 per cent after the base rate cut on 4 November. Rates have since held fairly steady and currently range from 8.9 per cent at one month to 9.1 per cent at twelve months.

47. The stock of **money market assistance** was little changed at £5.4 billion in October, with the £4 billion increase in the reserves offset by several factors, including a CG surplus (£¼ billion) and strong purchases of gilts (£1½ billion), CTDs (£¼ billion) and Treasury bills (£½ billion). The rise in market holdings of Treasury bills reflected the introduction of an extra tender of £500 million of 9 week Treasury bills at the end of October, and with the continuation of the tender in November the market is forecast to purchase a further £1¼ billion this month. When the bills mature, the need for commercial bill purchases will be reduced by about

£½ billion in December and £1½ billion in January, thereby smoothing the money-market assistance profile. The level of assistance is forecast to rise to £7¼ billion in November and in December before rising to about £10¼ billion by the end of January (see Table 25).

48. **Gilts** began November with the index at 90.1, and 5, 10 and 20 year par yields at 9.1, 9.5 and 9.3 per cent respectively. Prices were lifted by the base rate cut on 4 November, with the index reaching a peak of 92.8 on 9 November, before falling back again to end the month little changed. The Gilt Index now stands at 90.3, and the 5, 10 and 20 year par yields at 8.8, 9.3 and 9.3 per cent respectively. Yields have fallen slightly at the short end, steepening the yield curve, during November. Index-linked stock has been in demand. Real yields on index-linked have fallen by around ½ per cent to around 2.6 per cent at the short end, 3.8 per cent at the long end. Breakeven inflation rates of Index-linked Treasury 1990 and 2006 are currently 3.8 and 5.5 per cent respectively, compared with 3.2 and 4.9 per cent at of October. The equity dividend yield (based on the all-share index) has risen to around 4.7, having begun the month at 4.2.

#### Capital Markets and Corporate Finance

(see tables 20-21)

49. **Equity prices** (measured by the FT All Share Index) continued to slide in early November, the index reaching a low of 785 on 10 November, with falls often reflecting events in the US and Japan. Equity prices had then fallen by one-third since 16 October and were back to their levels of October 1986. Prices recovered slightly in mid-November but have since fallen back again, reflecting the weakness of the dollar. The index now stands at 796, 36 per cent below its July peak.

50. Net sales of **unit trusts** fell back sharply in October to £¼ billion, having been a record £1¼ billion in September and £3 billion in the third quarter. Assuming that net sales remained high until the middle of October it is likely that unit trusts experienced net withdrawals of some £¼ billion in the second half of October. Nevertheless, unit trusts' liquidity may be

exceptionally high if, as press reports suggest, they have sold large volumes of company securities in response to the stock market crash. Assuming sales of £2 billion of securities, units trusts' liquidity ratio in mid November might have jumped to about 15 per cent, from about  $7\frac{1}{4}$  per cent in Q3 and an average of about 5 per cent since 1979.

51. The latest firm data for the liquidity of **pension funds and life companies** relate to the second quarter of 1987. At that point their liquidity ratio was historically quite low at about 3 per cent for pension funds and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent for life companies, although their liquid assets stood at high levels (£8 $\frac{1}{4}$  billion and £5 billion, respectively). It is likely that pension funds' liquidity ratio fell further in the third quarter, perhaps to about 3 per cent, due to purchases of some of the record £8 billion of net capital issues. Early estimates of life companies' investments in the third quarter suggest that their liquidity may have risen a little, to about  $2\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. Since Q3, there has been a further £1 billion of net capital issues in addition to the BP sale, and anecdotal information suggests that pension funds and life companies have not been heavy sellers of equities since the stock market crash. Thus, although the fall in equity prices will have raised liquidity ratios by reducing the value of total assets, it is unlikely that they have yet risen much above 4 per cent, which is probably well below the institutions' desired level.

52. Pressure on institutions' liquidity from capital issues is likely to have eased very considerably since early November, with negligible equity issues and only a moderate pick-up in Eurosterling issues since then (see paras 53-54). No further equity issues are expected in November and December.

53. UK commercial companies raised a total of £1.7 billion net sterling finance in October from the domestic capital and eurosterling markets, compared to £2.5 billion in September and a monthly average of £1.5 billion in the rest of 1987. The fall in capital market issues since September largely reflects the decline in equity net issues, which fell to £1.4 billion in October, from

£2.0 billion the previous month (the October figure including £0.5 billion raised by BP in the form of a partly paid £1½ billion rights issue). Equity issues in the first half of November were negligible, and it seems likely that in the face of continuing stock market weakness, they will remain subdued for some time. In addition, the total of capital issues in the queue and those announced but not raised has fallen back by over £4½ billion between 1 October and 20 November, to stand at £4 billion, and little of this is expected to go ahead in the remainder of 1987. With companies expected to have a healthy demand for finance in the rest of the financial year, the weakness of the stock market may lead companies to increase their bank borrowing at least temporarily reversing the observed trend towards securitisation since 1984.

54. Eurosterling issues by UK companies in October were £250 million, most of which was by mortgage companies in the floating rate market. Mortgage companies have issued £1 billion of floating rate notes so far this year, reflecting their increasing share of the mortgage market (currently estimated to be about 10 per cent). In November so far, UK financial companies have raised a further £525 million. In the wake of the stock market falls and lower interest rates, activity in the euromarkets is likely to remain at higher levels in the coming months.

55. The stock of **sterling commercial paper** (SCP) outstanding rose by £150 million in October, to £2.3 billion, with net issues by UK companies of £110 million pushing the stock up to £1.6 billion. Monetary sector holdings of SCP rose by £50 million to £0.7 billion.

**MG2 Division**  
**1 December 1987**

## Monetary developments since last month's report

Latest outturns available at time of:

	Apr Report	Oct Report	Nov Report
<b>Monetary aggregates (12 month % growth)</b>	<b>(Mar)</b>	<b>(Sept)</b>	<b>(Oct)</b>
M0 (sa)	4.1	4.9	5.6(4.9) <sup>+</sup>
M3	19.0	19.5	22.2
M4	13.9	14.9	15.7
M5	13.4	14.3	15.1
Bank lending	20.7	23.5	22.7
Bank & building society lending (est)	19.1	20.0	19.2
<b>Interest rates (%)</b>	<b>30 Apr</b>	<b>2 Nov</b>	<b>30 Nov</b>
3 month interbank	9.3	9.3	8.9
20 year gilt-edged (par yield)	8.8	9.3	9.3
Yield gap	0.5	0.0	0.4
3 month overseas basket	6.3	6.7	6.7
3 month interbank/euro dollar differential	2.3	1.6	1.0
Real 3 month interbank	5.1	5.1	4.7
Equity dividend yield (all-share)	3.3	4.2	4.7
IG yields (2001) assuming 5% inflation	3.7	4.5	3.9
<b>Exchange rate</b>			
ERI	73.2	74.6	76.4
Oil adjusted reference index	72.8	73.1	72.4
ERI/reference rate ratio*	100.5	102.1	105.5
<b>Asset prices</b>			
FT-A Index (% pa)	25.4	8.0	-1.4
FT-A Level (July peak: 1239)	1024	876	796
Halifax house index (% pa)**	14.5	14.5	16.2

<sup>+</sup> Provisional November outturn

<sup>\*</sup> indicates what ERI would be if exchange rate simply responded to oil prices in the ratio 1:4. In determining the reference rate the base taken is the Jan '83 - Nov '85 average for the ERI and oil price.

<sup>\*\*</sup> figures are for April, October and November



## THE BEHAVIOUR OF M0

Recent Monthly Assessments have drawn attention to the disturbing signs that M0 have been showing in the last few months. In the past, M0 has been a good current indicator of money GDP - and is available some months before the money GDP data itself. It may also be a useful forward indicator of monetary conditions though the evidence is less clear-cut. Reflecting this, M0 is now the only monetary aggregate to have target status so it has considerable presentational importance as well. This annex looks at its recent and prospective behaviour in more detail.

### The Brisk Growth of Recent Months

2. Table 1 shows how M0 has moved in the current financial year to date. Month to month growth rates are liable to be affected by erratic movements in bankers' balances and so it also looks at the behaviour of notes and coin alone, which is probably a better guide to underlying conditions.

Table 1: Growth of M0 in 1987-88 to Date

	Seasonally adjusted, per cent			
	12 month growth		3 month annualised growth	
	M0	Notes & Coin	M0	Notes and Coin
April	4.8	4.6	0.5	-0.8
May	4.4	4.5	5.6	4.6
June	4.2	4.6	4.6	7.3
July	5.4	4.7	7.6	6.9
August	4.7	4.6	6.8	7.5
September	4.9	5.0	9.5	8.2
October	5.6	5.2	6.9	7.9
November	4.9	4.8	7.1	7.2

3. M0's 12 month growth rate has remained within the 2-6 per cent target range, as has that for notes and coin. But this owes much to the relatively rapid increase in M0 in the second half of 1986. Three month annualised growth rates, perhaps a better indicative of current behaviour, have been around 7-9 per cent consistently over the last few months. In consequence, M0 is now appreciably above the level indicated by its expected growth profile at Budget time; by November to the extent of about 1½ percentage points. (See Chart 7 of the main paper).

The Prospects for the Rest of the Financial Year

4. In the immediate future, there seems little prospect of a significant reversal of the current brisk growth in M0. Table 2 shows the expected path over the rest of the year.

Table 2: M0 Prospects for the Rest of the Year

		Percentage Change Over 12 Months		
		Current forecast*	FSBR Projection	Change
1988	December	4.3	2.3	2.0
	January	5.4	3.2	2.2
	February	6.6	4.3	2.3
	March	6.5	4.1	2.4

\* Projections produced by MPl Division based on the Autumn Statement forecast but modified to allow for the effect of the equity price falls.

As table 2 reveals, by the end of the year M0 is expected to be growing by about 6½ per cent over the previous year. This would be about 2¼-2½ per cent greater than expected at the time of the 1987 Budget and ½ per cent above the top of the target range.

Reasons for the Faster M0 Growth

5. Several factors are likely to have contributed to the unexpectedly rapid growth of M0:

(i) Activity has been rising at a faster rate than the Budget projections allowed for. By 1988 Q1 real GDP is expected to be 4¼ per cent higher than a year before against 2¼ per cent in the Budget projections. Consumer spending, which is particularly relevant to M0, is now expected to rise by 6½ per cent between 1987 Q1 and 1988 Q1: the corresponding increase in the Budget forecast was 3¼ per cent;

(ii) inflation, by contrast, is expected to be little different over the year as a whole. Consumer prices, which are probably the most important to M0, have been recorded

to date as lower than expected at Budget time (though this seems not wholly plausible and later upward revision cannot be ruled out). Some acceleration is expected by the end of the year and by 1988 Q1 consumer prices are projected to be  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent higher than a year previously, the same increase as in the Budget forecast;

(iii) interest rates in the financial year to date have been below the Budget projections, by an average of about  $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. This has reduced the incentive to economise on non-interest bearing assets such as those included in M0 and has thus added to the rise;

(iv) taken together these factors account for only part of the excess rise in M0. Some of the remainder may have risen because of unanticipated changes in the pace of financial innovation - a process which, so far as M0 is concerned, is likely to be uneven over time. But there is no reliable or timely data to confirm or refute this.

6. Using what is known about the determinants of M0, it is possible to make a rough quantitative assessment of the impact of the various factors discussed above.

	<u>Nov 1987</u>	<u>Mar 1988</u>
<u>M0 12 Month Growth Rate:</u>		
Expected at Budget Time	$3\frac{1}{2}$	4
Outturn/Current Expectation	5	$6\frac{1}{2}$
Excess	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$
<u>Due to:</u>		
Higher Activity	$+ \frac{1}{2}$	$+1\frac{1}{4}$
Higher Prices	-1	-
Interest Rates	$+ \frac{1}{2}$	$+ \frac{1}{2}$
Financial Innovation/Unexplained	$+1\frac{1}{2}$	$+ \frac{3}{4}$

### Implications

7. The substantive implications of the overshoot in M0 are not straightforward. In one sense, all of the excess growth

to the end of November is unexplained. Higher activity and lower interest rates than expected at Budget time each explain about  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of extra M0 growth. But this is exactly offset by the effect of the recorded lower consumer prices. On the other hand, it seems possible that both real consumer spending and the consumer price level may be revised up in future CSO estimates. That would leave a lower unexplained component, with buoyant real activity as the major factor accounting for the high M0 growth.

8. On present estimates, higher prices directly have not contributed to the M0 overshoot and unless future upward revisions to consumer price estimates are very large then that looks likely to continue to hold. If one also takes the view that the higher real activity reflects, at least in part, a better supply side performance than seemed probable at Budget time, so that it is sustainable and not a harbinger of future inflation, then the M0 overshoot would not be a cause of major concern. With hindsight there might, on that view, have been a case for a higher M0 target range since faster M0 growth would have proved consistent with the Government's inflation objectives. On the other hand, if the real activity is purely cyclical storing up inflationary pressures, then M0's behaviour must be a matter of more concern.

9. This is a critical issue and also a difficult one. The good trade performance in the early part of the year led some outside commentators to conclude that there had been a significant upward shift in productive potential. But the more recent deterioration in net trade performance suggests that any such shift is probably quite small. The behaviour of productive potential will obviously have to be assessed in detail in preparation for the 1988 MTFS. But, on present evidence, the warranted increase in the M0 range for 1987-88 looks to be modest: perhaps of the order of  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. It seems more likely, therefore, that the extra activity is temporary and ultimately unsustainable. It may be that the inflationary pressure that this might have been expected to generate has been masked to date by a higher exchange rate than would have been anticipated given domestic monetary indicators. But the continuation of the high exchange rate cannot be taken for granted and, to this extent, the rapid growth in M0 is disturbing.

10. Apart from these substantive worries, there may also be a presentational problem. On present projections, the last published figures before the next Budget (for February 1988) will show M0 outside the target range.

**BROAD MONEY FORECAST**

1A. The M3 And M4 forecasts are tentative because of uncertainties over the monetary effects both of the shakeout in equity prices and the BP sale. Using the assumptions listed below, M3 and M4 are forecast to grow in November by 1.4 percent and 1.1 per cent respectively, with annual growth remaining unchanged at 22 per cent for M3 and 15 3/4 per cent for M4. Annual growth rates are expected to rise further in the following two months.

2A. Special factors affecting the forecast are set out in Table 1. It is assumed that the fall in equity prices will have an expansionary effect on broad money, as liquidity preferences increase. The counterpart to the increased liquidity preference is assumed to be increased bank borrowing by both the private sector and the overseas sector (with expansionary effects on lending and the externals respectively) as companies substitute bank borrowing for equity finance. It is assumed that the effect on bank lending to the UK private sector is £¼ billion per month on the basis that, with equity issues falling to zero from an average of £½ billion per month (see main text), two-thirds of companies will postpone borrowing for three months, while of the remainder, half will substitute into bond issues and half into bank borrowing. It is assumed that the effect on overseas companies' sterling bank borrowing will also be £¼ billion per month. With respect to BP, it is assumed that the expansionary effect in October will unwind in November as the remaining proceeds are paid over. It is further assumed that the Bank of England will not buy significant amounts of shares under the support arrangements.

3A. The lending forecast assumes that underlying seasonally adjusted bank lending grows by 1.6 per cent (about £3 1/4 billion), and building society lending by 1.1 per cent (about £1 1/2 billion), per month. Special factors superimposed on the underlying forecast are set out in Table 2. It is assumed that the stock market crash will boost bank lending by about £1/4 billion per month (as explained above). It is assumed that BP will use some of the £1.5 billion held in cash on 30 October to repay bank borrowing undertaken early in 1987 when BP purchased SOHIO, but that distress borrowing by BP underwriters will offset this effect within total lending.

SECRET

4A. In the absence of further movements in base rates, other building societies are likely to follow the lead of the Halifax (which cut its rate to 10.3%) and announce cuts in mortgage rates of around one point effective from 1 December or 1 January. The Abbey announced a cut shortly after the Halifax but have only recently confirmed the new rate, which is to be 10.1% (The Woolwich have also announced a move to 10.2% from December). Societies may also take the opportunity to raise margins by lowering retail deposit rates by more than one point since their increased inflows following the fall in equity prices have removed the need for violent competition for retail funds, a factor which may be strengthened if the limit on a wholesale funding is raised.

5A. Given the prospect of competitive mortgage rates, and the ability to compete in the mortgage market on non-price factors such as income multiples, societies are likely to emerge from the doldrums of the past six months and regain some of the ground lost to banks and Mortgage Finance vehicles (most of these have however already announced cuts in rates). But the full effect of this, given the lag between approvals and completions, is unlikely to emerge until towards the end of the forecast period and any lowering in mortgage demand as a result of equity price falls may nullify higher market share.

6A. The main uncertainty in the forecast is of the size of the benefit to retail inflows from the equity price crash, and from the temporary gain in competitiveness in November via-a-vis the banks, which have cut deposit rates rather than mortgage rates with the falls in base rates. In November we have allowed an extra £150m for competitiveness, £100m for BP effects, plus £350m and £300m for gains from unit trust and equities respectively. In future months, the effects diminish somewhat but the forecast for November through January of £1400m, £1100m, and £950m respectively is for very high inflows relative to the average over the year so far of around £550m per month. As a result, liquid assets grow sharply, with a possible reversal to net gilt purchases of around £100m a month being the main feature.

ANNEX TABLE 1Broad Money Forecasts

£ million not seasonally adjusted

	1987 OCTOBER		NOVEMBER		DECEMBER		1988 JANUARY	
	<u>M4</u>	<u>M3</u>	<u>M4</u>	<u>M3</u>	<u>M4</u>	<u>M3</u>	<u>M4</u>	<u>M3</u>
(i) Underlying Increase*	2055	2380	4200	3450	4100	2150	-1325	-3150
Special Factors								
Privatisations	1500	1500	-1500	-1500	200	200	400	400
Bank/Building Society Lending	-	-	175	175	-	-	500	500
Stock market correction	-	-	500	500	500	500	500	500
Intervention	1600	1600	-	-	-	-	-	-
(ii) Total Special Factors	3100	3100	-825	-825	700	700	1400	1400
(iii) Total Increase	5155	5480	3375	2625	4800	2850	75	-1750
% Change on previous month	1.8	3.1	1.1	1.4	1.6	1.5	0.0	-0.9
% Change on previous year	15.7	22.2	15.8	22.1	16.8	23.6	17.0	23.5
<u>Memo</u>								
Underlying % Change on previous year	13.9	19.0	14.3	19.5	15.0	20.6	14.7	19.5
% Change expected at Budget time	14.2	16.0	14.3	15.9	15.2	17.0	15.6	16.8

[Line (iii) = Line (i) + Line (ii)]

\*Based on the following assumptions:

(a) Underlying bank lending rises by £3.2 billion per month and building society lending rises by £1.5 billion per month, both seasonally adjusted

(b) The public sector contribution to M4 and M3 is as follows:

	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>
M4	1084	-1650	150	-4950
M3	1816	-1750	150	-4850



## ANNEX TABLE 2

## Lending Forecasts

£ million

	1987 OCTOBER			NOVEMBER			DECEMBER			1988 JANUARY		
	Bank Lending	Building Society Lending	Lending Counter-part to M4*	Bank Lending	Building Society Lending	Lending Counter-part to M4*	Bank Lending	Building Society Lending	Lending Counter-part to M4*	Bank Lending	Building Society Lending	Lending Counter-part to M4*
(i) Underlying Increase	2908	1448	4047	3180	1450	4630	3225	1450	4675	3270	1300	4770
Special Factors												
PSBR offset	780	-	780	-	-	-	-	-	-	400	-	400
Bill leak	-294	-	-294	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	100
Take-overs	-500	-	-500	500	-	500	-	-	-	-	-	-
Stock market correction	-	-	-	250	-	250	250	-	250	250	-	250
Other identified	-	-	-	-325	-	-325	-	-	-	-	-	-
(ii) Total Special Factors	-14	-	-14	425	-	425	250	-	250	750	-	750
(iii) Total Increase (seasonally adjusted)	2894	1448	4033	3605	1450	5055	3475	1450	4925	4020	1500	5520
Total Increase	2935	1510	4136	3625	1625	5250	3950	1150	5100	3575	1225	4800
% Change on previous year	22.8	13.9	19.2	22.6	13.7	19.2	22.0	13.6	18.8	23.0	13.3	19.3
<u>Memo</u>												
Underlying % Change on previous year	23.4	13.9	19.2	22.3	13.7	19.0	21.6	13.6	18.6	22.2	13.3	18.8
% Change expected at Budget time	20.3	15.9	18.1	19.3	15.8	17.5	18.5	15.8	16.9	18.9	16.0	17.1

\*Excludes bank lending to building societies (which is included under Bank Lending)

## SECRET

ANNEX TABLE 3

## BROAD AGGREGATES FORECAST

	OUTTURN 1987 OCT	FORECAST NOV	£ mn u/a	
			DEC 1988	JAN
1. CG (OA) (SURPLUS-)	-531	-725	475	-5675
2. LABR	-390	-450	200	75
3. PCBR	-63	-225	25	-75
4. PSBR(1+2+3)	-984	-1400	700	-5675
5. NET DEBT SALES TO NBPS (-)				
GILTS	109	200	-400	-350
TREASURY BILLS etc	72	-500	100	500
NATIONAL SAVINGS	42	0	-50	-125
CTDs	-166	50	200	1000
OPS DEBT	-45	300	0	0
TOTAL	12	50	-150	1025
6. EXTERNAL FINANCE OF PUBLIC SECTOR (INC-)	2786	-400	-400	-200
7. OVER (-)/UNDER (+) FUNDING (4+5+6)	1814	-1750	150	-4850
8. STERLING LENDING TO NON-BANK PRIVATE SECTOR	2935	3625	3950	3575
(seasonally adjusted)	(2894)	(3605)	(3475)	(4025)
9. PRIVATE NET EXTERNALS AND NET NON-DEPOSIT LIABILITES	731	750	-1250	-475
10.M3 (7+8+9)	5480	2625	2850	-1750
BUILDING SOCIETIES:				
11. RETAIL DEPOSITS	1058	1050	2900	2250
12. WHOLESALE DEPOSITS NBPS	-2	0	150	150
13. HOLDINGS OF M3 (-)	-1381	-300	-1100	-575
14.M4 (10+11+12+13)	5155	3375	4800	75

SECRET

MONTHLY MONETARY REPORT : TABLES

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EXTERNAL

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- Table 1 -Economic Developments in G5
- Table 2a -Interest rates in G5
- Table 2b -Exchange rates in G5
- Table 3a -Share prices in world stock markets
- Table 3b -Commodity prices

U.K. REAL ECONOMY AND FISCAL POLICY

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- Table 4 - Recent indicators of activity and inflation
- Table 5 - Fiscal Stance
- Table 6 - CGBR(O)

EXCHANGE RATES AND EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS

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- Table 7 - Sterling Exchange Rates
- Table 8 - UK Nominal and Real Interest Rates
- Table 9 - Current Account

MONETARY AGGREGATES

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- Table 10 - Summary of Key Monetary Indicators
- Table 11 - Growth rates of Monetary Aggregates
- Table 12 - Real Growth Rates of Monetary Aggregates
- Table 13 - Components of M0
- Table 14 - Building Society Balance Sheet.
- Table 15 - Components of M3
- Table 16 - Components of M4 and M5
- Table 17 - Retail Deposits
- Table 18 - Components of Bank Lending
- Table 19 - Counterparts to Broad Money.
- Table 20 - Sterling Borrowing of Private Sector.
- Table 21 - Net Finance of ICCs and Building Societies.
- Table 22 - Funding and Money Market Assistance

FORECAST

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- Table 23 - Forecast growth rates of Monetary Aggregates
- Table 24 - Forecast M0
- Table 25 - Forecast Money Market Assistance
- Table 26 - Privatisation Issues and Mergers

Table 1: Developments in the G5 (including UK)\*

	Activity			Money supply		Costs and prices		
	Nominal GNP	Real GNP	Industrial production	M1	M2/M3	Unit labour costs	Consumer prices	GNP deflator
1983	7.1	2.9	3.7	9.8	8.6	-0.7	3.8	4.1
1984	8.6	4.9	8.0	6.6	8.6	-0.7	4.1	3.5
1985	6.6	3.2	3.0	8.2	8.4	0.3	3.5	3.3
1986	5.6	2.7	1.0	11.5	8.1	1.4	1.5	2.8
1987 Q1	5.0	2.5	1.0	13.5	8.8	0.5	1.5	2.4
Q2	4.7	2.2	2.1	12.4	8.9	-0.8	2.5	2.5
Q3							2.9	
1987 Jan			-0.1	14.4	9.0		1.0	
Feb			1.0	13.8	8.9		1.4	
Mar			2.0	12.4	8.6		2.0	
Apr			0.9	13.0	9.0		2.5	
May			2.6	12.7	9.0		2.5	
Jun			2.7	11.4	8.7		2.7	
Jul			2.7	10.6	8.5		2.6	
Aug			4.0				3.1	
Sep							2.9	

\* Percentage changes on a year before.

TABLE 2: INTEREST AND EXCHANGE RATES IN G5

## a. THREE MONTH NOMINAL INTEREST RATES IN THE G5 COUNTRIES\*

	United States	Japan	Germany	France	UK
1983	9.1	6.5	5.8	12.5	10.1
1984	10.4	6.3	6.0	11.7	9.9
1985	8.1	6.5	5.5	10.0	12.2
1986	6.5	5.0	4.6	7.8	11.0
1987 Jan	5.8	4.3	4.6	8.4	11.0
Feb	6.1	4.0	4.0	8.5	11.0
Mar	6.2	4.0	4.0	8.0	10.0
Apr	6.5	3.9	3.9	8.0	9.8
May	7.0	3.8	3.8	8.2	8.8
June	7.0	3.7	3.7	8.2	9.0
July	6.7	3.7	3.9	7.9	9.2
Aug	6.8	3.7	4.0	7.9	10.1
Sept	7.4	3.8	4.0	7.9	10.1
Oct	8.2	3.9	4.8	8.2	9.9
Nov	7.4	3.9	3.9	8.6	9.0
Dec 1st	7.8	3.9	3.7	8.7	8.9

\* CD rate for US, Gensaki for Japan, Interbank rates for rest.

TABLE 2

## b. EXCHANGE RATES

## EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDICES (1975 = 100)

	United States	Japan	Germany	France	UK	CROSS RATES	
						YEN/\$	DM/\$
1980	93.7	126.4	128.8	94.4	96.0	225.8	1.82
1981	105.6	142.9	119.2	84.3	94.8	219.5	2.25
1982	118.0	134.6	124.4	76.6	90.4	248.8	2.43
1983	124.8	148.4	127.1	70.0	83.2	237.4	2.55
1984	134.6	156.7	123.8	65.7	78.6	237.5	2.85
1985	140.7	160.5	123.6	66.3	78.2	238.4	2.94
1986	114.8	203.1	137.3	70.1	72.8	168.3	2.17
1985 Q1	149.7	154.3	119.3	63.4	72.1	257.5	3.26
Q2	145.8	155.2	121.6	65.2	78.9	250.6	3.08
Q3	138.4	157.6	125.0	67.2	82.1	238.6	2.85
Q4	128.8	174.9	128.5	69.3	79.8	207.4	2.59
1986 Q1	121.2	186.8	133.1	71.0	75.1	187.8	2.35
Q2	116.0	202.8	134.7	69.0	76.0	169.9	2.24
Q3	111.4	214.8	138.6	69.5	71.9	155.9	2.09
Q4	110.5	208.0	142.6	70.8	68.3	160.4	2.01
1987 Q1	104.2	210.1	147.7	71.9	70.2	155.2	1.84
Q2	101.1	222.9	146.9	71.6	72.7	142.6	1.81
Q3	102.5	218.0	146.4	71.4	72.7	147.0	1.84
1987 Jan	105.5	209.4	147.5	71.8	68.9	154.6	1.86
Feb	103.9	209.3	148.4	72.3	69.0	153.4	1.82
Mar	103.3	211.7	147.1	71.8	71.9	157.5	1.84
Apr	101.0	222.7	146.6	71.6	72.3	142.9	1.81
May	100.4	225.3	147.2	71.7	73.3	140.6	1.79
June	101.8	220.8	146.8	71.5	72.6	144.4	1.82
July	103.3	213.7	146.6	71.6	72.8	150.2	1.85
Aug	103.3	218.2	146.0	71.1	72.3	147.6	1.86
Sept	100.8	222.1	146.7	71.4	73.0	143.1	1.81
Oct	100.6	221.4	147.1	71.5	73.6	143.3	1.80
Nov 30th	94.4	231.0	152.2	72.7	76.4	132.4	1.64
% Change since dollar peak (Feb 85)	- 40	+ 47	+ 30	+ 16½	+ 9	- 49½	- 52
% Change since Plaza (Sept 85)	- 32½	+ 47½	+ 21½	+ 8	- 7	- 45	- 42½
% Change since Louvre Accord (Feb 87)	- 9	+ 10½	+ 2½	+ ½	+ 10½	- 14	- 10½

Table 3 (a): Share Prices for the Major Countries

	US St. & Poor Ind.	Japan Tokyo SE New	Germany Commerz -bank	France CAC Gen.	UK FT. All share	Italy Banca Com Ital	Canada Toronto Comp.	Australia All ord.	H.Kong Hang Sang Bank	S'pore Straits Times Index
1986 (Ave.)	262.3	1322.7	1998.8	361.5	778.5	694.0	2999.5	1207.4	1258.8	732.3
1987 Jan	297.0	1644.0	1888.0	415.2	880.1	718.0	3255.6	1529.0	1643.5	937.1
Feb	319.2	1744.8	1719.7	416.8	952.7	689.1	3492.1	1558.9	1770.0	1013.1
Mar	335.2	1848.0	1710.6	446.1	1001.3	694.8	3705.8	1644.2	1796.4	1061.2
Apr	335.2	2035.9	1832.4	451.5	989.2	739.7	3774.8	1725.3	1727.9	1097.2
May	336.2	2119.7	1773.5	440.6	1070.0	716.2	3750.6	1814.3	1846.9	1187.4
Jun	348.8.	2190.2	1791.2	410.7	1134.4	527.5	3705.6	1776.8	2009.7	1238.2
Jul	361.0	1982.0	1921.3	413.2	1194.0	683.3	3925.7	1910.6	2136.1	1349.0
Aug	384.3	2093.3	2024.5	410.2	1150.6	629.2	4042.7	2102.1	2300.0	1459.2
Sep	372.4	2088.7	1979.4	424.1	1174.0	619.3	3919.4	2232.2	2442.1	1417.9
Oct	314.9	2014.5	1802.4	364.9	1079.4	616.4	3132.7	1857.1	3357.3	1216.0
15 Oct	343.6	2158.6	1902.6	366.1	1189.9	665.5	3674.9	2146.4	3695.5	1426.1
30 Nov	263.2	1847.0	1322.6	293.9	796.3	528.4	2978.3	1328.7	2138.4	800.0
<u>Percentage changes</u>										
1986-25 Nov	+0.4	+39.6	-33.8	-18.7	+2.3	-23.9	-0.7	10	+69.9	+9.2
15 Oct - 25 Nov	-23.4	-14.4	-30.5	-19.7	-33.1	-20.6	-19.0	-38.1	-42.1	-43.9

The monthly figures are averages of weekly rates.

## ECONOMIST COMMODITY PRICE INDICES

1980=100

	All items indices				SDR indices		
	SDR	Dollar	Sterling	Real*	Food	Nfa**	Metals
<u>Annual</u>							
1980	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1981	95.1	86.2	99.4	91.1	96.9	98.6	89.5
1982	87.9	74.7	99.2	81.6	92.3	90.4	79.1
1983	102.7	84.3	129.4	95.5	105.5	109.8	92.8
1984	105.7	83.4	144.9	97.8	116.1	105.1	89.5
1985	95.8	74.8	135.2	86.5	103.4	94.2	84.3
1986	86.9	77.7	124.0	74.5	97.3	85.0	70.5
<u>Quarterly</u>							
1985 Q4	90.1	74.7	121.0	80.3	101.4	86.9	75.0
1986 Q1	93.7	80.9	130.8	81.7	109.7	87.1	73.6
Q2	91.0	81.1	125.0	79.5	104.9	86.9	71.8
Q3	81.4	75.2	117.4	70.3	88.8	80.1	68.3
Q4	82.4	76.4	123.9	70.1	87.4	86.5	68.4
1987 Q1	81.6	79.2	119.2	68.9	82.4	91.0	69.0
Q2	86.8	86.4	122.2	73.3	85.5	98.0	75.2
Q3	91.4	89.6	128.9	75.9	82.6	107.1	87.5
<u>Monthly</u>							
December	81.9	76.1	122.7		85.4	87.5	68.4
January	80.3	77.0	118.8		82.5	88.8	66.7
February	81.7	79.6	120.5		82.6	91.7	68.5
March	82.9	81.0	118.2		82.1	92.4	71.8
April	84.2	83.8	119.0		83.2	94.8	72.6
May	87.3	87.6	122.0		87.1	97.2	74.8
June	88.9	87.8	125.2		86.2	101.7	78.3
July	90.7	88.4	127.8		84.0	105.1	84.7
August	92.2	89.8	130.9		81.2	109.7	90.2
September	91.4	90.6	128.2		82.7	106.6	87.6
October	94.8	94.2	132.2		86.7	101.9	94.3
November (prov)	93.6	97.0	127.6		86.5	97.2	93.8
<u>Weekly</u>							
September 8	90.4	90.3	126.4		81.8	107.2	85.7
15	91.3	90.4	127.8		83.1	107.8	86.0
22	91.8	91.0	128.8		82.8	104.5	89.8
29	93.5	91.9	131.1		84.4	103.9	92.8
October 6	95.7	94.1	134.1		86.6	105.2	95.2
13	96.1	95.4	134.7		86.7	102.5	97.9
20	93.4	93.3	131.0		86.2	101.1	91.5
27	93.9	94.2	129.1		87.2	98.9	92.7
November 3	91.0	93.6	124.9		84.3	96.8	89.8
10	92.1	96.5	125.5		85.3	95.4	92.3
17	94.8	97.8	128.8		87.3	98.3	95.4
24 (prov)	96.5	100.1	131.2		89.2	98.3	97.7

\* In relation to prices of manufactured exports. Recent figures are estimated.

\*\* Non-food agriculturals



TABLE 4:

RECENT INDICATORS OF ACTIVITY AND INFLATION  
(per cent changes on year earlier)

	MONEY	OUTPUT				PRICES AND UNIT LABOUR COSTS				
		GDP	Manufacturing		RPI	RPI excluding mortgage payments	Producer Prices***		Unit Wage Costs	
			GDP(O)	Output			Output	Input	Manufacturing	Whole economy
1985-86	9.8	1985	3.7	2.9	6.1	5.2	6.3	4.4	5.6	5.1
1986-87	6.7	1986	3.0	1.0	3.4	3.6	4.3	-10.7	4.6	5.4
1986 2	6.4	1986 1	2.3	- 0.9	4.9	4.6	5.0	- 11.9	7.5	6.0
3	6.5	2	2.3	- 0.6	2.8	3.3	4.3	- 12.4	6.2	6.2
4	6.7	3	3.6	1.3	2.6	3.3	4.0	- 13.0	3.1	4.4
1987 1	7.0	4	3.9	4.1	3.4	3.4	4.0	- 5.6	1.1	5.0
2	8.1	1987 1	4.5	4.8	3.9	3.7	4.1	- 1.7	0.6	4.0
3	9.5*	2	4.1	5.2	4.2	3.6	4.5	4.6	1.2	4.6
4	8.2	3	4.5	6.1					1.5	
1988 1	8.1	4								
1987-88	8.5									
		1986 September		1.6	3.0	3.4	4.0	- 11.5	3.2**	
		October		3.8	3.0	3.4	4.0	- 7.4	2.7	
		November		4.3	3.5	3.3	3.8	- 4.9	1.8	
		December		4.3	3.7	3.5	4.0	- 4.4	1.6	
		1987 January		3.0	3.9	3.7	4.2	- 2.5	1.9	
		February		5.8	3.9	3.7	4.2	- 2.9	1.5	
		March		5.5	4.0	3.8	4.1	0.4	0.9	
		April		4.2	4.2	3.6	4.3	3.0	0.5	
		May		5.7	4.1	3.8	4.5	3.4	0.8	
		June		5.7	4.2	3.5	4.5	7.2	1.3	
		July		5.9	4.4	3.7	4.7	13.4	1.5	
		August		6.8	4.4	3.7	4.7	14.5	1.5	
		September		5.5	4.2	3.5	4.7	10.7	1.5	
		October			4.5	3.9	4.8	7.7	1.5	

\* Autumn Statement forecast.

\*\* Wage cost figures show averages for three months ending in month indicated.

\*\*\* Excluding food, drink and tobacco.

TABLE 5: INDICATORS OF FISCAL STANCE

(a) Annual Data

	PSBR		PSBR excluding privatisation proceeds		PSFD	
	Cash (£ billion)	Ratio to GDP (per cent)	Cash (£ billion)	Ratio to GDP (per cent)	Cash (£ billion)	Ratio to GDP (per cent)
1970-71	0.8	1½	0.8	1½	-0.2	-½
1971-72	1.0	1½	1.0	1½	0.7	1
1972-73	2.4	3½	2.4	3½	2.0	3
1973-74	4.3	5½	4.3	5½	3.5	4½
1974-75	8.0	9	8.0	9	6.0	6½
1975-76	10.3	9½	10.3	9½	8.1	7½
1976-77	8.3	6½	8.3	6½	7.5	5½
1977-78	5.4	3½	5.9	4	6.6	4½
1978-79	9.2	5½	9.2	5½	8.3	4¾
1979-80	10.0	4½	10.4	5	8.0	3¾
1980-81	12.7	5½	13.1	5½	11.7	5
1981-82	8.6	3½	9.1	3½	5.2	2
1982-83	8.8	3½	9.3	3½	8.3	3
1983-84	9.7	3½	10.9	3½	11.4	3¾
1984-85*	10.2	3	12.3	3½	13.1	4
1985-86*	5.8	1½	8.5	2½	8.3	2½
1986-87	3.4	1	7.8	2	9.6	2½
1987-88 (October forecast)	-1.2	-½	4.1	1	4.3	1

\* If adjusted for coal strike, PSBR and PSFD ratios to GDP roughly 0.9 per cent lower in 1984-85 and 0.3 per cent lower in 1985-86.

(b) Quarterly Data

£ billion	PSBR		PSBR excluding privatisation		PSFD	
	s.a.*	u.a.	s.a.*	u.a.	s.a.+	u.a.
1985						
Q2	1.2	2.6	2.5	3.9	2.9	4.6
Q3	1.9	2.4	2.4	3.4	1.5	1.9
Q4	1.5	2.1	2.1	2.6	2.1	0.7
1986						
Q1	1.1	-1.9	1.5	-1.5	2.0	1.0
Q2	2.1	2.3	3.2	3.4	2.2	3.6
Q3	2.1	3.6	2.1	3.6	3.0	4.2
Q4	-1.3	-1.6	0.9	0.5	1.6	0.0
1987						
Q1	0.5	-0.7	1.7	0.4	2.6	1.9
Q2	0.2	1.1	2.5	3.4	1.6	3.3

\* financial year - constrained

+ calendar year - constrained

Table 6: CGBR(O) April - October Comparison with Budget Profile  
£ billion

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<u>Receipts</u>	
Inland Revenue	+ 2.0
Customs and Excise	+ 0.4
Privatisation proceeds	- 1.1
Other receipts	+ 0.2
<u>Expenditure</u>	
Net debt interest payments	+ 0.3
Other departmental expenditure <sup>(1)</sup>	- 1.0
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<u>Net effect on CGBR(O)</u>	- 2.3

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(1) on a cash basis, net of certain receipts and on-lending

## CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 7

## EXCHANGE RATES

		Exchange Rate Index*	Real Exchange Rate	ERI/(Oil Price Adjusted ERI)†	Dollar: Sterling exchange rate	D-Mark: Sterling exchange rate	Index against EMS currencies*	US-UK Interest rate differential	Brent spot price (\$/bl)
1983	(3)	84.9	114.5	1.042	1.53	3.94	103.4	-0.3	30.9
	(4)	83.2	112.3	1.035	1.47	3.93	102.9	-0.5	29.6
1984	(1)	81.7	110.3	1.012	1.44	3.87	101.9	-0.9	29.7
	(2)	79.8	109.0	0.988	1.40	3.78	99.6	-2.1	29.7
	(3)	78.0	106.8	0.979	1.30	3.78	99.5	-0.6	28.5
	(4)	75.0	103.5	0.946	1.21	3.72	97.5	+0.3	28.6
1985	(1)	72.1	99.9	0.908	1.12	3.63	95.2	+4.1	27.7
	(2)	78.9	111.1	1.001	1.26	3.88	102.3	+4.4	27.0
	(3)	82.1	117.4	1.040	1.38	3.92	103.8	+3.6	27.4
	(4)	79.8	115.7	1.001	1.44	3.71	98.7	+3.5	28.3
1986	(1)	75.1	111.7	1.037	1.44	3.38	90.9	+4.5	17.8
	(2)	76.1	117.2	1.101	1.51	3.39	91.4	+3.2	12.8
	(3)	71.9	112.7	1.049	1.50	3.10	84.9	+3.8	12.4
	(4)	68.3	108.0	0.970	1.43	2.87	79.0	+5.1	14.8
1987	(1)	69.9	111.6	0.967	1.54	2.83	78.8	+4.3	17.9
	(2)	72.8	116.8	0.996	1.64	2.96	82.6	+2.1	18.6
	(3)	72.7	116.5	0.992	1.62	2.97	83.0	+2.8	19.0
1987	January	68.9	109.8	0.950	1.51	2.80	77.8	+4.9	18.4
	February	69.0	110.3	0.960	1.53	2.78	77.4	+4.4	17.2
	March	71.9	114.8	0.991	1.59	2.92	81.2	+3.4	18.0
	April	72.3	116.1	0.994	1.63	2.95	82.1	+2.9	18.2
	May	73.3	117.9	1.002	1.67	2.98	83.1	+1.6	18.8
	June	72.7	116.5	0.991	1.63	2.96	82.6	+2.1	18.9
	July	72.8	116.7	0.985	1.61	2.97	82.9	+2.6	19.8
	August	72.3	115.5	0.988	1.60	2.97	82.8	+3.2	18.9
	September	73.1	116.9	1.004	1.65	2.98	83.2	+2.6	18.3
	October	73.6	n/a	1.006	1.66	2.99	83.5	+1.7	18.8
	November 30th	76.4	n/a	1.055	1.83	3.00	84.3	+1.0	17.7

† Oil price adjusted ERI has roughly the same inflation implications as does an ERI of 80 given an oil price of \$29 (their average values for January 1983 - November 1985). The ratio shown therefore indicates whether movements in the ERI are inflationary or otherwise, relative to the period Jan-1983 - Nov 1985, having allowed for oil prices.

\* 1975=100

TABLE 8 : NOMINAL AND REAL INTEREST RATES

		NOMINAL RATES				REAL RATES				
		Three month interbank	Three month Eurodollar	Base Rate	Long Rate (20 year Gilts)	Expected inflation over 12 months*	Real 3-month interbank rate	Yield on Index-linked Gilts**		
								1990	2001	2011
1985	(1)	13.0	8.9	12.9	10.9	5.7	6.9	4.4	3.5	3.2
	(2)	12.6	8.2	12.6	10.8	5.6	6.6	4.3	3.8	3.4
	(3)	11.7	8.1	11.7	10.4	5.3	6.1	4.3	3.8	3.5
	(4)	11.6	8.1	11.5	10.3	4.2	7.1	4.1	3.9	3.6
1986	(1)	12.4	7.9	12.3	10.2	3.9	8.2	4.3	4.2	3.8
	(2)	10.2	7.0	10.4	9.0	3.6	6.5	3.6	3.6	3.4
	(3)	10.0	6.2	10.0	9.7	3.4	6.5	3.7	3.9	3.5
	(4)	11.2	6.1	11.0	10.7	4.1	6.8	3.7	4.1	3.8
1987	(1)	10.6	6.3	10.8	9.6	4.3	6.0	3.0	3.7	3.5
	(2)	9.2	7.1	9.4	9.0	3.8	5.2	2.4	3.8	3.6
	(3)	9.9	7.1	9.7	9.8	3.7	6.0	2.6	4.2	3.9
1987	January	11.0	6.1	11.0	10.0	4.1	6.6	3.5	4.0	3.7
	February	10.8	6.4	11.0	9.8	4.3	6.2	3.0	3.7	3.5
	March	9.9	6.5	10.4	9.1	4.5	5.2	2.5	3.5	3.4
	April	9.8	6.9	10.0	9.2	4.2	5.4	2.6	3.6	3.4
	May	8.8	7.2	9.1	8.8	3.7	4.9	2.1	3.6	3.6
	June	9.0	7.1	9.0	8.9	3.5	5.3	2.3	3.9	3.7
	July	9.3	6.9	9.0	9.3	3.4	5.7	2.2	4.0	3.8
	August	10.2	7.0	10.0	10.0	3.9	6.1	2.6	4.3	4.0
	September	10.1	7.5	10.0	10.0	3.9	6.0	3.1	4.2	4.0
	October	10.0	8.3	9.5	9.8	4.0	5.1	3.1	4.5	4.3
	November 30th	8.9	7.9	9.0	9.3	4.0	4.7	2.0	3.9	3.9

\* Unweighted average of forecasts by Phillips and Drew, National Institute and the London Business School; the expected rate of inflation for a given month is the change in the price level between six months earlier and six months ahead. This is assumed to approximate roughly to average inflation expectations over the three months immediately ahead.

\*\* Average of yields calculated for each Friday of month and quarterly for last Friday in each month. Assumes inflation averages 5 per cent per annum to redemption.

TABLE 9 CURRENT ACCOUNT

percentage change on previous year

	Export Volume less oil and erratics	Import Volume less oil and erratics	Terms* of Trade(AVI) 1980=100	Current balance fmn
1982	0.5	8.6	0.5	4035
1983	-1.1	9.5	-0.6	3338
1984	9.6	11.0	-1.9	1474
1985	6.8	4.2	1.8	2919
1986	2.4	5.7	-0.8	-980
1986 Q1	-2.5	3.2	3.0	744
2	0.0	2.4	1.9	146
3	2.9	7.5	-2.4	-910
4	9.3	9.9	-4.9	-960
1987 Q1	11.2	5.4	-1.5	672
Q2	6.4	10.2	+0.9	-195
Q3	9.1	12.0	+1.6	-1248
1986 Jan	-2.6	1.5	4.5	995
Feb	-2.7	2.6	3.3	204
Mar	-2.3	5.7	1.7	-466
Apr	-2.2	-1.8	2.3	283
May	-0.2	7.3	2.9	-113
Jun	2.6	1.7	1.6	-35
Jul	2.6	4.2	-1.9	-5
Aug	-0.4	9.7	-2.8	-734
Sep	6.4	8.4	-2.5	-179
Oct	7.7	5.1	-3.3	-155
Nov	11.3	10.6	-5.0	-462
Dec	9.0	15.0	-6.1	-313
1987 Jan	7.3	6.4	-2.7	85
Feb	18.2	8.5	-2.0	400
Mar	7.9	1.0	+0.3	186
April	10.4	10.6	+1.2	203
May	5.6	14.5	-0.1	-378
June	4.6	5.6	+1.5	-19
July	7.7	11.2	+0.4	-325
Aug	8.8	13.7	+1.2	-907
Sep	10.9	11.0	+3.3	-17
Oct	4.7	11.8	+2.0	-282

\* excluding oil and erratics.

## SECRET

TABLE 10

Key Monetary Indicators

	1986-87					1987-88							
	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>
<u>MONETARY AGGREGATES</u>													
12 month % change (ua)													
MO	4.9	5.2	5.2	4.1	4.1	3.5	5.3	4.4	4.2	5.3	4.5	5.2	5.5
M3	18.5	18.6	18.0	17.6	19.0	19.0	20.4	18.9	19.1	20.9	22.1	19.5	22.2
M4	15.8	15.6	15.2	13.9	13.9	13.9	14.5	13.7	13.8	14.8	15.5	14.9	15.7
M5	15.1	15.1	14.4	13.2	13.3	13.4	14.0	13.4	13.5	14.3	14.8	14.3	15.1
<u>STERLING LENDING</u>													
12 month % change (ua)													
Banks	19.4	20.8	21.8	22.5	21.7	20.7	21.4	21.7	21.5	22.2	21.5	23.5	22.8
Banks and building societies	19.0	19.6	20.2	20.4	19.8	19.1	19.4	19.4	19.2	19.4	18.8	20.0	19.2
<u>OVER(-)/UNDER (+) FUNDING</u>													
financial year to date: £mm	812	-3	-1,577	-3,931	-3,969	395	3,197	5,144	2,368	1,905	2,209	2,002	3,816
<u>MONEY MARKET ASSISTANCE</u>													
Level outstanding £mn	10,247	11,295	12,970	14,948	14,873	9,742	6,126	3,340	5,132	7,078	6,114	5,421	5,403
<u>INTEREST RATES</u>													
3 months*	11.1	11.3	11.3	11.0	10.8	9.9	9.8	8.8	9.0	9.3	10.2	10.1	9.97
20 year <sup>φ</sup>	10.6	10.9	10.6	10.0	9.8	9.1	9.2	8.8	8.9	9.3	10.0	10.0	9.84
<u>EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE</u>													
<u>RATE</u>	67.8	68.5	68.5	68.9	69.0	71.9	73.3	73.3	72.7	72.8	72.3	73.1	73.6

\* Inter bank

<sup>φ</sup> par yield<sup>†</sup> banking months until August thereafter end calendar months

Table 11

## MONETARY AGGREGATES 1987-88

	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEP	OCT
<u>MO</u>									
Averaged weekly									
Monthly change (£ million)	-228	+115	+325	+42	-93	+423	+13	+14	-32
Monthly % change	-1.5	+0.8	+2.2	+0.3	-0.6	+2.8	+0.1	+0.1	-0.2
	(-0.8)	(+0.4)	(+0.5)	(+0.4)	(+0.2)	(+1.2)	(+0.3)	(+0.8)	(+0.6)
12 Monthly % change	+4.1	+3.5	+5.3	+4.4	+4.2	+5.3	+4.5	+5.2	+5.5
<u>M3</u>									
Monthly change (£ million)	+2,930	+6,797	+3,183	+3,245	+1,884	+4,212	+2,287	+1,576	+5,480
Monthly % change	+1.9	+4.4	+2.0	+2.0	+1.1	+2.5	+1.3	+0.9	+3.1
	(+1.9)	(+2.8)	(+2.2)	(+1.4)	(+1.4)	(+2.2)	(+1.4)	(+1.4)	(+3.5)
12 Monthly % change	+19.0	+19.0	+20.4	+18.9	+19.1	+20.9	+22.1	+19.5	+22.2
<u>M4</u>									
Monthly change (£ million)	+2,456	+6,651	+3,535	+3,436	+4,019	5,289	+2,752	+2,888	+5,155
Monthly % change	+0.9	+2.5	+1.3	+1.3	+1.4	+1.9	+1.0	+1.0	+1.8
	(+1.5)	(+1.7)	(+1.5)	(+0.9)	(+1.4)	(+1.5)	(+1.3)	(+1.1)	(+2.1)
12 Monthly % change	+13.9	+13.9	+14.5	+13.7	+13.8	14.9	+15.5	+14.9	+15.7
<u>M5</u>									
Monthly change (£ million)	+2,594	+6,945	+3,544	+4,108	+4,122	+5,350	+2,618	+2,985	+5,288
Monthly % change	+0.9	+2.5	+1.2	+1.4	+1.4	+1.8	+0.9	+1.0	+1.7
	(+1.5)	(+1.5)	(+1.3)	(+1.2)	(+1.4)	(+1.4)	(+1.2)	(+1.1)	(+2.1)
12 Monthly % change	+13.3	+13.4	+14.0	+13.4	+13.5	+14.3	+14.8	+14.3	+15.1
<u>NIBMI</u>									
Monthly change (£ million)	+519	+1,058	+475	+1,168	+1,471	+99	-78	+398	+192
Monthly % change	+1.3	+2.6	+1.2	+2.8	+3.4	+0.2	-0.2	+0.9	+0.4
	(+0.4)	(-0.9)	(-1.2)	(+2.2)	(+4.3)	(+0.3)	(+0.4)	(+0.7)	(+3.4)
12 Monthly % change	+10.5	+10.3	+11.9	+12.1	+13.5	+12.4	+12.4	+6.1	+12.0
<u>M1</u>									
Monthly change (£ million)	+392	+4,364	+705	+2,967	+2,102	+984	+1,163	+1,524	+2,679
Monthly % change	+0.5	+5.8	+0.9	+3.7	+2.5	+1.2	+1.3	+1.7	+3.0
	(+0.1)	(+3.7)	(-0.3)	(+3.4)	(+2.8)	(+1.2)	(+1.7)	(+1.6)	(+4.6)
12 Monthly % change	+21.2	22.5	+23.2	+23.7	+23.8	+22.5	+23.8	+20.3	+24.4
Net £ deposits from banks abroad	-845	-1,395	+724	+987	-946	+492	-954	-111	+1,271
Overseas non-bank £ deposits	+550	+742	-194	+765	-429	+490	+195	+37	+902
<u>WIDER £ AGGREGATE</u>									
Monthly change (£ million)	+2,635	+6,144	+3,713	+4,997	+509	+5,194	+1,528	+1,685	+7,470
Monthly % change	+1.5	+3.4	+2.0	+2.6	+0.3	+2.7	+0.8	+0.8	+3.7
	(+1.4)	(+2.0)	(+2.1)	(+2.2)	(+0.5)	(+2.4)	(+0.8)	(+1.2)	(+4.0)

NB Figures in brackets are seasonally adjusted.



TABLE 12

-----  
 REAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATES OF MONETARY AGGREGATES  
 -----

	RPI less Mortgage Element	Weekly Averaged M0	M3	M4	M5	
FINANCIAL YEARS (12 month % changes to calendar March)						
1981-82	9.8	-6.5	4.2	3.7	3.0	
1982-83	5.9	-0.6	5.4	7.9	8.0	
1983-84	4.6	0.8	3.3	6.8	6.1	
1984-85	5.2	0.3	6.0	8.2	8.2	
1985-86	4.0	-0.5	12.2	10.1	9.1	
1986-87	3.8	0.3	14.6	9.7	9.2	
12 MONTH % CHANGES (ua except M0)						
	SEPTEMBER	3.4	1.4	15.1	11.9	11.1
	OCTOBER	3.4	1.5	14.6	12.0	11.3
	NOVEMBER	3.3	1.9	14.8	11.9	11.4
	DECEMBER	3.7	1.6	13.8	11.1	10.3
1987	JANUARY	3.7	1.4	13.4	9.8	9.2
	FEBRUARY	3.7	0.4	14.8	9.8	9.3
	MARCH	3.8	0.3	14.6	9.7	9.2
	APRIL	3.6	1.2	16.2	10.5	10.0
	MAY	3.8	0.6	14.5	9.5	9.2
	JUNE	3.5	0.7	15.1	10.0	9.7
	JULY	3.7	1.6	16.6	10.8	10.2
	AUGUST	3.7	1.0	17.7	11.4	10.7
	SEPTEMBER	3.5	1.4	15.5	11.0	10.4
	OCTOBER	3.9	1.6	17.6	11.4	10.8

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TABLE 13

## MO, THE WIDE MONETARY BASE

Levels £ million  
(changes in brackets)% change  
on previous  
Month% change  
on year earlier

Calendar months	Notes and coin			Bankers' deposits	MO		MO (s.a.)	% change on previous Month		% change on year earlier			
	(nsa)	(sa)	(sa)		(nsa)	(sa)		Notes (sa) and coin	MO (sa)	Notes and Coin (nsa)	(sa)	MO (nsa)	MO (sa)
1987													
June	14,946	15,075	(+91)	137	15,083	15,212	(+24)	+0.6	+0.2	+4.6	+4.6	+4.2	+4.2
July	15,271	15,166	(+91)	235	15,506	15,401	(+189)	+0.6	+1.2	+4.7	+4.8	+5.3	+5.5
August	15,337	15,258	(+92)	182	15,519	15,440	(+39)	+0.6	+0.3	+4.3	+4.6	+4.5	+4.7
September	15,349	15,376	(+118)	184	15,533	15,560	(+120)	+0.8	+0.8	+5.3	+5.1	+5.2	+5.0
October	15,299	15,457	(+81)	202	15,500	15,659	(+99)	+0.5	+0.6	+5.1	+5.1	+5.5	+5.6
November (4 of 4)	15,364	15,524	(+67)	183	15,547	15,707	(+48)	+0.4	+0.3	+4.8	+4.8	+4.9	+4.9

## Weekly data

Notes (sa)  
and coin

Bankers' deposits

MO (sa)

% change  
on previous week  
MO (sa)

October							
7th	15,435	(+42)	190	15,625	(+111)	+0.7	
14th	15,418	(-17)	192	15,610	(-15)	-0.1	
21st	15,467	(+49)	223	15,690	(+80)	+0.5	
28th	15,503	(+36)	202	15,705	(+15)	+0.1	
November							
4th	15,510	(+7)	128	15,638	(-67)	-0.4	
11th	15,511	(+1)	225	15,736	(+98)	+0.6	
18th	15,522	(+11)	193	15,715	(-21)	-0.1	
25th	15,553	(+31)	185	15,738	(+23)	+0.1	

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TABLE 14

S E C R E T

## BUILDING SOCIETY BALANCE SHEET FLOWS

Unadjusted £ million

	Total Flow	Net Mortgage Advances & Unsecured Lending	A S S E T S		L I A B I L I T I E S			
			Liquid Assets	Fixed Assets	Retail principal	Interest credited	Wholesale funds	Other (eg reserves)
1985 *	1459	1193	239 ( 18.0 )	27	592	495	205	167
1986 *	1623	1589	17 ( 16.4 )	17	553	498	523	49
1985 Q3*	1666	1157	479 ( 17.0 )	30	590	384	153	539
Q4*	2172	1367	783 ( 18.0 )	22	766	660	594	152
1986 Q1*	858	1271	-431 ( 17.5 )	18	740	462	167	-511
Q2*	1591	1645	-74 ( 16.6 )	20	478	522	321	270
Q3*	1783	1884	-112 ( 15.7 )	11	56	402	1099	226
Q4*	2262	1556	686 ( 16.4 )	20	938	649	403	272
1987 Q1*	1240	1120	105 ( 16.1 )	15	484	594	279	-117
Q2*	1564	1240	309 ( 16.4 )	15	612	457	182	313
Q3*	1487	1272	200 ( 16.1 )	15	410	515	364	198
Sep	1043	1238	-210 ( 16.1 )	15	193	630	594	-374
Forecast								
1987 Q4*	2158	1373	770 ( 16.9 )	15	970	610	262	316
Oct+	2122	1399	708 ( 16.4 )	15	814	309	535	464
Nov	2046	1568	463 ( 16.4 )	15	976	111	0	959
Dec	2306	1152	1139 ( 16.9 )	15	1418	1411	250	-773
1988 Jan	1750	1217	518 ( 17.1 )	15	1119	1298	250	-917

\* Monthly averages

+ Estimated ; part data

TABLE 15

## THE COMPONENTS OF M3

	BANK DEPOSITS				
	NOTES AND COINS	RETAIL		WHOLESALE	M3
		NIB	IB		
<b>% CHANGES</b>					
Financial years (ua)					
1984-85 <sup>1</sup>	5.2	6.5	7.7	19.1	11.5
1985-86 <sup>1</sup>	3.7	4.5	16.8	26.1	16.7
1986-87 <sup>1</sup>	2.2	16.9	17.5	25.8	19.1
Over 12 months (ua)					
OCTOBER	5.8	15.3	18.6	22.8	18.5
NOVEMBER	4.0	13.3	17.1	25.6	18.6
DECEMBER	5.1	14.4	18.7	22.2	18.0
1987 JANUARY	3.7	14.7	16.2	23.0	17.6
FEBRUARY	3.2	14.5	17.2	25.7	19.0
MARCH	-2.1	16.9	17.4	25.4	19.0
APRIL	6.5	14.5	17.1	27.9	20.4
MAY	3.7	16.4	19.0	23.1	18.9
JUNE	4.1	18.0	15.4	25.1	19.1
JULY	6.4	15.3	12.1	32.3	20.9
AUGUST	4.4	16.4	15.1	32.8	22.1
SEPTEMBER	6.1	6.1	14.2	31.8	19.5
OCTOBER	4.9	15.4	12.4	34.6	22.2
Over 6 months (sa)					
1987 MAY	-0.3	13.2	12.9	36.2	21.9
JUNE	-1.9	25.4	12.1	37.0	24.0
JULY	2.2	14.4	12.3	46.5	26.3
AUGUST	4.0	13.2	14.5	41.5	25.1
SEPTEMBER	8.9	16.0	12.7	32.1	21.7
OCTOBER	7.1	33.2	11.7	33.3	25.0
<b>CHANGES £ MILLION</b>					
monthly average (sa)					
1984-85 <sup>1</sup>	42	56	238	683	1017
1985-86 <sup>1</sup>	17	90	161	556	1565
1986-87 <sup>1</sup>	4	359	538	1255	2157
Over 1 month (sa)					
1987 MAY	-74	963	270	1178	2337
JUNE	-35	1814	491	43	2313
JULY	294	-178	660	2836	3612
AUGUST	10	150	533	1702	2395
SEPTEMBER	-2	310	434	1651	2393
OCTOBER	262	1238	170	4519	6189

<sup>1</sup>March on March

## THE COMPONENTS OF M4 AND M5

BUILDING SOCIETIES							
	M3	RETAIL <sup>1</sup>	WHOLESALE	HOLDINGS OF M3	M4	MONEY MARKET INSTRUMENTS	M5
<b>% CHANGES</b>							
-----							
Financial years (ua)							
1984-85 <sup>a</sup>	11.5	15.1				13.8	13.8
1985-86 <sup>a</sup>	16.7	15.3	52.6	94	-0.1	13.5	14.5
1986-87 <sup>a</sup>	19.1	10.8	11.4	50	-15.6	13.5	12.9
Over 12 months (ua)							
NOVEMBER	18.6	15.6		24.0	15.6	5.4	15.1
DECEMBER	18.0	17.0		17.9	15.2	1.7	14.4
1987 JANUARY	17.6	15.6		43.0	13.9	2.4	13.2
FEBRUARY	19.0	16.1		62.8	13.9	2.8	13.3
MARCH	19.0	17.2		57.6	13.9	4.3	13.4
APRIL	20.4	16.1		55.7	14.5	4.2	14.0
MAY	18.9	17.9		60.0	13.7	8.5	13.4
JUNE	19.1	16.4		69.0	13.8	8.3	13.5
JULY	20.9	13.4		69.2	14.9	5.0	14.3
AUGUST	22.1	15.6		67.6	15.5	2.8	14.8
SEPTEMBER	19.5	10.8		62.0	14.9	4.0	14.3
OCTOBER	22.2	13.5		60.0	15.7	5.1	15.1
Over 6 months (sa)							
1987 MAY	21.9	10.4		82.9	13.1	8.0	12.8
JUNE	24.0	11.1		72.8	15.2	8.7	14.8
JULY	26.3	11.5		45.1	18.4	12.0	18.1
AUGUST	25.1	12.2		48.3	18.0	6.0	17.4
SEPTEMBER	21.7	10.1		25.3	16.8	9.8	16.5
OCTOBER	25.0	9.1		23.5	18.3	15.8	18.2
<b>CHANGES £ MILLION</b>							
-----							
monthly average (sa)							
1984-85 <sup>a</sup>	984	1034	42	-28	139	2221	2090
1985-86 <sup>a</sup>	1565	1207	50	-362	-118	2480	2557
1986-87 <sup>a</sup>	2157	938	17	-372	51	2791	2975
Over 1 month (sa)							
1987 MAY	2337	908	100	-857	2488	914	3402
JUNE	2313	1269	-2	412	3992	236	4228
JULY	3612	936	249	-571	4237	-108	4129
AUGUST	2395	1363	39	12	3799	-167	3632
SEPTEMBER	2393	223	430	207	3270	110	3380
OCTOBER	6189	658	-2	-622	6227	68	6295

<sup>1</sup>Net in flow including Term shares and SAYE.<sup>2</sup>Treasury bills, bank bills, LA temporary debt, CID's and some national savings accounts.<sup>3</sup>March on March.

TABLE 17

## RETAIL DEPOSITS

	BANKS	BUILDING <sup>1</sup> SOCIETIES	NATIONAL SAVINGS <sup>2</sup>	TOTAL
<b>% CHANGES</b>				
<b>Financial years (ua)</b>				
1984-85 <sup>3</sup>	7.1	15.1	11.9	12.0
1985-86 <sup>3</sup>	11.6	15.3	7.5	12.9
1986-87 <sup>3</sup>	17.2	10.8	10.8	12.7
<b>Over 12 months (ua)</b>				
NOVEMBER	15.6	12.2	8.1	12.8
DECEMBER	17.0	11.7	8.4	13.0
1987 JANUARY	15.6	11.4	9.1	12.3
FEBRUARY	16.1	11.0	10.1	12.4
MARCH	17.2	10.8	10.8	12.6
APRIL	16.1	10.6	11.0	12.1
MAY	17.9	10.5	10.8	12.6
JUNE	16.4	10.6	10.5	12.1
JULY	13.4	10.6	9.2	11.0
AUGUST	15.6	10.7	9.7	11.9
SEPTEMBER	10.8	11.7	9.3	10.8
OCTOBER	13.5	10.5	8.3	10.9
<b>Over 6 months (sa)</b>				
1987 MAY	13	10.4	10.5	11.7
JUNE	17.2	11.1	10.4	12.7
JULY	13.1	11.5	8.9	13.6
AUGUST	13.9	12.2	8.1	13
SEPTEMBER	14	10.1	6.9	11.5
OCTOBER	19.7	9.1	5.6	10.9
<b>CHANGES £ MILLION</b>				
<b>monthly average (sa)</b>				
1984-85 <sup>3</sup>	42	1034	683	1759
1985-86 <sup>3</sup>	255	1207	1093	2555
1986-87 <sup>3</sup>	871	938	266	2075
<b>Over 1 month (sa)</b>				
1987 MAY	1233	908	185	2326
JUNE	2305	1269	269	3843
JULY	482	936	203	1621
AUGUST	683	1363	105	2151
SEPTEMBER	744	223	75	1042
OCTOBER	1408	658	-70	1996

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Total retail funds, including terms shares and SAYE.  
<sup>2</sup> Total inflows.  
<sup>3</sup> March on March.

TABLE 18

Breakdown of Bank Lending by instrument (banking months before 1986 October)

	unadjusted					Total s/a	
	Advances	Commercial Bills	Investment <sup>1</sup>	Other <sup>2</sup>	Total		
<u>1984-1986</u>							
<u>% change<sup>3</sup></u>							
1984-85	15.5	27.7	18.0	n/a	17.5	17.5	
1985-86	17.9	-7.4	81.3		16.9	16.8	
<u>Monthly average<sup>3</sup></u>							
1984-85	1131	186	25	91	1433	1452	
1985-86	1438	56	157	11	1661	1692	
Contributions to annual bank lending growth <sup>4</sup>							
<u>Monthly changes</u>							
1986							
	November	2221	420	129	483	3253	3374
	December	2655	1369	221	-272	3973	3599
1987							
	January	905	562	104	-136	1435	1640
	February	2617	-426	70	345	2606	2750
	March	4644	-2026	336	420	3374	2470
	April	1727	-409	210	-398	1130	2202
	May	3626	-2125	290	497	2288	2502
	June	5154	751	-8	-1215	4682	3979
	July	2090	1679	-98	890	4643	4530
	August	2840	-1519	119	-288	1154	2653
	September	5456	+13	-15	66	5520	4330
	October	2545	-500	77	813	2935	2894

1. Investment by banks in private sector

2. Market loans, shipbuilding repos, CD's and time deposits of building societies, commercial paper, and transit items.

3. April on April

4. First four columns equal fifth column.

## COUNTERPARTS TO BROAD MONEY

£ million

	M3	M4
LATEST MONTH : OCTOBER 1987	-----	-----
PSBR	-984	-984
Debt sales (-): Other Public Sector	-45	-111
Central Government	57	-607
Public external & fc finance (-)	2786	2786
-----	-----	-----
Over(-)/under(+) funding	1814	1084
-----	-----	-----
£ lending to private sector	2935	4136
Bank/bank & b society externals (-)	628	514
Bank/bank & b society £NNDLs (-)	103	-579
-----	-----	-----
TOTAL	5480	5155
-----	-----	-----

## FINANCIAL YEAR 1987/88 TO DATE

PSBR	458	458
Debt sales (-): Other Public Sector	1697	813
Central Government	-1483	-1803
Public external & fc finance (-)	3144	3144
-----	-----	-----
Over(-)/under(+) funding	3816	2612
-----	-----	-----
£ lending to private sector	22352	31904
Bank/bank & b society externals (-)	-2028	-2666
Bank/bank & b society £NNDLs (-)	-2273	-4776
-----	-----	-----
TOTAL	21867	27074
-----	-----	-----

## FINANCIAL YEAR 1986/87

PSBR	3343	3343
Debt sales to private sector (-)	-1235	-5840
Public external & fc finance (-)	-1700	-1700
-----	-----	-----
Over(-)/under(+) funding	408	-4197
-----	-----	-----
£ lending to private sector	30299	47406
Bank/bank & b society externals (-)	-676	-1553
Bank/bank & b society £NNDLs (-)	-4601	-8689
-----	-----	-----
TOTAL	25430	32967
-----	-----	-----



Table 20:- BORROWING BY PRIVATE SECTOR EXCLUDING BUILDING SOCIETIES (£ million)

	BANK/BUILDING SOC. STERLING BORROWING			OTHER STERLING BORROWING					ALL BORROWING		
	Banks	Building Societies	TOTAL	Sterling Commercial Paper	Equities	Bonds	Euro-Sterling (*)	TOTAL	Sterling	Foreign Currency	TOTAL
1984											
Q1	5141	3007	8148		163	44	25	232	8380	1102	9482
Q2	2781	4076	6857		429	75	0	504	7361	808	8169
Q3	3285	4087	7372		288	59	100	447	7819	1047	8866
Q4	4535	3402	7937		249	73	210	532	8469	1948	10417
1985											
Q1	7093	3189	10282		924	170	235	1329	11611	3225	14836
Q2	4158	3748	7906		1092	327	230	1649	9555	1382	10937
Q3	4148	3560	7708		873	274	130	1277	8985	-806	8179
Q4	4803	4232	9035		525	89	200	814	9849	939	10788
1986											
Q1	7431	3867	11298		471	209	350	1030	12328	2362	14690
Q2	5465	5083	10548		1369	344	325	2038	12586	1575	14161
Q3	5764	5592	11356		1431	290	231	1952	13308	3688	16996
Q4	10433	4667	15100	67	2338	-52	281	2634	17734	591	18325
1987											
Q1	7074	3464	10538	368	1553	-782	1231	2370	12908	7358	20266
Q2	8571	4240	12811	651	2259	352	655	3917	16728	4633	21361
Q3	11068	3889	14957	284	5950	732	570	7536	22493	-1129	21364
Average per quarter											
1984	3936	3643	7579	0	282	63	84	429	8007	1226	9234
1985	5051	3682	8733	0	854	215	199	1267	10000	1185	11185
1986	7273	4802	12076	16.75	1402	198	297	1914	13989	2054	16043
1987 to q3	8904	3864	12769	434	3254	101	819	4608	17376	3621	20997
1987											
JANUARY	1390	1304	2694	150	500	-67	110	693	3387	1369	4756
FEBRUARY	2600	980	3580	104	870	20	315	1309	4889	2402	7291
MARCH	3084	1180	4264	114	183	-735	806	368	4632	3584	8216
APRIL	1288	1590	2878	192	828	110	355	1485	4363	1236	5599
MAY	2268	1295	3563	171	415	184	150	920	4483	2693	7176
JUNE	5015	1355	6370	288	1016	58	150	1512	7882	749	8631
JULY	4525	1302	5827	131	1840	182	210	2363	8190	-2214	5976
AUGUST	1055	1269	2324	9	2090	390	150	2639	4963	1020	5983
SEPTEMBER	5488	1318	6806	144	2020	160	210	2534	9340	11	9351
OCTOBER	2626	1510	4136	111	1385	190	45	1731	5867	3513	9380

Table 21:- NET FINANCE OF U.K. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL COMPANIES AND BUILDING SOCIETIES (£ million)

	BANK BORROWING				OTHER BORROWING					ALL BORROWING	
	Sterling		Foreign	TOTAL	Sterling Commercial Paper	Equities	Bonds	Euro-Sterling(*)		TOTAL	TOTAL
	ICC's	BSOC's	Currency					ICC's	BSOC's		
1984											
Q1	2905	-86	-895	1924		163	44	25	0	232	2156
Q2	559	-56	-193	310		429	75	0	0	504	814
Q3	1219	533	-74	1678		288	59	100	0	447	2125
Q4	2312	408	1433	4153		249	73	210	0	532	4685
1985											
Q1	3386	6	-606	2786		924	170	235	0	1329	4115
Q2	747	248	47	1042		1092	327	230	0	1649	2691
Q3	229	161	1469	1859		873	274	130	600	1877	3736
Q4	874	351	1444	2669		525	89	200	475	1289	3958
1986											
Q1	3935	89	-879	3145		471	209	350	935	1965	5110
Q2	-172	178	-1120	-1114		1369	344	325	1075	3113	1999
Q3	1055	976	-1072	959		1431	290	231	1575	3527	4486
Q4	4604	187	-50	4741	67	2338	-52	281	0	2634	7375
1987											
Q1	1063	306	2085	3454	368	1553	-782	1231	290	2660	6114
Q2	984	-490	727	1221	651	2259	352	655	50	3967	5188
Q3	3390	-188	-141	3061	284	5950	732	570	100	7636	10697
Average per quarter											
1984	1749	200	68	2016	0	282	63	84	0	429	2445
1985	1309	192	589	2089	0	854	215	199	269	1536	3625
1986	2356	358	-780	1933	17	1402	198	297	896	2809	4743
1987 to q3	1812	-124	890	2579	434	3254	101	819	147	4754	7333
				1986:-	AUGUST	12	698	126	100	650	1586
					SEPTEMBER	31	385	113	0	750	1279
					OCTOBER	76	898	-49	105	0	1030
					NOVEMBER	77	835	-3	0	0	909
					DECEMBER	-86	605	0	176	0	695
				1987:-	JANUARY	150	500	-67	110	0	693
					FEBRUARY	104	870	20	315	140	1449
					MARCH	114	183	-735	806	150	518
					APRIL	192	828	110	355	0	1485
					MAY	171	415	184	150	50	970
					JUNE	288	1016	58	150	0	1512
					JULY	131	1840	182	210	0	2363
					AUGUST	9	2090	390	150	0	2639
					SEPTEMBER	144	2020	160	210	100	2634
					OCTOBER	111	1385	190	45	0	1731

\* Gross Issues announced by U.K. ICC's and Building Societies

NOTE/ Bank borrowing figures include monetary sector holdings of 'Other Borrowing' instruments, giving rise to some double counting in the 'All Borrowing' figures.

## FUNDING AND MONEY MARKET ASSISTANCE - FINANCIAL YEAR 1987/88

	APR-OCT 1987	£ million	u/a
CGBR	3744		
Gilt sales to nbps and overseas (inc-)	-4816		
Other CG debt sales to nbps incl Treasury bills* (-)	-1607		
CG external and fc finance other than BGS(-)	7892		
Funding of the CGBR Over(-)/under(+)	5213		5213
		Other BGS sales (-)	547
OPS net of on lending	-3286	Other CG debt sales (-)	45
OPS debt sales to nbps(-)	1697	Notes and coins (-)	-1138
OPS currency finance(-)	192	Other incl exchequer (-)	-603
Funding of OPS Over(-)/under(+)	-1397	CG bank deposits (+)	79
	-----	Total influences*	4143
Funding of PSBR Over(-)/under(+)	3816	(surplus+,shortage-)	-----
		Change in bankers deposits (-)	196
		Change in level of assistance (+) #	-4339
		of which	
		Issue Department bills	-2784
		Banking Department bills	682
		Market advances	-1364
		Repos	-874
		Level of assistance	
		End March 1986	13317
		End March 1987	9742
		End October 1987	5403

\* Treasury bills usually included below the line in the Money Market Assistance Table

# Surplus on influences leads to a fall in assistance and vice versa

## MONETARY AGGREGATES : FORECAST GROWTH RATES

percent

## Not seasonally adjusted

M0

M3

M4

-----  
1 MONTH % CHANGE TO:

1987 AUG			0.1	1.3	1.0
SEP			0.1	0.9	1.0
OCT			-0.2	3.1	1.8
NOV	)	*	0.3	1.4	1.1
DEC	) FORECAST		n/a	1.5	1.6
JAN	)		n/a	-0.9	0.0

## 12 MONTH % CHANGE TO:

1987 AUG			4.5	22.1	15.5
SEP			5.2	19.5	14.9
OCT			5.2	22.2	15.7
NOV	)	*	4.9	22.1	15.8
DEC	) FORECAST		n/a	23.6	16.8
JAN	)		n/a	23.5	17.0

## Seasonally adjusted

-----  
1 MONTH % CHANGE TO:

1987 AUG			0.3	1.4	1.3
SEP			0.8	1.4	1.1
OCT			0.6	3.5	2.1
NOV	)	*	0.3	0.8	0.9
DEC	) FORECAST		0.8	1.6	1.4
JAN	)		0.5	0.7	0.2

## 12 MONTH % CHANGE TO:

1987 AUG			4.7	21.8	15.0
SEP			4.9	19.8	14.6
OCT			5.6	22.9	15.7
NOV	)	*	4.9	22.7	15.7
DEC	) FORECAST		4.3	23.9	16.7
JAN	)		5.4	23.3	16.8

\* Provisional November outturn for M0

SECRET

TABLE 24: MO FORECAST

SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

	LEVELS £ MILLION			% CHANGE ON PREVIOUS MONTH		% CHANGE ON YEAR EARLIER	
	Notes and coin	Bankers' Deposits	MO	Notes and coin	MO	Notes and coin	MO
<b>ACTUAL</b>							
April	14,916	204	15,120	+0.7	+0.5	+4.6	+4.8
May	14,984	204	15,188	+0.5	+0.4	+4.5	+4.4
June	15,075	137	15,212	+0.6	+0.2	+4.6	+4.2
July	15,166	235	15,401	+0.6	+1.2	+4.7	+5.4
August	15,258	182	15,440	+0.6	+0.3	+4.6	+4.7
September	15,376	184	15,560	+0.8	+0.8	+5.0	+4.9
October	15,457	202	15,659	+0.5	+0.6	+5.2	+5.6
November	15,524	183	15,707	+0.4	+0.3	+4.9(4.9)	+4.9(5.0)
<b>FORECAST</b>							
December	15,650	190	15,840	+0.8	+0.8	4.7(4.6)	4.3(4.2)
January	15,730	190	15,920	+0.5	+0.5	5.3(5.0)	5.4(5.2)
February	15,780	190	15,970	+0.3	+0.3	6.5(6.5)	6.6(6.6)
March	15,830	190	16,020	+0.3	+0.3	6.9(6.9)	6.5(6.5)

\* Last month's forecast in brackets.

## TABLE 25: MONEY MARKET INFLUENCES

£ million  
not seasonally adjusted

	Actual		Forecast	
	1987 OCT	NOV	DEC 1988	JAN
<b>A. <u>Money market influences</u></b>				
(i) CGBR (+)	-730	-250	800	-6200
(ii) Reserves etc (+)	3921	25	0	0
(iii) Notes and coin (-)	-537	300	-800	725
(iv) National Savings (-)	1	0	-50	-125
(v) CTDs (-)	-282	50	200	1100
(vi) Gilts (-)	-1474	-125	-775	-525
(vii) Other Exchequer items etc	-221	0	0	0
<b>A. TOTAL MONEY MARKET INFLUENCES</b> (Market surplus + / shortage -)	678	0	-625	-5025
<b>B. <u>Money market operations</u></b>				
(i) Commercial bills (purchase +):				
Issue Department - outright	-1191			
- repo terms	1080			
Banking Department	-83			
(ii) LA bills (purchase +)				
Issue Department	-49			
Banking Department	-28			
(iii) Treasury bills (purchase +)	-400	-1800	500	1500
(iv) Market advances	56			
(v) Export Credit/Shipbuilding Repos	0			
(vi) Gilt Repos	0			
<b>B. TOTAL MONEY MARKET OPERATIONS</b>	-615	0	625	5025
<b>C. Change in bankers balances</b> = A + B	63			
<b>D. TOTAL ASSISTANCE OUTSTANDING</b> (excluding Treasury bills) = previous level + B - B(iii)	5403	7200	7325	10850
of which commercial bills	5808	5257	5375	8900

## TIMING OF GOVERNMENT SHARE SALES

The timetable now stands as follows:

1987

BP(I)	(28 October (Offer closes) (30 October (dealings start)
-------	--

An issue of BT bonus shares is planned in December/January based on a record date of 30 November, and that £250m of BT prefs are to be repaid in December.

1988

BGC(III)	19 April
BAA(II)	19 May
BP(II)	30 August

1989

BP(III)	27 April
---------	----------

SECRET




MONTHLY MONETARY REPORT : CHARTS

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
- I Exchange Rate Short Term
- II UK/US interest rate differential
- III Narrow money growth
- IV Broad money growth
- V Real M0 growth
- VI Real Broad money
- VII FSBR budget profile M0
- VIII FSBR budget profile M3
- IX M0 growth against target
- X Retail Deposits
- XI Bank and Building Society Lending
- XII £ Corporate bond issues
- XIII Bill Mountain
- XIV Nominal Interest Rates
- XV Yield Curve
- XVI Real Yields
- XVII House prices 1
- XVIII House prices 2
- XIX Capital Markets




# CHART I: EXCHANGE RATE



# UK/US INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIAL




# CHART III NARROW MONEY



# CHART IV BROAD MONEY


Annual percentage growth (ua)

12 MONTH PERCENTAGE GROWTH



# CHART V REAL MO

Annual percentage growth (sa)



# CHART VI REAL BROAD MONEY

Annual percentage growth (ua)




CHART VII

# COMPARISON OF 1987 BUDGET FORECAST WITH OUT-TURN FOR MO




CHART VIII

# COMPARISON OF 1987 BUDGET FORECAST WITH OUT-TURN FOR M3








Chart IX

# MO GROWTH (SA) COMPARED TO TARGET RANGE

CHART IX




# CHART X RETAIL DEPOSITS



# ANNUAL GROWTH OF THE STOCK OF LENDING TO THE NON BANK PRIVATE SECTOR


CHART XI



# STERLING BOND ISSUES BY UK AND OVERSEAS INSTITUTIONS


## (DOMESTIC AND EURO MARKETS)

CHART XII




# BILL MOUNTAIN RANGE

CHART XIII



# NOMINAL INTEREST RATES

CHART XIV



23rd November 1987

Time / Yield curves of British Government Stocks  
The curves have been fitted to the gross redemption yields on stocks with one year or more to maturity. They are not reliable below 2 years, and the 1-year yield is calculated as an average of 4 stock yields.

LA: 3-month deposit rate.  
TB: Market rate of discount, expressed as an annual yield.  
Debenture Yield: FT 15 year  
FT All Share Index gross dividend yield 4.46

### CHART XV





CHART XVI

# REAL YIELDS






# ANNUAL HOUSE PRICE INFLATION


CHART XVII

- DOE ( APPROVAL )
- - - DOE ( COMPLETION )
- · - · HALIFAX




### CHART 18 HOUSE PRICES

#### QUARTERLY HOUSE PRICES




#### MONTHLY HOUSE PRICES



#### INDICES OF RELATIVE HOUSE PRICES

BASED ON DOE MIX ADJUSTED HOUSE PRICE INDEX



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