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GRS 750 CONFIDENTIAL FM LUANDA Ø51937Z TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 140 OF 5 APRIL INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND CAPETOWN INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, SALISBURY, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM, GABOFONE, OTTAWA AND HAVANA.

ZIMBABWE/NAMIBIA: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

1. I WAS CALLED AT TWO HOURS NOTICE THIS MORNING (5 APRIL) TO SEE PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS. HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO RECEIVE ME AND TO EXTEND A PERSONAL WELCOME. HE WANTED TO EXPLAIN HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IN RELATION TO SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS.

## 2. ZIMBABWE

THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WANTED TO QUOTE-MANIFEST ITS SATISFACTION. THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS HAD BEEN FAIR AND REFLECTED THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-UNQUOTE. HE HAD ALREADY SENT CONGRAT-ULATORY MESSAGES TO ROBERT MUGABE AND TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (NO MENTION OF NKOMO BY NAME). NOW HE WANTED TO QUOTE-CONGRATULATE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR THE JUST SCLUTION THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO ACHEIVE. IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONSOLIDATE ZIMBABWE'S INDEPENDENCE AFTER THE LONG STRUGGLE AND ANGOLA WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH THE NEW COUNTRY-UNQUOTE. PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO CONVEY THIS MESSAGE.

## 3. NAMIBIA

ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT REMAINED CONCERNED AND PREOCCUPIED OVER NAMIBIA. THEY WELCOMED DR WALDHEIM'S LATEST STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF EARLY APPLICATION OF SC 435. DOS SANTOS SAID HE QUOTE-COULD SEE NO CONFLICT BETWEEN SC 435 AND THE DEMILIT-ARISED ZONE PROPOSED BY ANGOLA AND ELABORATED BY THE FIVE AND THE SECRETARIAT-UNQUOTE. THE DMZ, FIRST DISCUSSED AT LUANDA. WAS QUOTE-NOT AN OBJECTIVE IN ITSELF. BUT A MEANS OF SUPPORT-UNQUOTE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD CAST DOUBT ON THE GUARANTEES OFFERED BY ANGOLA AGAINST SWAPO INFILTRATION INTO NAMIBIA. BUT SOUTH AFRICAN DOUBTS WERE NOT QUOTE-VALID-UNQUOTE. THE DMZ AND UNTAG PATROLLING ON THE ANGCLAN SIDE WOULD PROVIDE A GUARANTEE. FULL ANGOLAN COOPERATION AND FACILITIES FOR UNTAG PATROLS IN THE ANGOLAN DMZ HAD BEEN OFFERED DURING TECHNICAL TALKS WITH GENERAL PREM CHAND (MY TELNO 351 OF 11 FEBRUARY). 14.

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4. PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY THAT QUOTE-THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS PROVIDING AN OBSTACLE TO ESTABLISHING A DMZ-UNQUOTE. THE CUBANS WERE PRESENT ONLY AT ANGOLAN REQUEST AND QUOTE-TO HELP US AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. IT IS ANGOLANS WHO FIGHT NOW AGAINST INCURSIONS BY SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES AND UNITA BANDS NOT CUBANS-UNQUOTE. NOTHING HAD YET BEEN SAID PUBLICLY ABOUT THIS DECISION BUT QUOTE-WE CAN ASSURE THE DMZ WITH OUR OWN HANDS. WE GUARANTEE THAT THE UN PROCESS WILL NOT BE UPSET BY INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH, THE PROBLEM LIES IN NAMIBIA-UNQUOTE. I PROBED ABOUT SUGGESTIONS THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GENERAL WITHDRAWAL NORTHWARDS OF CUBAN MILITARY DETACHMENTS. PRESIDENT SIMPLY REPEATED QUOTE- THERE WILL BE NO CUBANS IN OUR DMZ-UNQUOTE.

5. DOS SANTOS ENDED BY AN EARNEST RE-AFFIRMATION OF HIS WISH TO WORK FOR APPLICATION OF THE UN PLAN AND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

ANGOLA HAD NO AMBITIONS BEYOND HER BORDERS AND PLENTY TO DO WITHIN THEM TO ACHEIVE UNITY AND RECONSTRUCTION. IN VIEW OF SUCCESFUL. OUTCOME IN ZIMBABWE HE HOPED THA FIVE WOULD CONTINUE TO QUOTE-EXERCISE THEIR ROLE AND TO WORK UPON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO CONVINCE THEM TO GO FORWARD-UNQUOTE. FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE CALLING THE THREE AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

<sup>6.</sup> I THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS MESSAGE CONCERNING ZIMBABWE, ASSURED HIM THIS WOULD BE TRANSMITTED AND ASKED IF ANY DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ABOUT ATTENDANCE AT ZIMBABWE'S INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS. I WAS ASKED TO TELEPHONE PRESIDENT'S CHEF DE CABINET ON 7 APRIL.

<sup>7.</sup> TURINING TO NAMIBIA I TOLD PRESIDENT OF DR VILJOEN'S PRIVATE
VISIT TO LONDON AND REASONS FOR HIS RECEPTION BY MINISTERS AND
SPOKE ON LINES OF YOUR TELNO 271 OF 3 APRIL TO UKMIS NEW YORK. DOS
SANTOS LISTENED WITH INTEREST AND SAID HE UNDERSTOOD REASONS FOR
VILJOEN'S RECEPTION AND HOPED YOUP MEETING WOULD HELP TOWARDS
A MORE FORTHCOMING SAG REPLY TO THE UN ON THE DMZ. I SAID YOU
HAD PRESSED THE POINT THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT. AT SAME TIME WE
WERE URGING QUOTE-REASONABLE FATIENCE-UNQUOTE BY THE FLS AND HOPED HE
WOULD FEEL ABLE TO INSTRUCT THE ANGOLAN REPRESENTATIVE AT NEW YORK
IN THIS SENSE. I GCT NO POSITIVE ASSURANCE, BUT A NOD AND ADMISSION
THAT RHODESIAN ELECTION RESULT AND INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE
NATIONAL PARTY (QUOTE-QUITE BAD-UNQUOTE) COMPLICATED AND SLOWED SAG'S
RESPONSE. IT WAS NECESSARY SOMEHOW TO CREATE GREATER CONFIDENCE.

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## CONFIDENTIAL 8. I TOLD DOS SANTOS THAT PRESIDENT NETO HAD USED A SIMILAR PHRASE WITH ME LAST AUGUST (MY TELNO 309 OF 8 AUGUST 1979). I UNDERSTOOD THAT POSSIBILITY OF VISITS BY STAFF OF PROPOSED UN LIAISON OFFICE AT LUANDA TO SWAPO CAMPS HAD BEEN CONSIDERED. SPEAKING PERSONALLY I THOUGHT ANYTHING THE ANGOLAN SIDE COULD DO TO ASSURE THIS SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT. PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD BEAR THIS IN MIND, I THANKED HIM FOR CALLING ME AND HOPED I MIGHT ASK TO SEE HIM AGAIN IF MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE AROSE. DOS SANTOS SAID I SHOULD FEEL FREE TO ASK. 9. COMMENT TO FOLLOW. FCC PLEASE PASS ALL AND ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES BYATT [REPEATED AS REQUESTED] [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET] DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION C AF D OADS ECD SOUTHERN AFRICA ES & SD UND FRD M & C D NAD WED CABINET OFFICE

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