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FM PARIS 311535Z JUL 81

TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 31 JULY 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, BONN, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAPE TOWN.

INFO PRIORITY LUANDA, SALISBURY, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, NAIROBI, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM ALLINSON.

PARIS TELNO 658 TO FCO (REPEATED TO YOU): **ANGOLA**

1. AFTER TODAY'S MEETING OF NAMIBIA CONTACT GROUP IN PARIS CROCKER TOLD ME GENERAL HAIG WAS LIKELY IN MARGIN OF CANCUN MEETING TO MENTION PROBLEM OF CUBANS.
2. AT THE MEETING IN OUR DISCUSSION OF US PAPER (PARAS 2 AND 3 OF TUR) CANADIANS AND GERMANS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICANS INFORMING ANGOLANS FRANKLY BUT SEPARATELY FROM OUTSET OF RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS ON NAMIBIA BY FIVE ABOUT UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICAN CONCERN REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF CUBANS.
3. GERMANS ON MR GENSCHER'S INSTRUCTIONS EMPHASISED THAT THERE MUST NOT (REPEAT NOT) BE ANY LINKAGE WITH NAMIBIAN NEGOTIATION. ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT BE ASKED TO COMMIT SUICIDE. AFRICAN COUNTRIES WERE BETTER PLACED THAN FIVE TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION WITH UNITA. BUT GERMANY COULD NOT OPPOSE THE UNITED STATES OR OTHERS USING ANY LEVERAGE THEY MIGHT HAVE TO SECURE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF JOINT EFFORT BY FIVE.
4. CANADIANS SPOKE SIMILARLY AND QUESTIONED CROCKER'S INTERPRETATION OF MONTEBELLO DISCUSSION AS CONSTITUTING CHARTER FOR ACTION BY ALL FIVE IN CONCERT. BUT BOTH CANADIANS AND GERMANS ENDORSED COMMON OBJECTIVE OF SECURING CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.
5. FRENCH SAID MATTER SHOULD BE RAISED WITH ANGOLA WHEN FIVE WERE FURTHER ADVANCED ON NAMIBIA; THE RIGHT MOMENT COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED YET. EACH OF THE FIVE SHOULD MAKE OTHER COUNTRIES AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES IMPOSED BY CUBAN PRESENCE.
6. FOR UK I SAID NAMIBIAN SOLUTION WOULD HELP TO SECURE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. WE HAD AS RESULT OF PRESSURE OVER A PERIOD ALREADY GOT ANGOLANS TO SAY PUBLICLY THAT THEY WISHED TO RUN DOWN CUBAN PRESENCE AND TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH WEST. THE BEST COURSE MIGHT BE FOR THE US TO ACT DIRECTLY WITH ANGOLANS, KEEPING REST OF THE FIVE INFORMED OF THEIR PROGRESS. THE OTHER FOUR WOULD NEED TO CONSIDER WHAT SUPPORTING ACTION MIGHT BE OPEN TO THEM.

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7. CROCKER INDICATED THAT HE HAD HOPED WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO AGREE A PACKAGE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND POSSIBLY MILITARY INDUCEMENTS FOR ANGOLA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NAMIBIA GROUP MEETING. HE MADE IT VERY PLAIN THAT US DID NOT BELIEVE A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED FOR THE NEXT FIVE TO FIFTEEN YEARS UNLESS PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON THE CUBAN PROBLEM. AND IF THE ATTEMPT FAILED ON THAT SCORE THE US WOULD NOT BLAME SOUTH AFRICA, NOR BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON HER IN CONSEQUENCE. THE US LOOKED TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIVE TO SUPPORT THE EFFORT IN WHATEVER WAYS WERE FOUND TO BE APPROPRIATE WHILST ACCEPTING THAT IT WAS NOT A MATTER IN WHICH THE NAMIBIAN CONTACT GROUP SHOULD ENGAGE ITSELF. HOWEVER THE US DID COUNT ON THE OTHER FOUR FOR SUPPORT. IF THE PROBLEM OF SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS NOT RESOLVED CONFLICT WOULD SPREAD IN THE AREA WITH VERY GRAVE DANGERS FOR US ALL.

8. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE SEPARATE NATURE OF THE NAMIBIAN AND ANGOLAN NEGOTIATIONS IT WAS AGREED THAT WHILE A LETTER SHOULD BE SENT BY THE FIVE TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS SEEKING CONFIRMATION OF THE BASIS OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, THE AMERICANS WOULD TAKE SEPARATE ACTION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ABOUT THE CUBAN ISSUE.

9. CROCKER TOLD ME HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE MEETING WHICH HE BELIEVED HAD CLEARED THE AIR. HOWEVER IT APPEARED TO OUR SIDE THAT THE GERMANS AND CANADIANS SHOWED LITTLE DISPOSITION TO GIVE WAY AND THAT MR HAIG IS LIKELY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THEM TO GIVE MORE THAN LIP SERVICE SUPPORT TO THE EFFORT TO MOVE THE ANGOLANS. TO THE DEGREE THAT AMERICANS ARE WILLING, AS INDICATED BY CROCKER TO SEEK INDUCEMENTS TO ENCOURAGE THE ANGOLANS TO RESPOND FIRMLY AS A RESULT OF ECONOMIC AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, A SHOMEWHAT MORE FAVOURABLE GERMAN AND CANADIAN RESPONSE MAY BE POSSIBLE. THE SUBJECT WILL BE TAKEN UP AGAIN AT THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING ON 4 AUGUST.

10. CROCKER ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS WILL SEEK A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN UNITA AND THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVED THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED ESPECIALLY IF OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES COULD BE PERSUADED TO PLAY A LEADING PART IN SEEKING IT. THE GENERAL FEELING OF THE REST OF US WAS THAT WHILST ELEMENTS OF UNITA MIGHT BE ACCEPTED IT WAS HARD TO ENVISAGE A PLACE FOR SAVIMBI.

11. SEE MIFT.

HIBBERT.

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