

GPS 220

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RESKBY 131600Z

FM BONN 131445Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 607 OF 13 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS

INFO ROUTINE OTTAWA LUANDA UKMIS NEW YORK CAPE TOWN

YOUR TELNO 1204 TO WASHINGTON: ANGOLA

1. WE SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO HOLL (ACTING HEAD OF THE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT). IT PROVED NECESSARY TO USE THE DISCRETION GIVEN BY THE DEPARTMENT (TELECON ELDON/FULLER) TO GIVE HIM ON A PERSONAL BASIS SOMETHING OF THE BACKGROUND TO OUR DECISION TO GIVE THE REVISED DRAFT TO THE AMERICANS.

2. HOLL REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON WHETHER THE REVISED DRAFT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HERR GENSCHER. HE (GENSCHER) WAS ON HOLIDAY AND NOT YET FULLY INFORMED OF THE US DEMARCHE (WHICH WAS MADE HERE AT STATE SECRETARY LEVEL ON 11 AUGUST). THE SITUATION WAS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY A MESSAGE WHICH CHEYSSON HAD SENT YESTERDAY TO HAIG (WHICH, WE UNDERSTAND FROM ANOTHER CONTACT IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT, INDICATED THAT FRANCE COULD NOT ACCEPT A COMMON DIPLOMATIC LINE ON THE PROBLEM OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL), AND THE LATTER'S SECOND MESSAGE TO HIS FOUR COLLEAGUES. HERR GENSCHER WOULD HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN MAINTAINING THE HARD LINE THAT HE PUT FORWARD AT MONTEBELLO - TO WHICH THE FRENCH POSITION NOW SEEMED CLOSE - AND THE SOFTER TACTICS FAVOURED BY THE UK. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHAT HE WOULD DECIDE.

3. HILLER (DESK OFFICER FOR ANGOLA) SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US THAT HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT HIS MINISTER WOULD PROBABLY RECONCILE HIMSELF TO ACCEPTING SOMETHING ON THE LINES OF OUR REVISED DRAFT. BUT WE CLEARLY CANNOT YET RELY ON THIS.

TAYLOR

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