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FM WASHINGTON 132327Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2418 OF 13 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE TO PARIS BONN OTTAWA PRIORITY CAPE TOWN UKMIS NEW YORK  
AND LUANDA

YOUR TELNOS 1202 TO 1206: ANGOLA.

1. I SPOKE TO EAGLEBURGER TODAY AND LEFT HIM AN AIDE MEMOIRE BASED ON YOUR TELNO 1205 (I HAD NOT YET RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 1212). I EMPHASIZED THAT WE SUPPORTED THE AMERICAN OBJECTIVES AND WOULD GIVE THEM DIPLOMATIC BACKING FOR THEIR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ANGOLANS LEADING TO THE POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS: OUR DIFFERENCES WERE ESSENTIALLY ABOUT TACTICS.

2. EAGLEBURGER SAID IT HAD SEEMED TO HIM IN PARIS THAT THERE WAS A DIVERGENCE ON SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS AS MUCH AS ON TACTICS. HAIG AND HE WERE WORRIED THAT THE FIVE WERE FAILING TO AGREE ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE, I.E. THAT ALTHOUGH CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA WAS NOT A PRE-CONDITION FOR A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT, THE PARALLEL NEGOTIATING TRACKS MUST EVENTUALLY CROSS. WAS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE FIVE TO AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES ON THE U S FORMULATION THAT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD FACILITATE A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT? HAIG INSISTED THAT HE WOULD NOT PROCEED WITH CONTACTS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS, ANGOLANS AND ALL THE OTHER PARTIES ONLY TO FIND DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE FIVE ON THE FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH

3. I REPLIED THAT OUR FORMULATION IN YOUR TELNO 1206 (A COPY OF WHICH I GAVE HIM) WAS DESIGNED TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO OBTAIN COMMON AGREEMENT AMONG THE FIVE. EAGLEBURGER SAID HE WOULD NEED TO THINK ABOUT THIS AND DISCUSS IT WITH HAIG. BUT AT FIRST SIGHT HE THOUGHT THAT THE TEXT DID INDEED COME CLOSER TO MEETING THE AMERICANS' MAIN CONCERN THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DAY-LIGHT BETWEEN THE U S AND ITS PARTNERS IN THE FIVE WHEN THE TIME CAME TO DISCUSS WITH THE ANGOLANS THE QUESTION OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. HE ALSO EXPRESSED INITIAL SATISFACTION WITH PARA 5 OF YOUR TELNO 1205 WHICH SEEMED TO HIM TO GET IT JUST RIGHT

4. EAGLEBURGER SAID HE WOULD IDEALLY LIKE TO KEEP THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS AT ARMS LENGTH FROM SOUTHERN AFRICAN QUESTIONS BUT THAT HE WOULD PLAY ALONG IF THIS WAS NECESSARY TO SATISFY GERMAN AND FRENCH SENSITIVITY THAT THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED SEPARATELY FROM THE CONTACT GROUP'S DISCUSSIONS ON NAMIBIA. HE SUGGESTED THAT AT THEIR NEXT MEETING IN WASHINGTON THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS MIGHT CONSIDER HOW TO ORCHESTRATE THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO BE MADE BY INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE FIVE TOWARDS REACHING THE AGREED OBJECTIVES ON ANGOLA (E.G. WHO SHOULD TALK TO WHOM).

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5. I SAID THAT MY CALL CONSITUTED A REPLY TO HAIG'S ORAL MESSAGE OF 10 AUGUST, ALTHOUGH MY COMMENTS ALSO COVERED MOST OF THE POINTS CONTAINED IN HIS SUBSEQUENT WRITTEN MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 1210). EAGLEBURGER WRYLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME CONFUSION MIGHT HAVE ARISEN FROM THE TWO SIMILAR MESSAGES, BUT HE DID NOT ELABORATE ON THE REASONS FOR THIS. I HAVE SINCE RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 1212 AND WILL SPEAK TO HIM AGAIN ALONG THE LINES OF PARAGRAPHS 2A TO 2E. WE WILL ALSO GENTLY INSERT YOUR THOUGHTS ABOUT THE ILL-JUDGED NATURE OF THE AMERICAN MESSAGES AT A DIFFERENT LEVEL TOMORROW.

6. EAGLEBURGER UNDERTOOK TO GIVE THE AIDE MEMOIRE AND OUR PROPOSED REDRAFT OF THE LINE FOR USE WITH THE ANGOLANS TO HAIG THIS EVENING

7. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION, STOESSEL TOLD US THAT HAIG WAS DETERMINED TO CLEAR THE AIR BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER. HAIG (AND STOESSEL) THOUGHT THAT OFFICIALS MIGHT NOT BE REFLECTING IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE AMERICANS THOUGHT HAD BEEN REACHED BY MINISTERS ON OVERALL OBJECTIVES AT THE OTTAWA SUMMIT. HE SPECIFICALLY THOUGHT THAT CHEYSSON ACCEPTED THE AMERICAN APPROACH BUT THAT THIS HAD NOT FILTERED DOWN TO OFFICIAL LEVEL. WE REPLIED THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS NOT TO BREAK UP THE FIVE THOUGH OVER-HASTY ACTION: IT OFFERED BOTH US AND THE AFRICANS THE ONLY PEACEFUL COURSE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT

8. OUR CONTACTS WITH THESE AND OTHER OFFICIALS THROUGHOUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT INDICATE THAT THERE IS NOW A STRONG CURRENT RUNNING IN FAVOUR OF PULLING OUT OF THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS ALTOGETHER UNLESS THERE IS SOME MOVEMENT BY THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIVE TOWARDS U S INSISTENCE ON ASSOCIATING THE ANGOLAN AND NAMIBIAN PROBLEMS. OUR REPLY SEEMS TO HAVE ENCOURAGE EAGLEBURGER: BUT THE AMERICANS ARE OBVIOUSLY WORRIED THAT OUR PARTNERS MAY NOT SHOW SIMILAR FLEXIBILITY.

THOMAS

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