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FM FCO 141130Z AUG 81  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1216 OF 14 AUGUST  
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA  
INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN, LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK

FROM ALLINSON

YOUR TELNO 2418: ANGOLA

1. THANK YOU FOR ALL THESE VALUABLE EFFORTS WITH THE AMERICANS. I SPOKE SIMILARLY YESTERDAY TO LANNON WALKER (STATE DEPARTMENT), HOLL (AUSWAERTIGES AMT, BONN - SEE BONN TELNO 607) AND GRENIER, MINISTER AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY, AND BARDER SPOKE TO DAHAN AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY. WE URGED ALL OF THEM NOT TO ALLOW CURRENT EXCHANGES BETWEEN US TO PUT AT RISK THE FUTURE WORK OF THE FIVE AND NOT TO MAKE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT LIKELY TO HAVE THAT EFFECT: NOT TO REACT TOO HASTILY TO THE TONE AND LANGUAGE OF SOME RECENT MESSAGES, ESPECIALLY WHEN SO MANY OF THE MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS MAINLY CONCERNED ARE ON HOLIDAY: AND TO SEE WHETHER WE COULD NOT AGREE TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE BASIS OF THE LANGUAGE SUGGESTED IN FCO TELNO 1206 OR SOMETHING LIKE IT. IN BRIEF OUR MESSAGE TO EVERYONE WAS TO COOL IT.

2. ALL SEEMED REASONABLY RECEPTIVE TO THIS APPROACH AND PROMISED TO CONSIDER OUR REDRAFT CAREFULLY. DAHAN (WHO SAID HE HAD NOT YET SEEN THE SECOND MESSAGE FROM MR HAIG IN FCO TELNO 1210 OR THE UK REDRAFT IN FCO TELNO 1206) WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON THE NATURE OF M. CHEYSSON'S REPLY TO MR HAIG'S FIRST MESSAGE (SEE PARA 2 OF BONN TELNO 607), BUT LANNON WALKER SURPRISED ME BY SAYING THAT CHEYSSON HAD TELEPHONED MR HAIG FROM WHEREVER HE IS ON HOLIDAY AND HAD BEEN 'GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE'.

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3. WE REMAIN MUCH CONCERNED BY CONTINUING INDICATIONS THAT THE AMERICANS CONTEMPLATE PULLING OUT (EG PARA 8 OF YTUR) AND OF CANADIAN AND (ESPECIALLY) FRENCH AND FRG INCLINATIONS TO REFUSE TO COME TO ANY COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUES WITH THE AMERICANS (FCO TELNO 294 TO OTTAWA AND BONN TELNO 607).
4. IN REINFORCING OUR REQUESTS TO PARTNERS FOR TIME FOR CALM REFLECTION ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US, PLEASE DRAW ON THE FOREGOING AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
- A) WE STILL DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US ON THE ISSUE OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. WE ALL AGREE THAT THIS IS A DESIRABLE OBJECTIVE. WE SHOULD SURELY ALL BE ABLE TO AGREE WITH THE 'BOTTON LINE' AMERICAN FORMULATION THAT 'CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA WOULD FACILITATE A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT'. IT IS A STATEMENT OF FACT. WHERE WE DIFFER IS ON TACTICS. BUT THE FOUR WOULD BE ILL-ADVISED TO OBJECT TO THE AMERICANS TRYING TO NEGOTIATE BILATERALLY WITH THE ANGOLANS ON A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ON THE FIRM AND EXPLICIT UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE IS NO FORMAL LINKAGE WITH THE NAMIBIAN NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL IS NOT STATED TO BE A PRE-CONDITION OF FURTHER PROGRESS ON NAMIBIA. THAT THERE IS AN IMPLICIT LINK BETWEEN THE TWO, IE A SOLUTION OF EITHER ISSUE WOULD FACILITATE THE SOLUTION OF THE OTHER, IS AGAIN A STATEMENT OF FACT (CROCKER'S 'EMPIRICAL CONNECTION').
- B) WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE BREAK-UP OF THE FIVE WOULD RESULT IN INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS FOR ALL OF US, IN OUR DEALINGS NOT ONLY WITH AFRICA BUT ALSO WITH THE THIRD WORLD IN GENERAL. THE SOLE BENEFICIARIES WOULD BE THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND THE RUSSIANS. IT WOULD ALSO MEAN INDEFINITE PROLONGATION OF THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM WITH CONSEQUENT INCREASED INSTABILITY IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR FRIENDS.

CARRINGTON

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