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PP LISBON
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FM FCO 171700Z AUGUST 81
TO PRIORITY LISBON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 075 OF 17 AUGUST 1981
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, LUANDA, CAPETOWN, BONN,
PARIS, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK

FROM CAFD
ANGOLA

1. PORTUGUESE CHARGE (MACEDO) CALLED ON THE DEPARTMENT ON INSTRUCTIONS THIS MORNING.
2. MACEDO SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY THE IMPASSE OVER NAMIBIA. THIS WAS THE RESULT OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTRANSIGENCE AND HAD NOT BEEN ASSISTED BY CERTAIN AMBIGUITIES IN THE US POSITION. THE SITUATION IN THE REGION WAS DETERIORATING WITH THE INCREASE IN FIGHTING OVER THE NAMIBIA/ANGOLA BORDER. UNITA REMAINED EFFECTIVE ALTHOUGH NOT A THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT'S SURVIVAL. ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE REGION WAS NOT IN WESTERN INTERESTS AND WOULD SERVE ONLY TO REINFORCE CUBAN/SOVIET INFLUENCE. THE PORTUGUESE STILL BELIEVED THAT A QUICK SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM WOULD LEAD TO THE SOLUTION OF OTHER DIFFICULTIES IN THE REGION.
3. THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT THEY NOW HAD SOME ROLE TO PLAY GIVEN ITS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES AND ANGOLA. THEY WISHED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO BUILD ON THE COMMON GROUND THAT EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES RATHER THAN TO ACT AS A CHANNEL FOR TRANSMITTING IRRECONCILABLE VIEWS. NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT PROCEED ON FOLLOWING BASIS:
 - (A) A COMMON REAFFIRMATION OF SUPPORT FOR SCR 435:
 - (B) RESPECT FOR ANGOLA'S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS TO SETTLE THEIR OWN

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INTERNAL PROBLEMS:

(C) RECIPROCAL GUARANTEES, WHEREBY THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD LIMIT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN ANGOLA AND REDUCE SUPPORT FOR UNITA AND THE ANGOLANS WOULD GIVE A COMMITMENT FOR THE GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF CUBANS AS IMPROVEMENTS IN THEIR SECURITY SITUATION PERMITTED, AND WOULD PROMISE TO REDUCE SUPPORT FOR SWAPO.

4. IT WAS CLEAR THAT VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT RECOGNISED THAT THEY NOW NEEDED URGENT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE WEST. THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PROFESSIONAL HELP TO ANGOLA.

5. MACEDO SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY OUTLINED THEIR PROPOSAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS, THE ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE US AND WERE IN THE PROCESS OF INFORMING OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIVE.

6. WE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THIS APPROACH TO MINISTERS. WE SAID THAT WE AGREED WITH THE PORTUGUESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA AND OF THE RISKS TO WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE REGION ARISING FROM THE CONTINUED LACK OF PROGRESS ON NAMIBIA. WE ASKED TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS' AND THE ANGOLANS' REACTIONS TO THE PORTUGUESE APPROACH. WE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE FACT THAT THE PORTUGUESE HAD SELECTED PAULO JORGE AS INTERLOCUTOR (HE HAD ALWAYS APPEARED TO US TO BE ONE OF THE MORE DOCTRINAIRE MARXIST MEMBERS OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT AND DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH.)

7. PLEASE SEE COMMENTS IN MIFT.

CARRINGTON

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