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TO PRIORITY LUANDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 238 OF 19 AUG

REPEATED TO INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, CAPETOWN, BONN, PARIS,

OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, LISBON.

SAVING INFO TO LAGOS, SALISBURY, MAPUTO, DAR-ES-SALAAM, LUSAKA,

GABORONE

YOUR TELNO 326: US/ANGOLA/CUBA

1. THANK YOU FOR THIS MOST HELPFUL ANALYSIS.
2. WE SUSPECT THAT THE ANGOLANS' OPENING NEGOTIATING POSITION IN ANY TALKS WITH THE US WOULD BE MUCH AS DESCRIBED IN YOUR PARA 3. IT WOULD BE REASONABLE FOR THEM TO SEEK FROM THE US A COMMITMENT TO RECOGNISE THE MPLA GOVERNMENT. THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA WOULD ALSO BE IMPLICIT IN ANY AGREEMENT SINCE THIS WOULD DEPEND ON A PARALLEL AGREEMENT ON A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT (SEE PARA 3 BELOW). THE QUESTION OF UNITA PRESENTS PARTICULAR PROBLEMS. IT WOULD IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE AMERICANS TO ENTER ANY FORMAL AND SPECIFIC AGREEMENT TO 'DITCH SAVIMBI'. THE ANGOLANS BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN HANDLE UNITA ONCE NAMIBIA IS SETTLED AND SUPPORT FROM SOUTH AFRICA HAS CEASED (CF OLGA LIMA'S REMARKS REPORTED IN YOUR TELNO 270). THE MOST THEY COULD REASONABLY DEMAND WOULD BE THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT GIVE PHYSICAL SUPPORT FOR UNITA AND WOULD PERHAPS GIVE SOME FORM OF COMMITMENT TO REIN IN THE SOUTH AFRICANS. BUT THE AMERICANS SEE THE THREAT OF POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR UNITA AS USEFUL LEVERAGE WITH MPLA; AND THEY WILL BE RELUCTANT TO PROMISE TO CONTROL THE SOUTH AFRICANS AS BEING BEYOND THEIR CAPACITY. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL IN ANY EVENT FIND IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT (BUT NOT NECESSARILY IMPOSSIBLE) TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT FOR UNITA ONCE THEY HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM NAMIBIA. BUT THEY TOO WILL NOT WANT TO BE SEEN TO BE LETTING SAVIMBI DOWN.

3. WE AGREE THAT THE TIMETABLE FOR THE CUBANS' WITHDRAWAL (YOUR PARA 6) WILL RAISE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS FOR BOTH THE ANGOLANS AND THE AMERICANS. THE AMERICANS CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO SETTLE ON THE BASIS OF A VAGUE PROMISE THAT THE CUBANS WILL BE WITHDRAWN BY PHASES AFTER NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE. THERE WILL HAVE TO BE SOME PRECISE FORMULA GEARED TO THE TIMETABLE FOR THE NAMIBIAN TRANSITION PERIOD. THE ANGOLANS SHOULD AT LEAST BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF A FIRST BATCH OF CUBANS AT THE MOMENT OF CEASEFIRE IN NAMIBIA SINCE FROM THAT DATE THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL BE UNABLE TO MOUNT ATTACKS FROM NAMIBIA (UNDER SCR 435 SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES ARE CONFINED TO BASE FROM THE CEASEFIRE DAY AND REDUCED TO 1,500 MEN WITHIN 12 WEEKS: AND THERE WILL BE A UN MILITARY PRESENCE TO MONITOR OBSERVANCE OF THIS): SO THE ANGOLANS' MILITARY NEED FOR CUBAN SUPPORT SHOULD FALL AWAY SHARPLY FROM THE START, NOT JUST WHEN A SWAPO GOVERNMENT IS INSTALLED.
4. WE ALSO AGREE THAT ANY APPROACH BY THE AMERICANS WILL NEED TO MAKE EVERY ALLOWANCE FOR THE ANGOLANS' DEEP-ROOTED DISTRUST OF THEM. BUT THAT DISTRUST IS MUTUAL. THE REPUBLICANS TOO BEAR SCARS FROM THE 1975 DEBACLE. DESPITE ALL THE MAJOR OBSTACLES TO SUCCESS BOTH SIDES WILL HAVE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE FACT THAT THERE ARE PRIZES FOR THEM TO BE GAINED FROM CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS: AND SERIOUS PENALTIES FOR FAILURE - THE INDEFINITE PROLONGATION OF THE NAMIBIA PROBLEM (GIVEN CURRENT US POLICIES) AND SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS ON ANGOLA WITH THE CONSEQUENT ENTRENCHMENT OF CUBAN AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA.
5. SUBJECT TO WASHINGTON'S VIEWS, WE SUSPECT THAT ANY FORMAL ATTEMPT TO GIVE THE AMERICANS DETAILED ADVICE ON THEIR LINE TO TAKE WITH THE ANGOLANS WOULD BE LIABLE TO FALL ON DEAF EARS WHILE CURRENT DIFFERENCES IN THE FIVE PERSIST (AND PERHAPS TO ERODE OUR POTENTIAL INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICANS LATER). BUT WASHINGTON HAVE DISCRETION TO DRAW IN GENERAL TERMS IN ANY INFORMAL CONTACTS ON YOUR ASSESSMENT OF ANGOLAN SUSCEPTIBILITIES. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO TAKE PARTICULAR CARE ON THE QUESTION OF UNITA AND SAVIMBI.

CARRINGTON

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