

*SUBJECT*

CONFIDENTIAL

*Angola*  
*cc. USA : US Defence Policy*

*Aug 80.*

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Lord Carrington telephoned the Prime Minister twice yesterday, 31 August. The main purpose of his calls was to seek the Prime Minister's agreement to the UK line in the debate on the UN Resolution on Angola. But he also touched on the question of how we should react to the US decision on Enhanced Radiation Warheads.

On Angola, Lord Carrington said that we had hoped that the UN Resolution would be drafted in unacceptable terms, since this would enable the US, the UK, and France to veto it without any qualms. However, he had learned from Sir Anthony Parsons that the French had successfully removed from the draft the clause calling for mandatory sanctions against South Africa. On this basis, the French were proposing to vote for the Resolution. Two other members of the Contact Group of Five, the FRG and Canada, would join them in voting for the Resolution. The problem for the UK was that the redrafted Resolution contained a passage in paragraph 3 which described the South African military action as a flagrant violation of Angola's sovereignty and a breach of international peace and security. FCO lawyers advised that the adoption of such a Resolution would require the UN to make proposals to deal with the "breach of international peace and security". Moreover, paragraph 4 of the redrafted Resolution demanded the immediate withdrawal of South African troops from Angola.

Lord Carrington said that it was his considered view, and also that of Sir Anthony Parsons, that the UK should abstain from the vote on the Resolution, thereby leaving the US to veto it alone. We would explain our abstention on the basis that South Africa was already withdrawing her troops, and that it would be wrong for the UN to vote on this issue until the real facts were known. Lord Carrington said that he did not feel the Americans would be too distressed to be isolated in this way, and he would send a personal message to Secretary Haig explaining the UK's position. There was another reason for

/our abstention.

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our abstention. If we were to veto the Resolution with the US, then the Contact Group of Five would be completely split, and could well disintegrate. To abstain would allow the UK to play the role of middle-man between the US and the French, FRG and Canadians.

The Prime Minister accepted Lord Carrington's advice and agreed that the UK should abstain in the vote on the Resolution.

On the US decision on neutron warheads, the Prime Minister said that she had seen Lord Carrington's recent minute to Mr. Nott urging that the UK should not take a high profile in supporting the American decision. She said that the UK should not put any difficulties in the way of the Americans, and should certainly take a line that was no less robust than that taken by Mr. Callaghan when President Carter took decisions on neutron weapons. She felt that she would have to support the American decision in the House of Commons, or if she were interviewed by foreign press (for instance, if French television were to interview her before the Anglo/French Summit). Lord Carrington said that the position of the FRG on this issue was crucial. The weapons would have to be deployed - and used - on German soil. Chancellor Schmidt was in a very difficult domestic, political position. We should do nothing that would make his position even more difficult. In his view, the Prime Minister should not say that the Americans went about their decision on ERW in the right way; the US had not consulted its allies, it had only given them some hours' notice of its decision. Lord Carrington agreed to find suitable words for the Prime Minister to use which would not offend the FRG.

WFSN

1 September 1981