

PRIME MINISTER

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament

As you requested, I have investigated alternative times for your speech in New York.

You will see from the FCO letter attached that Sir A. Parsons recommends that you leave London after Questions on 15 June in order to be able to speak in New York on Wednesday, 16 June.

You were concerned at the limited time available for the preparation of your speech, given the very busy first part of June which included Versailles, President Reagan's visit and the NATO Summit.

This new proposal would give you a little more time after your return from Bonn on 10 June. But I think we should aim to get your speech in as near to possible final form well before that. If you agree, I should like to arrange for Mr. Hurd and Mr. Blaker plus one or two officials to discuss an outline for the speech fairly early in May with a view to getting a full draft to you before the Whitsun recess.

Yes We need to make a firm reservation of your place in the list of speakers at New York. May we go firm on Wednesday, 16 June?

Yes Agree that we should proceed with the preparation of your speech as recommended above?

mf

A.J.C.

25 March 1982



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1982

Dear Francis,

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament

Thank you for your letter of 25 March. The Prime Minister agrees to speak in New York on Wednesday 16 June and therefore to leave London after Questions on Tuesday 15 June.

Mrs Thatcher has also confirmed that she would like her speech to the Special Session to be prepared well in advance. With that in mind, she would be grateful if an outline could be produced which would serve as a basis for discussion early in May. We shall arrange a meeting in due course. The Prime Minister would be grateful if Mr. Hurd and Mr. Blaker, plus one or two officials, could attend. The objective thereafter will be to produce a draft in final form for the Prime Minister to consider during the Whitsun recess.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Lamport in Mr. Hurd's Office and Peter Craine in Mr. Blaker's Office.

A. J. COLES

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH



Prime Minister

Contact with these arrangements
including meeting with
Australian Foreign Minister?

Yes not

17 June 1982

Dear John,

A.J.C. 17/6

Prime Minister's Visit to UNSSD II

Following the Prime Minister's decision to postpone her visit to New York until next week, the delegation in New York have proposed a programme for Wednesday 23 June. I enclose a copy. The programme includes a call on and probably lunch with the Secretary-General and a call on Kittani, the President of the General Assembly, as previously agreed.

I suggest that your press people continue to pursue media arrangements with New York direct. The latter hope it will be possible simply to put back the previous arrangements by one week.

The delegation have suggested that the Prime Minister should have a bilateral meeting with Mr Street, the Australian Foreign Minister. We endorse that recommendation. Such a meeting would inter alia enable the Prime Minister to reiterate her personal thanks for Australia's strong support during the Falklands crisis.

I should be grateful to know soon if these arrangements are acceptable to the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

United States (Prime Minister's Visit)

3.30 pm

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement on my visit to New York and Washington yesterday.

In New York, I addressed the United Nations special session on disarmament and had discussions with the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly. I have placed in the Library a copy of my speech to the special session. I emphasised that disarmament, properly defined, is the balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments in a manner which enhances peace and security.

As regards nuclear weapons, I welcomed President Reagan's radical proposals for substantial cuts in strategic weapons and for eliminating a whole class of intermediate-range systems—the zero option. I called for a balanced reduction in conventional weapons; commended the fresh proposals which are being made in the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions; urged a new impetus for a convention banning the development and possession of chemical weapons; and advocated a special effort to agree on new mandatory confidence and security-building measures in Europe.

Throughout, I emphasised the need for stringent verification of arms control agreements. And I expressed my conviction that the aim of all these measures must be to defend the values in which we believe and to uphold international law and the United Nations charter. We have a right and a duty to defend our own people whenever and wherever their liberty is challenged.

In my discussions with Mr. Perez de Cuellar, we reviewed the prospects for a ceasefire in the Lebanon and discussed how such a ceasefire could be maintained.

I gave the Secretary-General an account of the present situation in the Falkland Islands. I emphasised our wish for a permanent cessation of hostilities, though I have to report that so far the Argentine's response has been negative. I also referred to the repatriation of well over 10,000 prisoners, but I explained that we could not return them all until we were satisfied that hostilities would not be reopened. The Falkland Islanders would be preoccupied for some time to come with the task of reconstruction, none the less, Britain would in due course seek to bring the islands to full self-government. Mr. Perez de Cuellar stated that he remained ready to act as a channel of communication between Britain and Argentina, if this would help.

My talks with Mr. Kittani, the President of the General Assembly, were devoted mainly to the special session and Middle East matters.

I was particularly glad to be in New York during the last week of Sir Anthony Parsons' term of service as our representative at the United Nations. His contribution and abilities have been widely and rightly praised. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]

Subsequently, at the invitation of President Reagan, I visited Washington where we had valuable and friendly discussions. We discussed at some length the tragic situation in the Lebanon. The President described the latest American efforts, through Mr. Habib, to promote a solution. We also discussed the current situation in the Falkland Islands. I emphasised our wish to do all we can to promote peace and stability in the South Atlantic. The

President repeated his view that our action to repossess the islands had been taken to uphold the vital principle that aggression should not pay.

We discussed East-West relations. The President explained that his recent decision to extend restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union had been based on the principle that normal relations with that country were not possible so long as there was no progress towards liberalisation in Poland. I endorsed the need for such progress while reiterating the reasons why we thought existing commercial contracts should be exempted from the American restrictions.

I also conveyed the concern felt in this country, and elsewhere in the European Community, at the decision by the United States Government to impose countervailing duties on steel imports from the Community.

Finally, I expressed my gratitude for the impressive success of the FBI in defeating attempts by the Provisional IRA illegally to purchase weapons in the United States of America and to export them for use in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale): May I express our concurrence with the representations that the Prime Minister made on those last two matters? All of us should join in the tribute that she paid to Sir Anthony Parsons, because he played a conspicuous part in securing support for resolution 502. We certainly wish to congratulate him on the part that he played.

Some of the matters that the Prime Minister raised will be discussed in coming weeks, but I should like to press her on the discussions that she may have had with President Reagan about the Lebanon and the extremely critical situation there. Did she support the proposal for maintaining a United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon? What proposal will she and President Reagan put forward to secure that? What other measures should be taken? Does she agree with the President about trying to re-establish the rights of the State of Lebanon and will she give us an account of that?

The report that the Prime Minister has given us today about her speech on disarmament had a slightly better tone than the original speech. Are the proposals that she made and those outlined in her statement the beginning and end of the proposals that the Government intend to put forward at the disarmament conference? We believe that there should be a debate in the House on the special session and discussions about the further proposals that the British Government should advance. At the special session, did she put forward disarmament proposals that differ in any way from those put forward by the President of the United States? Finally, will she consider fresh representations on disarmament to try to make the special session a success?

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman has asked me about the Lebanon. Yesterday a ceasefire was negotiated. It was the eighth ceasefire during the sad and tragic sequence of events. However, I believe that it has now been broken. Obviously our great desire is to stop further fighting in West Beirut and on the main road to Damascus. Mr. Habib continues to make efforts to achieve a ceasefire that will hold.

Most people wish to see once again a fully independent Lebanon under the control of its own strong Government. It is easy to say that, but, as the right hon. Gentleman knows from Lebanon's history, it is very difficult to obtain. However, although it will not be easy, we must

continue to try. The life of the UNIFIL forces has been extended by two months by a United Nations resolution that we voted for. It is important to try to keep them in position and to encourage various nations to take part.

The disarmament proposals that I put forward were pretty comprehensive and covered nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons. I congratulated those who had negotiated the agreements on outer space and on the sea bed and I also called for further confidence and security-building measures. There was not much that was not covered.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: I remind the House that there is a further statement, and that the main business is covered by an allocation of time motion. Therefore, I propose to allow questions only until five minutes to four, by the clock.

Mr. David Steel (Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles): I endorse what the Prime Minister has said about Sir Anthony Parsons, who has had both a distinguished and a strenuous period of service at the United Nations. During the Prime Minister's talks at the United Nations, was there any discussion about strengthening the mandate and the organisation of the United Nations peacekeeping forces? Does the right hon. Lady have any hope that the permanent members of the Security Council will take some action about that?

The Prime Minister: No. I am afraid that it is one of the ironies and tragedies that the mandatory resolutions of the Security Council cannot be implemented because the United Nations does not have its own peacekeeping force. I do not know anyone who sees any immediate possibility of securing such a peacekeeping force.

Sir Anthony Kershaw (Stroud): The whole House will endorse the Prime Minister's view that the development of the Falkland Islands is desirable. However, no State or financial institution will invest in the Falkland Islands if there is any prospect, however remote, that the Argentines will resume sovereignty over the area.

The Prime Minister: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. That has been one of the problems in securing sufficient investment and has stopped various Governments from making greater investment. It is one of the reasons why we shall have to consider the longer term defence of the islands. There is not the slightest shadow of a doubt that in the immediate future and the middle term that will have to be carried out by us.

Mr. Stanley Newens (Harlow): Did the right hon. Lady raise the question of the pernicious international arms trade that facilitated the supply of arms to Argentina in its aggression against the Falkland Islands, and facilitates the supply of arms to Israel while it invades the Lebanon? Is it not time that the right hon. Lady took action to stop the trade in weapons of death?

The Prime Minister: That matter was not discussed at the United Nations General Assembly yesterday. There have been various proposals made on a regional basis, but none of them has ever proved practicable. The hon. Gentleman is wrong if he suggests that there should be no supply of arms. Each and every nation has the right to defend its own people and territories. The fact that we sell arms helps us to have our weapons at a lower cost and keeps some 140,000 people in work.

With regard to the sale of arms to Argentina, as I said to the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) on Tuesday, Governments of both parties have sold arms to Argentina. We carried it on the same basis—of considering the matter on its merits.

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport): Is the Prime Minister aware that the Government will be judged, not by cheap jibes about whether they are ready to fire shots, but by whether they so conduct themselves that no shots need to be fired? The tone of the Prime Minister's speech in New York was such that it sounded more as if she wanted to beat ploughshares into arms. [Interruption.] Hon. Members should read the speech. Will the Prime Minister say whether in the two arms negotiations in which Great Britain should be playing a major part—the comprehensive test ban treaty and the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna—there has been one positive step taken during her Premiership?

The Prime Minister: The talks in Vienna have continued for over nine years—and that period covers rather a lot of Labour government. It is unfortunate that not much has been achieved. If the right hon. Gentleman takes a reasonable view, he will know why. We have found it difficult to obtain from the Soviet Union the actual numbers of forces they have in conjunction with the Warsaw Pact countries.

I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will be extremely disappointed to know that the speech I made to the General Assembly received more applause than any other speech made during the last three weeks.

Sir Frederic Bennett (Torbay): Reverting to the tragic position in Lebanon, the Prime Minister will doubtless recall that a couple of days ago both Front Bench spokesmen emphasised that, however hard Europe might try, the main responsibility for ending the Israeli attack upon Lebanon lies with the United States of America. Did my right hon. Friend find that there was an awareness of that fact that can be speedily acted upon?

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend. The only country that can bring pressure to bear upon Israel is the United States of America, and it is very much aware of that. I tried to get across the fact that if there is to be a proper solution of this problem there must be a solution to the problem of the future of the Palestinian people.

Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline): Did the Prime Minister obtain from President Reagan an understanding that our defence role would be a North Atlantic role? Was there any intimation from the President that he would be willing to have United States forces in the Falkland Islands as we would be straining our international defence role if we had to garrison and keep naval forces there?

The Prime Minister: We did not discuss very much the possibility of a multi-national force in the Falkland Islands. I say "very much" because such a multi-national force is frequently mentioned. There is no possibility of having one for some months. It is too early to consider it.

Sir Bernard Braine (Essex, South-East): In her discussions with the President and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, did my right hon. Friend glean any evidence that they were aware of the utter unfitness of Argentina to have any control over the democratic Falkland Islands community? Did she remind them that among the thousands of people who had disappeared, most

[Sir Bernard Braine]

of whom had been tortured and killed, in Argentina—in the years that the Labour Party was in office—there were United Kingdom subjects, who can be named, and that successive British Governments had been pressurised by international communities into negotiating with Argentina? Did she make that plain to those two gentlemen?

The Prime Minister: I have made it perfectly clear time and again, both to the American Government and a number of others, that there is no question of sovereignty to negotiate. The islands are British sovereign territory and their people are British subjects who wish to keep their British way of life. There is nothing on sovereignty to negotiate. We negotiate on sovereignty only with the people of the territory itself. I pointed out to the United Nations that there are 45 nations in the United Nations who obtained their independence through us. I said that with us they enjoyed democracy, which is something that the Argentine citizens would love to have.

Mr. Ioan Evans (Aberdare): As the world is spending over \$500 billion on the arms race and there are 50,000 weapons with the destructive power of a million Hiroshimas, would the right hon. Lady address herself to the fears of mankind about the arms race and adopt a more constructive approach to reducing military expenditure? Will she withdraw the White Paper, "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1982", which embarks on a massive programme of spending on the Trident as well as £14,000 million on the arms race?

The Prime Minister: With regard to what the hon. Gentleman said about nuclear weapons, 90 per cent. of world expenditure is on conventional arms. There has been no nuclear warfare since the bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, but there have been some 140 conventional conflicts which have led to about 10 million deaths.

With regard to what he said about disarmament, of course people have fears. A few moments ago Opposition Members were accusing us of not having had sufficient armaments in the Falkland Islands and of that having attracted war.

Sir John Biggs-Davison (Epping Forest): On the issue of the equipment that my right hon. Friend did well to obtain from the United States, was she able to inform the President that Her Majesty's Government are compiling a record of Argentine war crimes, including the indiscriminate laying of mines which requires this equipment and the bestial pillaging by the soldiery of civilian property?

The Prime Minister: I gave the President a very full account of the situation in the Falkland Islands. I gave as much detail as I possibly could, incorporating some of the treatment of the islanders by the Argentine troops. I also told him of the great difficulty we were experiencing over the indiscriminate laying of plastic mines which cannot be detected. It is customary under the Geneva convention to mark the fields and positions where mines have been laid. That has not been done by the Argentines. There is also a disarmament convention which forbids the laying of plastic mines but, of course, the Argentine is not a signatory.

Mr. Frank Hooley (Sheffield, Heeley): Did the Prime Minister point out to President Reagan that it is grotesque for his Administration to encourage American farmers to earn millions and millions of dollars by exporting grain to the Soviet Union while it tries to put British workers out of work at John Brown by refusing permission for it to supply essential equipment for the Siberian gas line and also inhibits exports from Sheffield of important steel products?

The Prime Minister: As the hon. Gentleman will have gathered from my statement, I spoke strongly about John Brown's contracts. Normally, when new restrictions are put on trade, it is customary to exempt existing contracts. I pointed out the relationship with the wheat exports to which the hon. Gentleman has referred and the fact that these would be likely to continue. The President pointed out that there would be restraint on manufactured exports from the United States. Finally, I said to the President that if we were suddenly to have prohibitions from the United States on exports of vital parts of equipment that we need to export from here, people in future would not put orders with the United States because they would be liable to cancellation. All these points were made. I shall be taking the matter further.

Sir William Clark (Croydon, South): Is my right hon. Friend aware that the overwhelming majority of people in this country are delighted by the warm welcome that she received at the United Nations? Is this not proof that world leaders admire the firm stand that the Government took over the Falklands issue? Was the question of interest rates raised during her discussions with the President in order to accelerate the disappearance of the world recession?

The Prime Minister: The phrase most frequently used by those with whom I conversed afterwards was that the speech at the United Nations was realistic and balanced. They welcome both realism and balance in these matters.

I did not discuss interest rates with the President. I discussed them with a number of other people whom I met because the matter is causing us some concern. It is also causing some concern in the United States. It is stopping the very expansion that the United States needs. I made clear that we wish to have the deficit down because we are ready to take advantage of an expansion in world trade. We wish therefore to see American interest rates come down so that ours can stay down where they are now, or go lower.

Mr. James Lamond (Oldham, East): Since the United Nations' own specialist committee has reported that there is no problem on verification of disarmament, and since Mr. Gromyko, in his speech earlier in the session, said that the Soviet Union was ready to sign an agreement banning the development of all chemical weapons, that it was ready to make the statement unilaterally that the Soviet Union would never use nuclear arms first and that it was in full support of the freeze proposals put forward in the American Congress by Senator Edward Kennedy, what other steps are required before the right hon. Lady and the President of the United States are ready to talk meaningfully about disarmament?

The Prime Minister: Not all the problems over verification have been solved by a very long way. Words are not enough. There has to be readiness to have inspection on the spot. That is difficult to maintain.

There have been disquieting but fairly well documented reports that chemical weapons have been used in South-East Asia. We have urged the United Nations to consider the evidence. The hon. Gentleman mentioned the Russian undertaking not to use nuclear weapons first. I have pointed out that the more effective undertaking is that recently given by NATO not to use any of its military weapons to attack first. That is the undertaking we await from the Soviet Union—if it could be given with full, proper, trustworthy and credible assurances.

United Nations

Caroline

Thank you.

MS 2/4

MR. COLES

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament

I spoke to Douglas Hurd's office and the first meeting for the above speech is at 1030 on Tuesday 4 May. Mr. Hurd then goes on honeymoon. The next meeting is on Wednesday 19 May at 1800. Mr. Blaker has been invited to both meetings.

CS.

2 April 1982

PRIME MINISTER

UN Second Special Session on Disarmament:
Your Speech

We had arranged a meeting with Douglas Hurd and Peter Blaker tomorrow evening to discuss the attached outline. You will clearly not wish to hold this meeting when your mind will be on your speech for the debate on Thursday.

However, we must if we can stick to the agreed plan to give you a full draft text before the Whitsun Recess - you will have no time afterwards given the crowded calendar of the first half of June.

The attached paper sets out the objectives for your speech and, on a separate page, provides an outline. If you are content with these, the FCO and MOD will work up the outline into a full speech.

Agree?

18 May 1982

MR COLWES UN

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h.c.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Points to get across

1. The Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (7 June - 9 July) will be an important event. It will stimulate action within the UN framework and outside it. We hope that the Session will agree a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament setting flexible and realistic guidelines for the future. We have put forward our ideas on this to the Committee on Disarmament.
2. Senior representatives of NATO and other government will attend the Special Session and lend their authority to its proceedings. The Prime Minister's intention to speak to the Session is a mark of the importance which the Government attach to it.
3. We are working for specific measures of disarmament which will assure our security at lower levels of armament and risk. We can only achieve this through the negotiation of balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements.
4. The search for arms control and disarmament measures is wider than people realise. Resolutions, petitions and speeches are no substitute for patient negotiation of the detailed issues between the governments actually concerned. Several such negotiations are going on or are in prospect. On intermediate range nuclear weapons we support President Reagan's zero option, ie. the elimination of long-range land-based nuclear missiles from Europe. This is much the most radical proposal in the field. Mr Brezhnev is talking of steps which would leave the Russians with a substantial superiority in this field. We are preparing to do away with such missiles altogether. We welcome President Reagan's commitment to achieving substantial reductions in strategic weapons and we look forward to the opening of negotiations between the USA and USSR.

POINTS ON WHICH THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE PRESSED

Trident and Non-Proliferation

1. There is no provision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 which denies a state the right to maintain and modernise its nuclear deterrent. The obligations in Article VI of the Treaty are met by virtue of the INF talks in Geneva for a reduction in nuclear weapons, and the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva for a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Trident and Arms Control

2. As a strategic deterrent, the Trident force is irrelevant to the INF negotiations in Geneva since these talks are concerned with sub-strategic, land-based forces. Nor will the British nuclear deterrent be considered in the forthcoming START talks, the objective of which must be to bring about reductions to a level of parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. (If pressed) If circumstances were to change significantly, we would of course be prepared to review our position in regard to arms control. But that point would appear to be a long way off.

Size of Trident Force

3. As with Polaris, the Trident force will be of the minimum size compatible with ensuring effective deterrence. The number of missiles will still represent only a very small proportion of the nuclear arsenals of either the Soviet Union or the United States.

4. Trident D5 will not involve any significant change in the planned total number of warheads associated with our strategic deterrent force in comparison with the original intentions for a force based on the C4 missile system.

/A freeze

A freeze on the deployment of Cruise Missiles in Britain

5. We share the concern for a reduction of nuclear weapons. But the NATO decision of 1979 to modernise with the Cruise and Pershing missiles was taken as a means of bringing the Russians to the negotiating table. In that we have succeeded, We should not now remove the incentive to the Russians to negotiate for the elimination of long-range land-based nuclear weapons in Europe.

Date of NATO Summit (10 June)

6. The determining factor in the choice of date was the need to find a day when the fifteen Heads of State and Government could be gathered in one place (Bonn). There is plenty of time for NATO leaders to attend both the NATO Summit and UNSSD II.

Conflict on purpose between NATO Summit and UNSSD II

7. We see no conflict. NATO is a defensive alliance which has long been active in arms control eg the talks on Mutually Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna.

Coincidence of UNSSD II and British Army Equipment Exhibition (21-25 June)

8. The Government is fully committed to the pursuit of arms control and disarmament through the negotiation of equitable, balanced and verifiable agreements. While such negotiations continue, sovereign states have an unquestionable right to self-defence; we claim this right for ourselves and it would be inconsistent to deny it to others. Industrialised countries like the UK are recognised as traditional sources of supply by those states which are unable to meet their own security needs. There is no inconsistency in the coincidence of the two events.

Addition to Defensive Points

9. Will the Government put forth proposals to the Special Session as their predecessors did in 1978?

We will put ideas to the Special Session for better progress in the negotiation of specific measures . While the Session cannot itself negotiate measures we hope it will act as a spur to the negotiators.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 May 1982

J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear John,

PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT SECOND UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL
SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (UNSSD II)

I attached in my letter of 4 May a suggested outline for the Prime Minister's speech at the second Special Session on Disarmament. It has not proved possible in the meantime to arrange a meeting for the Prime Minister to discuss the outline with Ministers. I am nevertheless forwarding a draft so that the Prime Minister may have it, as requested, before the Whitsun holiday. Mr Hurd has seen the draft. He thinks it covers broadly the right ground, but will need to be turned into Prime Ministerial language.

2. The Falklands crisis has obliged us to place square brackets around paragraph 4 of the draft which refers to the obligations of members of the United Nations to settle disputes by peaceful means.

Yours ever,

S M J Lamport
Private Secretary to Mr Hurd

DRAFT PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT SECOND SPECIAL SESSION

[COURTESY REMARKS ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT]

1. Leaders of countries in every corner of the globe come to this Special Session, as I from Britain, in search of surer ways of preserving peace. Ways that match the reality of the world in which we live. Ways that will keep pace with the rate of change which we are witnessing. We carry into this Chamber the aspirations of men and women, wherever they may be, that governments will respond to the challenge they face today, that they will foster and defend conditions in which our peoples may live in peace and justice and follow the way of life of their choice. In taking up this challenge I begin with a tribute - to the values and wisdom of those who decided, in 1945, that the principles under which governments should conduct their relations with one another be written into the Charter of this Organisations.
2. Too many countries, of varying power and in different areas, are bent on imposing change on others by resorting to force. They acquire arms to prepare for such a possibility. Their neighbours or opponents then acquire arms to match the potential aggressor's. And so the accumulation mounts within regions and world wide. Tension, in other words, breeds arms, and arms in turn feed tension. We must find a way of breaking this vicious circle and curbing the resources spent on arms.
3. One part of this Herculean task is to try to deal with the very sources of tension - the disputes and rivalries between states. That is a broad subject. It requires efforts to make progress on

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the various regional problems that create tension. Britain attaches the highest priority to this task. It is one in which we have played our part and to which we will continue to dedicate our energies. We are active with four other countries in efforts to bring Namibia to independence in peace. That would help to reduce tension in Southern Africa, as the independence of Zimbabwe did in 1980. Britain has been co-operating with the other members of the European Community in helping to find ways of making progress and easing tension in the Middle East. We have also made proposals for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan.

[4. If tension is to be reduced, there must also be strict adherence to international law. Britain stands today at the centre of a serious conflict arising from action taken by another State in defiance of its obligations under the Charter to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force. That State's action also demonstrated its determination to set aside the Charter principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and it has persisted in its illegal military action in defiance of its obligations under the Charter to carry out the decisions of the Security Council. Faced with such total contempt for the purposes and principles of this Organisation, we have had to take recourse to the right of self-defence which the Charter recognises as inherent.]

5. None of us should underestimate the importance of this Second Special Session. It brings under examination matters of vital concern to all of us. It will probe into the reasons why earlier

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hopes of more rapid progress have been disappointed. It will search for new and practical steps to lower the risk of war, to reduce arsenals and to restrain the development of new weapons. It is essential that our examination of the problems should be thorough and that we should find practical means of resolving urgent problems.

6. The British Government has given its commitment to the aims set out in the Final Document of the First Special Session. It has shown its practical support for these aims by playing a constructive part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. It has continued the active role played by Britain in all the discussion and negotiations on multilateral disarmament questions that have taken place under United Nations and other auspices both before and since the Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. My Government is disappointed that the negotiations in the UN-inspired bodies have not achieved the positive results that were looked for, with so much hope, four years ago.

7. Perhaps this is because we have lost sight of the real objective. Throughout the Final Document of the First Special Session there are repeated references to the essential principles of disarmament. I should like to offer a simple definition of disarmament. It is this: the balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments in a manner which enhances peace and security.

8. There can be no argument about the need to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Some believe that nuclear conflict is imminent. I do not share that view. I find in the experience of more than three decades convincing proof of stability - a stability born of

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the recognition that there would be no victor in a nuclear exchange. [The report of the Palme Commission to this Session, reflecting the opinion of leading statesmen from all regions of the world, and the 1981-82 survey by the independent International Institute for Strategic Studies support the contention that our efforts to keep the peace in Europe have been and will continue to be effective.] Deterrence has played a vital role in this.

9. But we cannot afford to be complacent. Without adequate controls the endless accumulation of weapons will jeopardise security. Equally, measures of arms control and disarmament can only achieve lasting results and help the cause of peace if they enhance security. Realisable prospects of achieving substantial reductions of nuclear weapons are now offered by the direct path of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two countries which have the largest nuclear arsenals. These negotiations, of concern to the world at large, are of vital interest to Europe, where the concentration of nuclear weapons is greatest. We fully support the radical proposals which have been made by the United States for the elimination of intermediate-range weapons and for substantial reductions in the strategic field. These go to the heart of the matter, as moratoria, freezes and declarations do not.

10. We share the widespread international concern about the dangers of chemical warfare. Our concerns are heightened by reports that these hideous weapons may recently have been used in defiance of accepted legal and moral standards. As part of a determined effort to eliminate chemical warfare once and for all, we have given a new impetus in the Committee on Disarmament to the search

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for a properly verifiable convention banning the development and possession of chemical weapons. This is a matter to which my Government attaches great importance.

11. Negotiations on nuclear and chemical weapons have to be complemented by further multilateral efforts directed at the central question of conventional arms and forces. There is a heavy concentration of conventional forces in Europe and we shall continue to explore in the Vienna talks for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions every possible avenue for reductions which sustain - indeed improve - the security of all. The Western participants in these talks have recently made an important new proposal designed to facilitate agreement. Britain also favours a conference which will reach agreement on new mandatory confidence and security building measures which will increase trust about the military intentions of either side and thereby reduce the risk of conflict in Europe.

12. All will recognise the need for resolution in face of the threats to security and peace that confront us now and which will do so in the future. In the case of the British Government we will draw strength from our experience in the pursuit of peace which stretches back over many years. In the span of the 37 years which have elapsed since the end of the Second World War, successive British Governments have played a constructive and central role in the achievement of specific measures. These are measures which we value today for the constraints they place on the use of force. Quick to run down our forces at the end of World War II, we proceeded to abolish compulsory military service. We were protagonists of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of /1968.

1968. We then destroyed our stocks of chemical weapons and were proud to take the initiatives which led to the conclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 and the Inhumane Weapons Convention in 1980. Let there be no doubt about our intention to continue in this creative role.

13. We cannot regard it as legitimate that the ideas of one people should be imposed on another by force of arms, at the cost of the latter's sovereignty and in defiance of agreements governing the respect for human rights. Nor, for all that we are told to the contrary, can we regard the apparently endless build-up of forces, both conventional and nuclear, by the Soviet Union, as anything but an indication of a wish to extend its influence and control. The Soviet leaders have repeatedly declared their wish for peace, for restraints to be placed on the development of weapons. I share those objectives and appeal to them to consider further how they might best be attained. Declarations are not enough. They have to be matched by deeds.

14. With regard to our strategic deterrent I wish to emphasise that the force stands at the minimum credible level. If circumstances were to change significantly - if, for example, Soviet military capabilities were to be reduced substantially - we would of course be prepared to review our position in relation to arms control, for the goal we all share is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the world. But we should be honest and realistic enough to recognise that this is still a long way off. In the meantime our nuclear weapons pose no threat to any country unless it commits aggression against us. Their sole purpose is the prevention of war.

/15. Britain

15. Britain supports the regime established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 as a valuable instrument for limiting the possibilities of nuclear conflict. I reaffirm the formal assurance given to Non Nuclear Weapon States at the First Special Session about the use and threat of use of our nuclear weapons.

16. The fact of the matter is that the majority of states are not threatened by nuclear weapons. 'Security is assured' in the first instance by conventional forces. It is outside Europe that the problems of keeping the peace have arisen in the sharpest form. The problems are manifest in regional conflicts and in ever increasing expenditure on defence. We cannot ignore the fact that 140 conflicts with conventional weapons have taken place since 1945. These have cost at least 10 million lives. I am glad that the Secretary-General is appointing a group of experts to examine the question of conventional disarmament. We hope that careful thought will be given to measures which could increase confidence between groups of states and reduce the demand for weapons.

17. Greater confidence between nations is essential: to achieve this we need openness in the publication of military expenditure. It has long been our practice in the UK to publish this information. I am happy to announce that the British Government will participate in the Secretary-General's scheme for the reporting of military expenditures by supplying information in matrix form for inclusion in the United Nations' work for the Reduction of Military Budgets.

18. I express our support for the studies that have been undertaken at the United Nations about the relationship between disarmament and /development.

development. We would all like to spend less on defence, while maintaining security. But it is really too simple to suggest that a pound saved on armaments will always be a pound added to the aid programme. Outside the OECD, there are too many industrialised countries which order their priorities differently. They spend a lot on arms and only a little in aid. On their own admission they will never become major aid donors. By contrast, Britain's aid programme is the fifth largest among OECD members. Our assistance is concentrated on the poorest countries. The total flows of finance from the United Kingdom to developing countries are amongst the highest in the world.

19. I have stressed the priority we attach to specific measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, the need for greater openness and confidence. Current negotiations are engaged which could carry us further towards these goals. The first requirement then is to press for progress in those negotiations. They fall within a wider scheme of action, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. We believe that any such programme should be practical and flexible, reflecting the problems of today, capable of adjusting to those of tomorrow. Legal language, time-frames, and attempts to pre-determine the path of negotiation are inappropriate. We should shape our ambitions to match reality.

20. Only thus will the legitimate concern of our people be satisfied. Public opinion is not however a universal instrument. It cannot flourish in states where there is no parliamentary opposition, no free press, no independent non-governmental organisations. If

/public

public opinion is to be effective, it must be able to apply pressure on governments to negotiate. I pay tribute to the constructive role played in Britain by the many non-governmental organisations active in the disarmament field and welcome their participation in this Session. They continue an honourable tradition. The UK was actually the first country to have an independent World Disarmament Campaign. When the United Nations Centre for Disarmament formulates its own proposals, we shall look particularly for ideas which may ensure a freer flow of information about the issues in debate to those parts of the world at present denied that information.

21. Mr President, measures of arms control and disarmament, if they are to be successful, must improve the prospects of peace and security for all. These are no less than the fundamental aims of the United Nations. The need for disarmament has never been stronger. The opportunities have never been greater. It is up to us to grasp those opportunities. We must turn the proposals now under negotiation into firm and binding disarmament agreements. The United Kingdom gives highest priority to the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces, substantial reductions in the strategic arms of the major nuclear powers, conventional force reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, confidence building measures in the European continent, and a complete ban on chemical weapons. The British Government and our Delegation at this Special Session will spare no effort to achieve agreement on a plan for a safer world in which our children can grow up in peace.

FILE

RD

MR RICKETT

The Prime Minister wishes to hold a dinner party on Friday, 11 June to discuss her disarmament speech. Hugh Thomas will be invited and is at present contacting Michael Howard and Hugh Trevor Roper to see if they are available as well. He may also ask Peter Wiles. The other guests will be Douglas Hurd and myself.

Hugh Thomas will tell me this evening what progress he has made. We can then send out invitations.

A J COLES

1 June, 1982

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GRS 1200

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FM FCO 071100Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 7 JUNE 1982

SECOND UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (UNSSD II)

1. UNSSD II WILL TAKE PLACE FROM 7 JUNE TO 9 JULY IN NEW YORK. MANY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ARE EXPECTED TO ATTEND. UP TO 150 BRITISH NGOS WILL BE REPRESENTED, AND MR FRANK JUDD, DIRECTOR OF VSO, HAS AGREED TO ACT AS INDEPENDENT ADVISER TO THE UK DELEGATION IN LIAISON WITH NGOS. REPRESENTATIVES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY JAPAN, ARE EXPECTED IN EVEN GREATER NUMBERS AND THE SESSION IS LIKELY TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY NUMEROUS PROTESTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER PLANS TO ADDRESS THE ASSEMBLY ON 16 JUNE. COPIES OF HER SPEECH WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE IN THE VERBATIM SERIES.

LINE TO TAKE (MAY BE DRAWN ON FREELY)

3. THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO THE PURSUIT OF DISARMAMENT THROUGH THE NEGOTIATION OF SPECIFIC, BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS IN WHICH THE SECURITY OF STATES IS ASSURED AT ALL STAGES.

4. THE MAIN TASK OF THE SESSION WILL BE TO REVIEW PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT SINCE UNSSD I IN 1978. THIS HAS BEEN SLOWER THAN WE SHOULD HAVE WISHED. INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, IN PARTICULAR THE DELIBERATE DISREGARD OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES FOR THE UN CHARTER, HAVE NOT HELPED TO INSPIRE THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE. BUT THERE ARE NOW FIRM SIGNS THAT THINGS ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. TALKS HAVE OPENED BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS ABOUT INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) AND WILL SHORTLY OPEN ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS (START). LIKE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES, THE UK SUPPORTS THE AMERICAN AIM OF ACHIEVING MAJOR REDUCTIONS IN BOTH TYPES OF WEAPON. MOREOVER, THE WEST WILL SOON MAKE NEW PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO UNBLOCK THE MBFR TALKS ON CONVENTIONAL

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FORCES IN VIENNA. IN THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA CONVENTIONS BANNING CHEMICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE UNDER DISCUSSION AND THERE IS AGREEMENT TO BEGIN LOOKING AT VERIFICATION ASPECTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN.

5. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT IS PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SUCCESS OF WHICH WOULD POINT THE WAY TO THE FUTURE. WE HOPE THAT UNSSD II WILL ENDORSE THIS VIEW. IT IS ILLUSORY TO SUPPOSE THAT THERE IS ANY DRAMATIC SHORT CUT TO GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. THE WAY LIES THROUGH CAREFUL AND PATIENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH REALISM, UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND VERIFICATION WILL BE THE WATCH WORDS.

6. AS A DELIBERATIVE BODY, WHOSE DECISIONS TAKE THE FORM OF RECOMMENDATIONS RATHER THAN OBLIGATIONS, UNSSD II CANNOT ITSELF NEGOTIATE TREATIES. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO EXPECT TOO MUCH OF IT. WE HOPE THAT THROUGH REALISTIC DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, UNSSD II WILL GIVE AN IMPETUS TO THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE ELSEWHERE, IE INF, MBFR, ETC.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MUST PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH NON-NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SINCE THE SECURITY OF THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES DEPENDS ON THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE INSEPARABLY BOUND UP. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS NUCLEAR WAR: DETERRENCE IS CONTINUING TO WORK. BUT OUR COMMITMENT TO DETERRENCE DOES NOT MEAN ANY SLACKENING OF OUR RESOLVE TO HELP PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO AREAS WHERE THEY ARE NOT YET A FACTOR IN THE SECURITY BALANCE.

8. WE HOPE THAT UNSSD II MAY AGREE A REALISTIC AND FLEXIBLE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT AS A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES. BUT THE VALUE OF UNSSD II SHOULD NOT BE JUDGED BY ITS SUCCESS IN FULFILLING WHAT MAY PROVE TO BE TOO AMBITIOUS OR TOO UNWORKABLE AN ENTERPRISE. PIECES OF PAPER ALONE DO NOT HELP THE CAUSE OF REAL DISARMAMENT. WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT UNREALISTIC COMMITMENTS, EG TO IMMEDIATE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, TO A TIMETABLE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS OR TO A PROGRAMME WHICH REQUIRES A BINDING COMMITMENT BY STATES.

/9. WE

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9. WE SEE NO NECESSITY FOR MAJOR CHANGES TO THE UN DISARMAMENT MACHINERY AND INSTITUTIONS. WE SHOULD WELCOME A STRENGTHENING OF THE CO-ORDINATION ROLE OF THE CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF EFFORT IN THE VARIOUS UN BODIES.

FOR USE WITH TRUSTED CONTACTS

10. WE INTEND TO TAKE A ROBUST LINE AT UNSSD II IN RESISTING NON-ALIGNED PRESSURE FOR BLANKET COMMITMENTS TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT WHICH DO NOT ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLES ABOVE.

11. WE SHALL WORK FOR A REALISTIC OUTCOME. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF UNSSD I RAISED EXPECTATIONS UNJUSTIFIABLY THROUGH ITS RHETORICAL, IDEALISTIC TONE.

12. ON MACHINERY, WE WOULD PREFER THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO STAY THE SIZE IT IS (40) FOR REASONS OF EFFICIENCY, BUT IF THERE IS WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT ON AN INCREASE WE WILL SUPPORT THE CANDIDATURE OF OUR PARTNERS AND ALLIES IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

13. WE HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE MERITS OF A UN-SPONSORED WORLD DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN. THERE IS A CASE FOR EDUCATING PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT DISARMAMENT, BUT THE FACT IS THAT INFORMATION ONLY FLOWS FREELY IN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF PAYING FOR A CAMPAIGN WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT BE DIRECTED AGAINST WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ONLY.

BACKGROUND (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION)

14. A DECISION WAS TAKEN AT THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DISARMAMENT, HELD IN 1978, TO HOLD A SECOND SPECIAL SESSION IN 1982. THE MAIN ITEMS ON ITS AGENDA ARE A REVIEW OF PROGRESS SINCE UNSSD I, CONSIDERATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT, AND A REVIEW OF UN DISARMAMENT MACHINERY.

15. UNSSD II WILL BE DOMINATED BY THE STRENGTH OF FEELING AMONGST THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES (NNA) OVER THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND NOTABLY ON NUCLEAR QUESTIONS, TO WHICH THEY ATTACH OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE. THE NUCLEAR POWERS, AND PARTICULARLY THE US, WILL COME UNDER HEAVY CRITICISM FOR THE SLOW PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MAY BE A THEME TO WHICH THE ARABS WILL RETURN FOLLOWING

/THE ISRAELI

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THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR LAST YEAR.
16. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL TOPICS AT UNSSD II WILL BE THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT (CPD), COMMISSIONED BY UNSSD I, WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER NEGOTIATION IN THE CD. DISCUSSIONS IN THE CD SHOWED A WIDE GULF BETWEEN THE NNA, WHO DEMAND A LEGALLY BINDING PROGRAMME WITH A STRICT TIME FRAME WHICH LAYS EMPHASIS ON ACHIEVING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE EARLY STAGES, AND THE WEST, WHICH IS AIMING FOR A MORE REALISTIC PROGRAMME WITH NO ARTIFICIAL TIME CONSTRAINTS. THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES FAVOUR A VAGUE, DECLARATORY APPROACH. NO REAL PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE CD AND DIFFERENCES WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED OR CIRCUMVENTED AT UNSSD II ITSELF.

17. IT IS EXPECTED THAT A NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO GIVE IMPETUS TO THE STALEMATED MBFR TALKS WILL BE ANNOUNCED AT THE BONN SUMMIT (9/10 JUNE) AND TABLED IN VIENNA SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

PYM

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 June 1982

Handwritten: 1-a. 22-6

Dear John,

Prime Minister's Speech

Thank you for Clive Whitmore's letter of today (but dated 10 June), to which you attached a copy of Hugh Thomas' draft of the Prime Minister's speech at the UNSSD this week.

I attach at Annex our suggested amendments. These have already been telephoned to you by David Gillmore.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

UNSSD: PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH

SECTION II: BRITAIN AND ARMS CONTROL

1. If it was thought necessary to reduce the length of this speech, it might be preferable to omit all of the first sentence of the first paragraph of this section and the first sentence of the second paragraph.
2. Amend last sentence of second paragraph to read: 'We have also been prominent at all the discussions . . . '.
3. Last paragraph, last sentence, amend to read: ' . . . we came to know all too well the destructiveness of modern weapons.'

SECTION III: THE NEED FOR CAUTION

1. Amend end of last sentence of first paragraph to read: 'many questions about which a large number of people are content to suspend judgement altogether.'
2. Paragraph 4, first line, delete 'morals'; insert 'lessons'.
3. Paragraph 8 line 4, insert the word 'orderly' before 'commerce'.

SECTION IV: THE NEED TO GO AHEAD

1. Amend first sentence to read 'Despite all these cautionary tales, we know that the limitation and reduction of armaments are essential.'
2. Amend paragraph 3 to read: 'We must thus be ready to sit down at negotiating tables even with governments whose policies, we know, threaten the peace in freedom we hold so dear.'
3. Paragraph 5, last sentence, amend to read: 'The fire raids of the Second World War, even if nominally conventional, were destructive on a massive scale.'
4. Paragraph 6, amend to read: ' . . . the dark shadow cast over the West by Soviet conventional forces which have kept the East of the continent in subjection for so long.'
5. Paragraph 7, amend to read: 'The First Sepcial Session of this Assembly very properly thought that there should be regional consultations about the trade in conventional armaments. We should not exclude from consideration during this Session the accumulation of conventional weapons through production as well as through transfer.'
6. Paragraph 9, delete 'unfortunately' from the second line.
7. Paragraph 10, at the end of first sentence delete 'soothe the fears' and insert 'reduce mistrust'.

8. Paragraph 10, amend last sentence to read: "The progress made in SALT and the agreement to begin the START talks between such very different nations as the US and the USSR are further indications of what can be done."

SECTION V: GUIDELINES

1. Amend beginning of paragraph 4 to read: "Our ambition in negotiations should be . . ." (ie remove reference to 'these discussions').

2. Paragraph 7, delete last sentence beginning "These Governments which have military rulers . . .".

3. Delete last paragraph (paragraph 11). The point here is that it is difficult to sustain an argument about economy of force in relation to nuclear weapons.

SECTION VI: PRACTICAL STEPS

1. Paragraph 2, amend to read: "I hope that the Special Session will endorse the proposals made by President Reagan both for large cuts in the systems of strategic nuclear delivery and for the elimination of the most threatening nuclear forces in Europe."

2. Amend paragraph 3 to read: "Once this has been achieved, the way will be open for negotiations on other intermediate systems. My strong hope is that we could in due course achieve substantial reductions in so-called battlefield nuclear weapons. Many of these systems are of doubtful military value and they constitute a potential source of serious instability."

3. Paragraph 4: amend last sentence in parenthesis: "I here reaffirm our formal assurance given to the non-nuclear weapon States at the First Special Session about the non-use of nuclear weapons."

4. Paragraph 5. Amend to read: "Bearing in mind that we have ourselves abolished our stock of chemical weapons, Britain urges the Special Session to devote attention to eliminating them all from all stockpiles. We are disturbed by well-documented reports that chemical weapons, perhaps including toxins, have recently been used in several countries in South East Asia. Those reports must be minutely investigated."

5. Paragraph 6, amend last sentence to read: "The West is making an important new proposal on this."

6. Paragraph 7, amend to read: "We are also interested in the ideas originated by France for a European Disarmament Conference (CDE). I hope that when the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe resumes in Madrid in the autumn, we can reach agreement to sit down to negotiations on confidence and security-building measures in Europe. Such measures would increase trust between the two sides in Europe and thereby reduce the risk of war in Europe's heartland."

7. Paragraph 8. Delete third sentence (the Soviet Union is the biggest arms dealer only according to SIPRI and then only in the Institute's figures for the last year; previously it had been the United States). Amend end of last sentence to read: ''limitations to which all their different suppliers may be able to subscribe.''

8. Paragraph 9, amend opening to read: ''Britain supports, and will participate this year in, the Secretary General's scheme . . .''.

9. Paragraph 10, amend to read: ''We have also welcomed the work begun on the relationship between arms spending and development.''

SECTION VII: CONCLUSIONS

a. Falklands

1. Paragraph 2, amend third sentence to read: ''The State with whom we are in dispute drew erroneous conclusions from the patient restraint with which we had conducted our policy in that area.''

b. Principles

2. Amend opening of first paragraph to read: ''My second point in conclusion is this: the resources which we in Britain devote to arms are, we believe, the minimum needed . . .''.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



H M Treasury

Parliament Street London SW1P 3AG

Switchboard 01-233 3000

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f-a.
ML 16/6

M E Quinlan CB
Deputy Secretary, Industry

J Cole Esq
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

15 June 1982

Leon John,

SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

Herewith a very rough first shot. I shall be meditating on it further (not least because it is, I fancy, as yet a bit on the short side) but you may like to see it in case you have any marked views on whether or not it is anywhere near the board.

I am sending a copy to David Gillmore on the same basis; he has told me how matters stand (as of half-past-three this afternoon) on the matter of timing.

Yours ever,
Michael

M E QUINLAN

Mr President:

1. This is the first time that I have had the opportunity to address the General Assembly. I account it a privilege to do so, and to do so under your Presidency.

2. But what makes the occasion most special to me is the subject - the subject of peace. The leaders who have come here, as I have, carry in this matter an especial duty; not just to our own countries' interest but to the common interest of all, in the most vital matter of all. We are collectively the trustees of our generation. I shall try to speak ^{now} in that spirit; ~~and not~~ ^{I shall not be concerned} to score national debating points.

3. Our generation faces a ^{very} special responsibility, because of what the march of modern technology has done to the weapons of war. We are all conscious of that most vividly in respect of nuclear weapons. Mankind now has - and can never lose, never forget - the knowledge of how to blow itself up; and we have to live, as our forebears did not, with that irreversible fact, and to manage its implications.

4. In its own terrible way, however, that fact also carries a special opportunity. For ^{part of} what it means is that the initiation of war among the major nuclear powers is simply not a rational option. Given what these ghastly armouries can do, recourse to arms between these powers can never be a sane way of ^{settling about the} regulating or resolving differences. The history of the past thirty-seven years displays a deepening recognition of that by every participant. ^{In} circumstances often tense and difficult, deterrence has ^{been} kept the peace between East and West; and that is an achievement beyond price, one which we must not for the future relinquish or endanger.

5. I believe ^{nonetheless that} we can sustain that vast achievement at much lower levels of these awful armouries and at much lower costs, if we have the will, the vision and the flexibility to agree to do so. These are major goals, and I shall have more to say later on the ways towards them. But let us throughout have the wisdom and the honesty to recognise that to attempt ~~to~~ pretend to dismantle the deterrent system wholesale - above all to do so one-sidedly - might be a course of reckless danger, and danger for the whole world. I do not want to make world war ^{seem} appear a rational option again; it cannot be, and it must not for a moment ^{be allowed to appear so.} ~~seem to be.~~

stable ; it has

6. I have spoken so far of nuclear weapons. These were a special concern of the 1978 Special Session; they must manifestly remain so for us. But I am uneasy that they may sometimes mask the appalling facts about what we sometimes call, in the over-cosy jargon of the strategic theorists, nonconventional weapons and conventional war; and I venture to hope that this Session may focus renewed and sharper concern upon these. Let us consider just a few facts. Since the disaster of Nagasaki nuclear weapons have not been used at all. But there have been something like one hundred and forty non-nuclear armed conflicts, and in those conflicts perhaps up to ten million people have died. This very week we watch the tragedy in the Lebanon; and I naturally have vividly in my own mind the many hundreds of men - brave young men from my country and from Argentina - cut down in the South Atlantic by the impersonal killing-power of modern armaments. Nuclear war is indeed a terrible threat; but conventional war is ~~just~~ a terrible reality. We must - all of us, for virtually all of us wield conventional forces - seek to do something about the dangers of conventional war, and its burdens. Those burdens, let us remember, are far greater than those of nuclear weapons. If we deplore, as I certainly do, the amount spent on military preparations in a world where so many go hungry and so much else needs to be done, our criticism and our action should turn above all to conventional forces, which absorb far the greatest proportion - over ninety per cent - of military spending world-wide.

7. We are all of us involved in this - virtually all of us have conventional forces. I am personally convinced that we need a deeper and wider effort throughout the non-nuclear field, looking at weapons and manpower and deployments, to see what we can do together to lighten the risks and the burdens and the fears.

8. But in a sense Mr President, I have still not come to the root of the matter. For the fundamental risk to peace is not the existence of weapons, whether nuclear or other, of particular types or in particular numbers or places. It is, above all, the existence of political willingness to initiate recourse to force, to the use of arms. It is here, and not in "arms races", whether real or imaginary, that the springs of war lie. I mentioned a moment ago a hundred and forty conflicts since 1945. Few if any of those can plausibly be traced to an arms race. No informed historian can imagine that the World War of 1939 to 1945 was caused by any kind of arms race. On the contrary, it sprang most clearly and tellingly from the belief of a tyrant that his neighbours lacked the means or the will to resist him effectively - from weakness in deterrence. A formidable countryman of that tyrant,

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seventy years earlier, is quoted as saying "Do I want war? Of course not - I want victory". Hitler believed he could have victory without war, or with not very much or very difficult war. The cost of disproving that belief was immense; the cost of preventing him from forming it in the first place would have been infinitely less. The lesson is that disarmament and good intentions on their own do not guarantee peace; they may even destroy it. ~~It may therefore~~

19.

it can

be not merely a mistake of analysis but an evasion of responsibility to suppose that we deal with the problem of war, and the duty of peace, primarily by focussing upon weapons. These are ^{often} more symptoms than causes.

9. We are entitled, every one of us, to live in peace with our own values and way of life; not to have the doctrines, the institutions or the control of other ^{Countries} forced upon us, not to be compelled to choose between peace and freedom. We are entitled to be protected from ^{external} aggression - if necessary through our own efforts, if possible ~~it~~ (and preferably) through a just international system. The efforts of political leaders for peace, both through this great organisation and in other ways, need to be directed first and foremost to removing the conditions that lead to conflict - injustice between and within nations, mistrust and secrecy, the denial of human rights - and to strengthening the methods and mechanisms for resolving conflict without war. ~~[My country for its part was always ready, and would be ready still, even after the events of the past three months, to submit the matter of the Falkland Islands to the judgement of the International Court at The Hague.]~~ ^{We have to work at this urgently; but we} must also do so realistically, without cant and without illusion

why in general

10. Mr President, I have explained ~~that~~ ^{alone} I do not believe that armaments cause wars or that action on them ^{in any way} will prevent wars. But I have said all this not to decry disarmament and arms control but to give them their real value, to set them in their true context. It has in my view been a frequent and serious disservice to their cause to attribute to them potentialities which they cannot make good; excessive claims ^{and demands} have too often been not an aid to ~~more modest~~ ^{but} realistic practical action but a substitute for it. Disarmament measures cannot, in any realistic ^{framework} sense, remove the possibility of war. But the limitation and reduction of armaments can still do a great deal. It can reduce the economic burden of military preparation, ^{it can} and sometimes ease ~~its~~ political friction and the fears ^{this} may heighten; it can in some ^{the} degree moderate the scale or inhumanity of conflict. To do these things, and to do them in a way that is balanced, visible and dependable, is to do a ^{very} great deal; ^{and we must seize every opportunity, and indeed make new opportunities.} and I should like now to turn briefly to some specific issues in this direction.

legitimate for self-defence

11. In the nuclear field, the hopes of the world lie above all with the direct dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, which have

it can sometimes seal off or limit the ^{destructive} exploitation of ^{advancing} science and technology;

by far the largest arsenals. As I implied earlier, I believe that provided reasonable balance is not lost these arsenals could both be greatly reduced without any danger to peace. This is where ^{decisive} action, not just deceleration or standstill, is needed; and I therefore welcome the radical proposals made by the United States for eliminating intermediate-range systems and substantially cutting the strategic armouries. The negotiations must surely have the urgent support and goodwill of us all.

12. I am deeply worried about chemical weapons. When the world community in 1972 decided to ban biological weapons - a matter in which I am proud that Britain played a major initiating role - we all looked forward to successful action on chemical weapons. It has not happened; indeed, many of us have been greatly disquieted by persistent reports that these ^{obscene} ~~obscure~~ weapons have actually been used. The Committee on Disarmament needs to give renewed and special impetus - and Britain has sought recently to contribute to this - to arriving at a convention banning development and possession; and the reports I have just referred to underline how vital it is that such a ban should be truly verifiable if it is not to be simply a source of danger, instability and suspicion.

13. I spoke earlier about the huge weight of conventional forces. The biggest concentration and confrontation of such forces anywhere, in the world lies in Europe, my own continent, ~~and~~ ^{and} something needs to be done about this, to reduce the burden without creating imbalance or insecurity. This must be possible if both sides truly want it, and the Western participants have recently made an important ^{fresh} ~~new~~ proposal. Britain would also like to see a ^{new} conference take place soon to agree ^{quickly} on new mandatory confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe. This would be a powerful complement to the ~~necessary~~ action on numbers, ^{at} Vienna.

14. There are several other efforts in progress to which Britain gives its full support, like the valuable project under the Secretary-General's auspices for much greater openness about military spending, and the work on the relationship between disarmament and development. I shall not catalogue all this work in detail now; my country will ^{demonstrate} ~~show~~ its support by the breadth and quality of our practical participation.

in the long
negotiations
at in Vienna

I have no reason to be ashamed of Britain's record over the years

15. ~~I am moderately proud of our record~~ in the disarmament and arms control field - I believe it stands up well to comparison. But I cannot be complacent; Britain and everyone else needs to do more. And the way in which we need, all of us, to do it is not by ringing speeches, still less by propaganda postures, but by patient, realistic, relevant work, step by step in difficult and complex matters. Frankly, I am not very interested in disarmament theory or rhetoric; I am interested in disarmament action, because that is what people want. It may be a long business, and an unspectacular one; but there is no ~~alternative~~ ^{short cut and no} ~~sensible alternative~~.

16. I should like to finish what I have to say, Mr President, by reverting to my central theme of peace. There is, I believe, a real prospect that we can keep the notion of all-out global war, of nuclear war, simply obsolete and unreal; and I believe we can do it at less cost than today if we have the wisdom to agree on the measures to that end. We cannot yet, I fear, make all sorts of war obsolete; ~~in candour~~, I doubt whether our generation can realistically expect to achieve in full the goal which Pope John Paul proposed during a visit to my country ^{only} last month, when he said "War should belong to the tragic past, to history; it should find no place on humanity's agenda for the future". But we can less and less afford to regard that objective as wholly unattainable, or just a pious theoretical aspiration. We have to make it a ^{central} ~~genuine~~ ^{genuinely shared by all,} political goal to be pursued by concrete practical action directed to removing real causes ^{and risks}. All of us can help, in large ways or small, ~~and I hope and expect that this Session will make a distinctive contribution.~~ Disarmament and arms control are important among the instruments available to us. I hope and expect that this Session will make a distinctive contribution to exploiting them more fully. I pledge my own country to play its part.

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File Sub



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 June 1982

UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

I enclose the latest draft of the speech which the Prime Minister will make in New York next week. I am also sending a copy to David Omand.

The Prime Minister will be working further on this draft tomorrow. Should you or David Omand have any comments, I should be grateful to receive these as soon as possible and at latest by close of play on Friday.

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B/F

A. J. COLES

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Mr. President,

This is the first time I have spoken in the General Assembly. It is a privilege to do so, and to do so under your Presidency.

But what makes the occasion most special forme is the underlying subject of our meeting - the subject of peace. The leaders who come here carry a special duty - not just to our own countries but to the common interest of all, in the most vital matters of all. We are the trustees of mankind in our generation. It is in that spirit that I ~~intend~~ to speak today.

I want to begin by talking briefly about our fundamental aims, and where arms control and disarmament must fit in. I shall then offer some views upon the broad issues which nuclear and non-nuclear weapons set before us all, and upon the use of force. And I shall address particular tasks for arms control and disarmament in the context of these wider aims and issues.

I can state my view of basic aims very simply. I want peace for everyone; but not peace at any price. It must be peace with freedom and justice. A great American President once said that he would sooner die on his feet than live on his knees. I agree with that. I want my own country, and every other country - large or small, developed or developing, all have the same rights - to live at peace, in liberty, in its own way within its own established borders. And I tell the Assembly frankly that I assess measures of arms control and disarmament purely as possible instruments to that central aim. If they serve it, if they help

/, us to attain

us to attain it more surely or at less cost, I am in favour of them. If they are irrelevant to it, I am not interested in them. If they damage it, I am against them.

I come now to the means of war. Our generation faces a very special responsibility, because of what the march of modern technology has done to the weapons of war. We are all aware of that most keenly in respect of nuclear weapons. Mankind now has the knowledge of how to destroy itself. We cannot cancel or forget that knowledge. We have to live with it as an irreversible fact; and Governments which possess nuclear weapons have the burden of managing the consequences.

In their own terrible way, however, these weapons also bring a special opportunity. For part of what they mean is that starting a war among the nuclear powers is simply not a rational option. Given what nuclear weapons can do, recourse to arms between these powers can never be a sane way of dealing with our differences. The past 37 years show a deepening recognition of that. In circumstances often tense and difficult, deterrence has worked. Nuclear weapons have kept the peace between East and West. That is an achievement beyond price. We must not abandon or endanger it.

I am sure that we can continue that vast achievement at much reduced levels of these armouries if there is the will and the good sense to do so. I shall have more to say later on the way towards this. But we must have the wisdom and the honesty

/ to recognise

to recognise that in today's world to attempt or pretend to dismantle the deterrent system would be a course of reckless danger, and danger for the whole world. We must never let the launching of world war seem again in any way a rational option.

not
I am/taking nuclear deterrence for granted for the rest of human history. We must of course look for a better system of security. But to suggest that there is one within reach now would be a pretence, and a perilous pretence. There is not; and to act as though pious rhetoric were the same as reality could destroy the peace and freedom of us all. For our time, the task within reach is to harness the existence of nuclear weapons, as we have done for half a lifetime now, to the service of peace. In that task the nuclear powers' duty is to show restraint and responsibility. The distinctive role of the non-nuclear countries, I suggest, is to recognise that proliferation cannot be the way to a safer world.

I have spoken so far of nuclear weapons. These were a major concern of the 1978 Special Session; and they must remain so for us. But I am uneasy that they may be allowed to mask the facts about what we sometimes call, too comfortably, conventional weapons and conventional war. I earnestly hope that this Session will focus new and sharper concern upon these. Let us consider just a few facts. Since the disaster of Nagasaki nuclear weapons have not been used at all. But there have been something like 140 non-nuclear conflicts, in which up to ten million people have died. We have just been watching the tragedy in the Lebanon; and I have vividly in my own mind the many hundreds of men - brave

/ young men from

young men from my country and from Argentina - cut down in the South Atlantic by the impersonal killing-power of modern armaments. Nuclear war is indeed a terrible threat; but conventional war is a terrible reality. We must do more about its dangers and its burdens. Those burdens are far greater than those of nuclear weapons. If we deplore, as I do, the amount of military spending in a world where so many go hungry and so much else needs to be done, our criticism and our action should turn above all to conventional forces, which absorb far the greatest proportion - around 90 per cent - of military spending world-wide.

We are all involved in this - virtually all of us have conventional forces. I am convinced that we need a deeper and wider effort throughout the non-nuclear field, looking at weapons and manpower and deployments, to see what we can do together to lighten the risks and the burdens and the fears. I would particularly welcome ^{new} action over arms transfers, especially if this came through agreement among the states of a region to which others could subscribe, and not by having the big suppliers impose their own limitations and preferences from outside.

But in a crucial sense, Mr. President, I have still not reached the root of the matter. For the fundamental risk to peace is not the existence of weapons of particular types or in particular numbers or places. It is, above all, the existence of political willingness to initiate their use. This is where we need action and protection. And our key need is not for promises against first use of this or that kind of military weapon - such promises

/ can never

can never be dependable amid the stresses of war. We need guarantees against first use of any kinds of military weapons; guarantees against starting military action at all. The leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance have just given a solemn collective undertaking to precisely that effect.

Let us face the reality. The springs of war lie in the readiness to resort to force against other nations, and not in "arms races", whether real or imaginary. Aggressors do not start wars because an adversary has built up his own strength. They start wars because their calculations predict a profitable result. I mentioned a moment ago 140 conflicts since 1945. Few if any of them can be traced to an arms race. No historian can imagine that the World War of 1939 to 1945 was caused by any kind of arms race. On the contrary, it sprang from the belief of a tyrant that his neighbours lacked the means or the will to resist him effectively. A formidable countryman of that tyrant, 70 years earlier, is quoted as saying "Do I want war? Of course not - I want victory". Hitler believed he could have victory without war, or with not very much or very difficult war. The cost to humanity of disproving that belief was immense; the cost of preventing him from forming it in the first place would have been infinitely less. The lesson is that disarmament and good intentions on their own do not ensure peace; they may even damage it.

I am totally opposed to massive arms build-ups. I am saddened to read in Andrei Sakharov's writings about the militarisation of his country's economy and the unchecked power of its military-industrial complex.

But I am not prepared merely to wring my hands about such things
I would much prefer to see arms build-ups prevented, by good sense or /
agreement. But if that does not work, then the owners of these vast/
be allowed to imagine that they could safely be used, either to
blackmail or to coerce. And that cannot be achieved just by
words. I am not prepared to entrust the security of my country
and its friends to speeches and hopes and virtuous example.
It can be ensured only by deterrence, by adequate strength.

Mr. President, I have explained why in general I do not believe
that weapons cause wars. It is not merely a mistaken analysis
but an evasion of responsibility to imagine that we can deal
with the problem of war primarily by focussing upon its instruments.
These are often more symptoms than causes. But I have said all
this not to decry arms control and disarmament but to give them
their real value, to set them in their true context. It has in
my view been a frequent and serious disservice to these useful
techniques to raise unreal expectations about what they can do
for us. Excessive claims and demands for disarmament have too
often been not an aid to practical action but a paper substitute
for it. Disarmament measures cannot, in any realistic framework,
remove the possibility of war. But the limitation and reduction
of armaments can still help greatly in the right circumstances.
It can reduce the cost of legitimate self-defence. It may ease
fear and political friction. It can help to make conflict a

/ little less

little less inhumane, as the work on the laws of war seeks to do. It can sometimes seal off or limit the military use of advancing science and technology, as in outer space or with anti-ballistic missile deployments. To do such things, and to do them in a way that is balanced, visible and dependable, is to do a great deal.

Critics too often play down what has already been achieved in arms control agreements, whether formal or informal - outer space, the sea bed, Antarctica, nuclear-free Latin America, banning nuclear tests above ground, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the various Geneva accords over the years, the SALT agreements, the banning of biological and radiological weapons. Much of this is perhaps imperfect or incomplete, and relatively little of it is actual disarmament. We can all wish that the achievement were much greater. But to suggest that what has been done so far is merely trivial is both inaccurate and unhelpful to further progress. We have a useful foundation to build on. What we have to do is to seize every opportunity, and indeed to make new opportunities, for further building. I want now to turn to some specific issues in that direction.

In the nuclear field, the hopes of the world lie above all with direct talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, which have

/ by

by far the largest arsenals. As I said earlier, I believe that these arsenals could both be greatly reduced without any danger to peace. Decisive action is needed here, not just declarations or freezes. I welcome the radical proposals made by the United States for completely eliminating whole classes of intermediate-range systems and for substantially cutting the strategic armouries. The negotiations must surely have the urgent support of us all.

/I hope

I hope moreover that action on nuclear armouries will thereafter go wider still. In Europe, East and West each deploy thousands of nuclear warheads for medium and short-range delivery systems. No doubt some weapons in this category are needed to keep deterrence credible and sure. But I believe that if we think clearly we will recognise that far fewer would be enough. The United States showed the way during 1980 by unilaterally withdrawing a thousand warheads without replacement. We should make this an important area for further action, by both the great alliances.

I am deeply concerned about chemical weapons. When the world community decided in 1972 to ban biological weapons - a matter in which Britain played a leading role - we all looked forward to action next on chemical weapons. It has not happened. There is even ground for unease about whether everyone is truly observing the agreed ban on biological weapons; and many of us have been further disquieted by well-documented reports, which urgently need investigation, that chemical weapons and toxins have actually been used. The Committee on Disarmament needs to give renewed and determined impetus to agreeing a convention banning development and possession of such weapons. Britain has sought recently to contribute further to this.

I spoke earlier about the huge weight of conventional forces. The biggest concentration and confrontation of such forces anywhere in the world lies in Europe, my own continent. We need to reduce the frictions and burdens of this without causing imbalance or insecurity. This must be possible if both sides sincerely want

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it, and the Western participants in the overlong negotiations in Vienna are making an important fresh proposal. Britain would also like to see a special effort made to agree quickly on new mandatory confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe. This would be a valuable complement to action at Vienna on force levels.

Through all these subjects there runs a vital thread - verification. It is frankly absurd to expect that in these matters where national security is at stake countries should take the observance of agreements by others simply on trust, especially when ^{some} states are so deeply secretive. Agreements which are not backed by proper verification can be worse than useless - they can be a new source of danger, fear and mistrust. Verification is not an optional extra item in disarmament and arms control. It is at the heart of the matter, and we must always tackle it in that light.

There are in progress several further endeavours to which Britain gives its backing, like the Secretary-General's project for much greater openness about military spending. We will this year table the full range of information asked for. I shall not go right through the list of other efforts; my country will demonstrate its support by the quality of our practical participation.

I believe that Britain's record over the years in work on disarmament and arms control stands up well to any comparison. But I cannot be complacent; Britain and everyone else needs to

do more. And the way in which we need, all of us, to do it is not by ringing speeches, still less by propaganda postures, but by patient, realistic, relevant work, step by step in difficult and complex matters. Frankly, I am not very interested in broad disarmament theory or rhetoric; I am interested in specific, sensible disarmament action in the practical service of security. This is a long business, and an unspectacular one; but there is no short cut and no sensible alternative.

Mr. President, let me summarise what I have said. The central aim is peace in freedom for every country to live according to its own choices. The test of all our efforts in this Special Session must be whether they help that aim. We cannot abolish nuclear weapons, and we must not endanger the massive contribution which they make, however paradoxically, to peace; but we can surely preserve this with far fewer of them. We should tackle much more vigorously than hitherto the problems of non-nuclear armaments, with which all recent wars have been fought and which absorb the vast bulk of military spending. And we should recognise that wars are caused not by armaments but by aggressors; that what ^{is} tempts aggressors/the prospect of easy advantage; and that the best safeguard of peace is to deny them that prospect. Within the context of these realities measures of agreed arms control and disarmament can make an important contribution if we use them sensibly, without cant or illusion. I hope this Session will help to enhance that contribution. I pledge my own country to play its part.

MEMORANDUM ON DISARMAMENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER -

1. I assume that the Prime Minister does not want to contribute to the cant usually talked about disarmament, and it would be immensely refreshing if she could state a few unpopular home truths on the matter. For example: there is no correlation between the size of armaments and the probability of war, nor between 'arms races' and the causes of wars. Some wars have been preceded by 'arms races' and some have not. Some 'arms races' have culminated in war and some have not. Few historians any longer believe that the arms race before 1914 provided more than a contributory cause to the outbreak of World War One, and even fewer that the Second World War was the result of any arms race. There would be general agreement, however, that the adventurism of the Axis Powers was stimulated by the military weakness of the status quo powers, France, Britain and the United States. Perceptions of military weakness have been at least as potent a cause of war as fears of military strength, and disarmament can under certain circumstances be at least as effective a cause of war as great armaments. (British unilateral disarmament in the South Atlantic is an interesting case in point.) I would be happy to write a brief paper dealing with this question if it were thought useful, but I enclose a copy of a recent lecture I gave which elaborates some of the arguments referred to above.

2. What matters then is not disarmament as such but peace, and disarmament is only desirable if it can be shown to contribute to peace. So long as sovereign states exist they will continue to make provision for their security, and will engage in a process of 'competitive modernization' in armaments as in every other field of technology. Arms cannot be frozen at a given point of technological development. Each generation will equip itself with the most effective weapon-systems, as with the most effective transport, communications, health-preserving and nutritive systems, that technology makes possible.

3. We must therefore be clear over what the real problems are with which the development of armaments presents us.

I suggest that these are three.

- 1) Their expense
- 2) Their effect on international stability
- 3) Their inhumanity

4. Cost

The problem of escalating costs is self-evident, and provides the only effective incentive to serious arrangements for disarmament. All major powers, not excluding the Soviet Union, would welcome proposals that genuinely provided them with equal security at less cost. One does not have to share the liberal view that money spent on weapons would be better spent on aid to the Third World in order to accept that defence costs tend to absorb an unacceptably high proportion of all national budgets.

5. Stability

Armaments can be 'destabilising' in two ways. An increase in the military capability of one nation is normally countered by a comparable increase in that of its rivals, leaving both countries poorer but no more secure. In addition, certain kinds of weapons-systems can be seen as offering such an immediate threat of an effective 'first strike' that the adversary will be under a constant temptation to 'pre-empt'. The first of these processes produces 'arms races' that may not be dangerous in themselves but impose grave burdens on all national economies. The second can result in situations of such mutual mistrust that any political crisis may erupt unnecessarily and disastrously into nuclear war. For both these reasons, increase in armaments can result not in greater security but in considerably less.

6. Restraint

In spite of all our efforts, wars may occur; and after every war, peace must be made. Relations must be re-established with the adversary, the damage repaired and an improved political structure created. It is thus a matter of political prudence, as well as a moral imperative, that the war itself should be conducted with the greatest possible restraint and humanity and that laws of war, carefully worked out over generations, should be observed. Nuclear weapons must thus be seen always as deterrents, and preferably as deterrents simply to the opponent's use of his own nuclear weapons. Much

of the moral and intellectual force behind the 'Peace Movement' today arises from the belief that we have abandoned this concept of deterrence and are planning to use nuclear weapons in the conduct of war. A firm reassertion of the original concept of nuclear deterrence would bring the Government much political and moral credit.

7. Any disarmament proposals should address themselves specifically to the above questions. The object, clearly stated, should be to work towards a stable international system in which nations can preserve their security at minimal cost, being neither provoked by the strength of their rivals into a ruinously expensive armaments competition nor tempted by their weakness into military adventurism. Their weapons should also be such that, if an armed conflict should occur, it could be conducted with the greatest possible 'economy of force'; that is, with weapons that will inflict the least possible damage on civilians and on the environment, making it possible to observe those restraints within war that are mandatory on a Christian society.

8. Problems of arms control can be broken down under four heads:

- 1) The central nuclear balance
- 2) The European balance
- 3) Regional balances (including nuclear proliferation)
- 4) Qualitative control - CBW, etc.

9. The central balance is primarily a matter of negotiation between the USA and the USSR, and I assume that the UK would not wish to dissociate itself from the US proposals for deep cuts in strategic systems as a means for achieving maximum stability at minimal cost. Regional balances are a matter for the countries concerned, but there is no harm in reminding a UN audience that arms reductions are a matter of concern for small nations no less than for great - especially since the economic burden on the former is so very much greater than on the latter. The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to concentrate, in any detailed proposals she has to make, on items 8.(2) and 8.(4) above.

10. Any proposals for arms control agreements over the European balance will need to carry the approval of our NATO allies, so any initiatives the Prime Minister has in mind will already have been agreed in discussion with them. If the following ideas have not already been approved it is thus too late to consider them, but I put them forward for what they are worth.

1) The main destabilizing factor in Europe is the overwhelming Soviet superiority in conventional forces. At present stability is maintained only by an allied commitment to a first use of nuclear weapons that Soviet nuclear parity makes decreasingly convincing. Stability can be restored only by either a substantial increase in alliance conventional forces, or a substantial

reduction in Soviet forces. Clearly the latter would be in every way preferable. A new impetus should therefore be given to the MBFR negotiations as a matter of urgency.

2) Support should be given to the US proposal for a 'zero option' on the emplacement of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) such as SS20s, Pershing IIs and cruise missiles.

3) Consideration should be given to the elimination of battlefield nuclear weapons of which the military value is doubtful, whose effect on the local environment would be devastating, and whose presence is highly destabilising.

4) We should continue to press for the elimination of chemical and biological weapons from all military planning and stockpiles.

11. Although it is not immediately relevant to the UN Special Assembly, it might be useful if the NATO allies could agree among themselves as to what they would consider to be a desirable and practicable 'model' of force levels and structures that would take account of the security needs of both sides in Europe at the lowest feasible cost. To the best of my knowledge we have never negotiated with any such objective, however notional, in mind, and such a concept would add clarity to our proposals.

Michael Howard

DISARMAMENT: A BRIEF HISTORICAL NOTE

I

1. There is little to recall about discussions of disarmament before 1914. It was not even something imposed on vanquished by victors.

2. There were, however, numerous suggestions for securing "perpetual peace" in the 18th century in which measures of what would now be called disarmament would have played a part.

3. The two conferences at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 concerned themselves primarily with measures to secure rules of war, treatment of civilians, wounded and prisoners, the rights and obligations of neutrals etc. But the first Conference did include a ban on gas warfare, dum dum bullets, & "projectiles thrown from balloons". Britain sought at the second conference to secure some limitation of armaments.

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II

4. The Treaty of Versailles insisted on specific and radical measures of German disarmament to be carried out under Anglo-French military control. These were looked upon as a foretaste of, or introduction to, "the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations" (Part V of the Treaty).

5. These clauses were put forward in an international mood which accepted that great armaments were themselves a cause of war - particularly the naval "arms race" between Germany and Britain. The mood was articulated by President Wilson in his speeches in 1918.

6. Much of the proposed German disarmament was carried but there were numerous evasions. Many of them - perhaps most - became known to the allied control commission in the 1920s. But Britain and France did not agree how these evasions were to be handled. After 1930 the control commission was withdrawn. After 1933

.../ cont

Hitler stepped up rearmament and in 1935 specifically denounced all the clauses on disarmament in the treaty of Versailles.

7. There were several attempts to carry forward the disarmament clauses in the Treaty of Versailles to countries other than Germany, e.g. the naval treaties of 1921-22 and 1930 which affected most of the powers which then had substantial navies. There was a protocol banning the use of gas in war (1925), a convention on international (private) arms traffic (1925), plans for the renunciation of war e.g. the Kellogg Pact (1928) and finally a disarmament conference at Geneva in 1932. This last led to nothing, basically, because of divergencies between France and the others: France desired a system of international police and insisted that security must precede disarmament. The Germans demanded equality of treatment. The US in June 1932 proposed a one third cut in all "defence components".

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8. A subsequent meeting of this conference did secure a "No Force declaration" by which the major powers promised not to resolve differences between them by force. Other discussions revolved around a scheme put forward by Britain by which all European armies would be reduced by specific figures, and France and Germany would be permitted equality. The US supported this but the plan failed formally at least because Germany, by then with Hitler as Chancellor, refused to agree that the SA (storm troops) should be counted in. The conference met again in 1934 briefly.

9. These efforts seemed to have been wrecked as much by France as by Germany but it is understandable that after 1914-18 the French should be fearful and it is inconceivable that Germany would have been restrained while Hitler was in power. There were arguments (e.g. by Lord Cecil) - still sometimes heard - that, had it not been for French intransigence in 1932, the German government of

.../ cont

of Dr Bruning might have been saved and Hitler kept from power. It is hard to give credence to such "if onlys".

III

10. After 1945, naturally the first series of efforts concentrated on the issue of nuclear weapons. Most of the prewar protocols and conventions on the use of force were, as it were, absorbed in the Charter of the UN. The US put forward ideas to secure the internationalisation of nuclear energy the Barmch Plan (1946-47). This was opposed by the Soviet Union, who were nearer the development of nuclear weapons than anyone supposed: their first nuclear weapon was tested in 1949.

11. Between then and the 1960s there were a series of far reaching but rather over ambitious

.../ cont

disarmament plans which sought formally to secure "general and complete disarmament" including the abolition of all nuclear weapons. These were usually discussed in the UN disarmament Commission or its sub committee. After 1955, however, it was admitted that there was no possibility of achieving a world in which it would be proved that all nuclear weapons had been beyond all doubt dismantled. This led to the pursuit of less ambitious schemes for "arms control", to become the subject of academic and theoretical debate and study in the US and Europe during the 1960s. Meantime the post war mood, unlike that in 1919, was one in which it was supposed that war in 1939 had been caused by excessive disarmament of a unilateral type.

12. Some understandings of a limited kind were achieved e.g. the partial Test Ban treaty (1963), the Antarctic treaty (1959), the Outer Space treaty (1967), the treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), the Nuclear non proliferation treaty (1968) and the SALT I treaty (1970).

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13. Discussions in the UN or its subcommittees of primarily interested powers in the late 'forties and 'fifties centred also on ways whereby substantial measures of "conventional" disarmament - reduction of armaments and forces to the level "strictly necessary for the mainenance of internal security" - might be interwoven with the measures agreed on nuclear weapons. These discussions, though of value in discovering information about Soviet attitudes to weapons in general, led to nothing.

14. Meantime the situation changed as a result of:

- (a) the Soviet decision, apparently taken after the Cuban crisis of 1962, to devote every effort to reach at least equality with the US in nuclear weapons and methods of delivery to prevent a similar occurrence arising in which the USSR would have to back down again.

.../ cont

- (b) the achievement of this aim in the 1970s. partly as a result of US decisions in the late 1960s to have a policy of minimum deterrence;
- (c) rapid technological advances which changed the whole history of weapons in the 1970s; and
- (d) the achievement by the Soviet Union of an ocean going navy.

14. In the 1970s direct talks between the US and USSR followed the achievement of SALT I, about further measures of strategic arms limitation. A SALT II treaty was signed in 1979 but not ratified by the US because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It would seem that both sides have kept to the provisions of this non-ratified treaty.

15. Other disarmament conferences, including other powers were held at Geneva and Vienna e.g.

.../ cont

those affecting force levels in Europe and intermediate range weapons. On the whole direct conversations between the super powers have seemed a wiser course in recent years than special UN conferences, though after the first special session on Disarmament (1978) UN activities began again and a UN disarmament centre was founded - largely devoted to gathering information.

IV

16. There seem to me to be seven main points - perhaps obvious - which need to be taken into account when discussing disarmament:

- (a) the power of nuclear weapons and the speed with which they can be delivered is a new dimension in the

.../ cont

world, even though politicians and generals who may give the order to use them may not be very different from those in the past.

(b) in the new countries of the so called Third World [redacted] armies play an essential civil function comparable to that exercised by monarchies in the past. Armed forces can be the only institution which keeps the nation concerned together.

(c) similarly in these countries we have seen a steady growth in military rule. Nor can military intervention in politics be excluded even in Europe e.g. Spain, Portugal and Greece,

.../ cont

perhaps even Italy, countries where there remain threats of military rule. Even France has experienced a coup d'etat with a distinct military flavour within the last 25 years.

- (d) many of the threats to peace are not caused by regular armies but by irregular ones - e.g. terrorists, guerrillas etc.

- (e) the great powers' allies need to be watched. If, for example, the USSR were to agree to cut her armed forces by a third, there is an obvious chance that she would make up the difference by using Cubans or others as an international brigade - anyway outside Europe.

.../ cont

- (f) the "Third World" has recently been increasing its arms fast. It seems as if the Soviet Union remains the principal supplier of these weapons.
- (g) There is ample documentation for the fact that the Soviet Union has in recent years devoted enormous resources to propaganda in favour of its own version of disarmament specifically to further its own strategic interest. It may be that the present interest in disarmament in Western Europe is indirectly mainly due to this Soviet campaign, though naturally such a thing would be hard to prove. (Particularly useful recent document on this matter is "Moscow and the Peace Offensive" published by the Heritage Foundation, No.184).

Mr. Colie
22/6 Ambassador

TOAST BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE LUNCHEON IN HONOUR OF
THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM - 23 JUNE 1982

*The SG's
toast for
tomorrow.*

MADAM PRIME MINISTER, EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

Alto
22/6

IT IS A VERY GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME, MADAM PRIME MINISTER,
TO HAVE THIS FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO WELCOME YOU TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
YOUR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO
DISARMAMENT DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE THE UNITED KINGDOM ATTACHES
TO THESE EFFORTS TOWARDS THE CREATION OF A MORE STABLE AND SECURE
WORLD. LET ME ALSO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR ADDRESS TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS MORNING AND ON YOUR ENCOURAGING EXPRESSION OF
YOUR COUNTRY'S COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF DISARMAMENT.

- 2 -

THE UNITED KINGDOM OCCUPIES A SPECIAL
PLACE IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN THE HISTORIC MISSION ENTRUSTED
TO THIS ORGANIZATION BY THE CHARTER. ONE OF THE FOREMOST
ARCHITECTS OF THE WORLD BODY, FROM ITS CONCEPTION IN THE ATLANTIC
CHARTER TO ITS REALIZATION IN SAN FRANCISCO WAS AN EMINENT PREDECESSOR
OF YOURS, WINSTON CHURCHILL. EVEN IN THE DARKEST DAYS OF THE
SECOND WORLD WAR HE WAS ABLE TO LOOK BEYOND THE FIGHTING AND THE
DESTRUCTION IN PLANNING FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
TO PRESERVE THE FUTURE PEACE. IT WAS TOGETHER WITH THE LEADERS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT CHURCHILL, IN 1943 IN TEHERAN,
RECOGNIZED THE RESPONSIBILITY - AND I QUOTE "RESTING UPON US AND ALL
THE UNITED NATIONS TO MAKE A PEACE ... AND BANISH THE SCOURGE AND TERRO
OF WAR FOR MANY GENERATIONS."

MADAM PRIME MINISTER, YOUR COUNTRY'S PROFOUND COMMITMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS, IS AS VITAL TODAY AS IT WAS AT THE FOUNDING OF THE ORGANIZATION. AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER ARE RESPECTED AND THAT PEACE AND SECURITY ARE MAINTAINED. THIS ORGANIZATION, WHICH WAS BORN OUT OF THE ASHES OF A DEVASTATING WAR, NEEDS ALL OF THE VISION AND DEDICATION POSSESSED BY ITS FOUNDERS IF IT IS TO REALIZE THEIR HOPES FOR THE FUTURE.

IF I MAY QUOTE THE FAMOUS WORDS OF ANOTHER ENGLISHMAN, JOHN DONNE, "NO MAN IS AN ISLAND ENTIRE OF ITSELF: EVERY MAN IS A PIECE OF THE CONTINENT, A PART OF THE MAIN". WE HAVE GROWN TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE INCREASING INTERDEPENDENCE OF OUR WORLD, BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL, BUT WE HAVE STILL NOT DRAWN THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS. EVERY CONFLICT RUNS THE RISK OF ESCALATING AND THREATENING THE GENERAL PEACE. OUR MODERN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, CAPABLE OF MASS DESTRUCTION, IS ALL TOO LIKELY TO ASSUME ITS OWN GRIM LOGIC AND LEAD TO EVENTS WHICH WE CAN NO LONGER CONTROL.

FACED WITH THIS AWESOME PERSPECTIVE, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE RESOLVE TO STRENGTHEN THE ONLY EXISTING UNIVERSAL MACHINERY FOR SECURITY AND THE SOLUTION OF CONFLICTS, NAMELY THE UNITED NATIONS. OUR ORGANIZATION POSSESSES THE MEANS TO PRESERVE THE FABRIC OF PEACE, BUT ONLY IF IT IS USED DETERMINEDLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR THE SUPPORT WHICH YOUR COUNTRY, ~~MADAM-PRIME-MINISTER~~, HAS CONSISTENTLY EXTENDED TO SO MANY OF THE UNITED NATIONS' ENDEAVOURS, THUS RISING TO THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES I HAVE MENTIONED. LET ME ALSO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PAY A PERSONAL TRIBUTE TO YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, SIR ANTHONY PARSONS, WHOSE BRILLIANCE, GOOD WILL AND INTEGRITY I HAVE VALUED MOST DEEPLY.

MADAM PRIME MINISTER,

I KNOW THAT YOUR STAUNCH PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THE IDEALS OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND SELF-FULFILLMENT, AND YOUR ATTACHMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, WILL CONTINUE TO BE A SOURCE OF STRENGTH EVEN IN DIFFICULT TIMES. YOUR RESOLUTION, VISION AND COURAGE INSPIRE THE CONFIDENCE WE NEED IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS A LIFE OF JUSTICE AND DIGNITY FOR ALL HUMANKIND.

EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO JOIN ME IN A TOAST TO HER EXCELLENCY PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER AND TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.