

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
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MR URE

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DESKBY 050800Z AND
TIME-FACTOR IN ULT. SENTENCE

IMMEDIATE

* For Typists - 1840X

HD/SAMD (Standard Dist. + A.D. FI.)
HD/DEFENCE D
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND

PS/No. 10, DOWNING STREET ✓

DIO CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff) ~~and MOD SITCEN~~.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 050800Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 050045Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER ³⁹³ ~~GEOE~~ OF 4 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (SITCEN), WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TEL NO 200: SECURITY COUNCIL : FA
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. TWO IMPORTANT FACTORS MUST BE BORNE IN MIND IN OUR CONSIDERATION OF ANY FUTURE ACTION IN THE UN:-

(I) THE ANTIPATHY OF THE NON-ALIGNED AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL (INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE IRELAND AND JAPAN) TO THE USE OF FORCE. THIS, COMBINED WITH THE ARGENTINE REJECTION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL APPEAL, WAS THE PRINCIPAL REASON WHY WE SECURED NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT FOR A RESOLUTION TABLED BY A WESTERN PERMANENT MEMBER CRITICAL OF A NAM MEMBER STATE.

(II) WE HAVE VIRTUALLY NO SUPPORT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISPUTE, IE THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL WOULD APPROVE OF THE OUTCOME IF IT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN ANY OTHER WAY.

2. GALTIERI'S OPEN REJECTION OF THE RESOLUTION (AS REPORTED ON THE RADIO) THEORETICALLY STILL LEAVES US WITH THE INITIATIVE IN THE COUNCIL, AND I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING WHETHER WE SHOULD TAKE EARLY ADVANTAGE OF THIS, BEARING IN MIND PARA 3 OF YOUR TELNO 200. I HAVE COME TO THE FOLLOWING FIRM CONCLUSIONS.

3. WHATEVER THE RIGHTS OR WRONGS MAY BE, WE WOULD HAVE NO SUPPORT FOR A CALL FOR MEASURES EG SANCTIONS UNDER CHAPTER 7. TO TRY THIS ON WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO QUOTE GOING DOWN FIGHTING UNQUOTE.

FOR A CALL FOR MEASURES EG SANCTIONS UNDER CHAPTER 7. TO TRY THIS ON WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO QUOTE GOING DOWN FIGHTING UNQUOTE. IT WOULD INVITE A HUMILIATION. IT WOULD BE REGARDED BY ALL MEMBERS AS A RITUAL PRELIMINARY TO MILITARY ACTION BY US. IT WOULD NOT BE ANALOGOUS TO THE AMERICAN REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS OVER THE IRANIAN HOSTAGES. HAD THE COUNCIL REALISED THAT THIS WAS A PRELIMINARY TO AN AMERICAN ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT THE HOSTAGES BY FORCE, THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE HAD A HUMILIATING RESULT IN TERMS OF VOTES.

4. SHORT OF THIS, WE COULD GO BACK TO THE COUNCIL TO REAFFIRM SCR 502, DEPLORE THE ARGENTINE REJECTION OF IT, STRESS ARGENTINA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLES 25 AND 40 AND REITERATE A CALL FOR IMPLEMENTATION. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD BY ITSELF BE A BIT WET. FURTHERMORE, I HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANY RESOLUTION WHICH DID NOT ALSO CALL ON US TO HALT OUR MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE (BOTH YESTERDAYS' PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS CONVINCED ME OF THIS). EQUALLY, THERE IS ALREADY A TENDENCY IN THE CORRIDORS TO TALK ABOUT THE NEXT STEP BEING SOME UN INVOLVEMENT, EG THE GOOD OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE DESPATCH OF A UN COMMISSION OR UN PEACE-KEEPING OF SOME KIND. IF WE HAD TO REJECT ANY OF THESE PROPOSITIONS, NOTWITHSTANDING OUR LEGAL RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER, WE WOULD BE DANGEROUSLY EXPOSED AND ISOLATED EVEN AMONGST OUR FRIENDS. WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO COUNT ON THE FRENCH BUT I WOULD BE DUBIOUS ABOUT THE AMERICANS, AND THERE WOULD BE NO HOPE OF HOLDING THE IRISH OR THE JAPANESE WITH US.

5. I TAKE IT THAT YOU WOULD NOT WISH US TO INITIATE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF IT WERE TO LEAD TO PREMATURE INVOLVEMENT OF UN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT MACHINERY, AND THAT EQUALLY YOU WOULD NOT WISH ME TO HAVE TO VETO SUCH PROPOSITIONS. BY DOING SO WE WOULD LOSE ALL THE GROUND WHICH WE HAVE SECURED IN THE LAST FEW DAYS AND WE MIGHT WELL BE FACED BY AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE LIGHT OF OUR PUBLICLY EXPRESSED DETERMINATION TO RECOVER THE ISLANDS BY FORCE IF NECESSARY. AT THAT STAGE, WE NOT ARGENTINA, WOULD BE IN THE DOCK HERE.

6. I BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT WE WOULD BE BEST ADVISED (BUT SEE BELOW) TO KEEP AWAY FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNTIL AND UNLESS WE ARE OURSELVES READY TO DE-ESCALATE THE SITUATION BY INVOKING UN PEACE-MAKING MACHINERY OR THE ICJ. FOR THE MOMENT, OUR BEST COURSE, AS SEEN FROM HERE, WOULD BE TO PURSUE THE DIPLOMATIC OPTION OUTSIDE THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

~~UN PEACE-MAKING MACHINERY ON THE ICJ. FOR THE MOMENT, OUR BEST COURSE, AS SEEN FROM HERE, WOULD BE TO PURSUE THE DIPLOMATIC OPTION OUTSIDE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, EXTRACTING FULL VALUE FROM SCR 502, THROUGH THE AGENCY OF INFLUENTIAL THIRD PARTIES SUCH AS THE US OR LEADING MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY. THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE UN AUDIENCE THAT WE WERE PURSUING DIPLOMATIC POSSIBILITIES, AS ENJOINED BY SCR 502, AND MIGHT REDUCE THE FOLLOWING RISK.~~

7. THIS IS THAT BRITISH FLEET MOVEMENTS WILL PRECIPITATE AN EARLY CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FROM PANAMA (AT ARGENTINIAN REQUEST) OR FROM SOME OTHER DELEGATION WITH STRONG VIEWS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. IN THIS CASE, WE WILL FIND OURSELVES IN THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN PARA 4 ABOVE. MY PERSONAL INSTINCT IS THAT THE ARGENTINES MAY HOLD THEIR HANDS FOR A BIT IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF GALTIERI'S REJECTION OF SCR 502 TO BE OVERTAKEN BY THE EFFECT OF THE PUBLICITY WHICH WILL SURROUND THE MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH FLEET. HOWEVER, I UNDERSTAND THAT THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL BE ADDRESSING A MEETING OF THE OAS IN WASHINGTON ON 5 APRIL AND IT IS NOT TO BE EXCLUDED THAT THEY MAY COME STRAIGHT BACK TO THE COUNCIL THEREAFTER.

8. IF YOU DECIDE THAT, FOR DOMESTIC REASONS, IT IS NECESSARY FOR US TO TAKE A FURTHER IMMEDIATE INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES, WE WILL DO OUR BEST, AS WE WILL IF WE ARE DRAGGED INTO THE COUNCIL BY OTHERS. IF YOU THOUGHT IT USEFUL, I COULD FLY HOME TOMORROW (5 APRIL) FOR CONSULTATIONS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE COMPLEX SITUATION AT THE UN. I COULD RETURN TO NEW YORK IN A DAY IF THE COUNCIL WAS CALLED AT SOMEONE ELSE'S INITIATIVE. IF YOU WISH ME TO DO SO I WOULD NEED TO KNOW BY 1400Z ON 5 APRIL TO ENABLE ME TO CATCH THE CONCORDE AT 11.15 LOCAL TIME (1615Z).

PARSONS

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