

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

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DIO CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

(COPIES PASSED TO THE EMERGENCY STAFF AND MOD SITCHEN).

FALKLAND ISLANDS

26

ADVANCE COPIES

(25)

SIR K COUZENS)

MR LITTLER)

MR PERETZ)

MR HAWTIN)

MR ILETT)

TREASURY

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

GRS 390

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 061615Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 319 OF 06 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, ROUTINE BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGENN
DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK,
MADRID, WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 317 (NOT TO ALL) : FALKLANDS

1. I ASKED TO SEE CHEYSSON THIS AFTERNOON TO MAKE THE POINTS IN
YOUR TELNO 129 TO BONN. HE GAVE ME A PARTIAL RESPONSE TO THE
REQUESTS I HAD PUT TO GUTMANN YESTERDAY.

2. CHEYSSON SAID THAT ALL DELIVERIES OF ARMS AND OF MILITARY
SUPPLIES HAD BEEN BANNED. THIS INCLUDED A STOP ON THE DELIVERY
OF APRIL 1982

2. CHEYSSON SAID THAT ALL DELIVERIES OF ARMS AND OF MILITARY SUPPLIES HAD BEEN BANNED. THIS INCLUDED A STOP ON THE DELIVERY OF AN IMPORTANT CONSIGNMENT WHICH HAD BEEN DUE ON 15 APRIL. HE REITERATED THAT FRANCE WAS ABSOLUTELY AT ONE WITH THE UK IN DEALING WITH THE CRISIS, BUT ON OUR OTHER REQUESTS THERE WOULD BE VARIOUS TECHNICAL QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE ACTION WE PROPOSED ON THE GSP OR OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO GATT WOULD BE JURIDICALLY POSSIBLE. FRANCE WAS NOT SAYING NO, BUT NEEDED TO BE CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS A WAY OF DOING WHAT WE WANTED. THIS WAS A MATTER FOR EXCHANGES BETWEEN EXPERTS AND SHOULD BE HANDLED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE SENT TO THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE WITHIN 48 HOURS.

3. CHEYSSON SAID THAT OUR OTHER REQUESTS, WHICH CALLED FOR NATIONAL ACTION, WERE BEING STUDIED URGENTLY. HE ASKED US TO KEEP IN CONTACT WITH HIS ECONOMIC DIRECTOR, M. PAYE, TO WHOM WE HAD GIVEN A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF OUR PROPOSALS THIS MORNING. WE WILL PERSUE THIS WITH PAYE TOMORROW.

4. CHEYSSON ENQUIRED HOW OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS WERE RESPONDING. I SAID THAT AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL THERE WAS A VERY POSITIVE RESPONSE ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT YET HAVE DETAILS ON HOW PARTICULAR REQUESTS HAD BEEN RECEIVED. I ASKED ABOUT RECALLING AMBASSADORS. CHEYSSON SAID HE WAS STILL REFLECTING ON THIS. AS ITS ACTIONS HAD SHOWN, FRANCE HAD NO DESIRE TO PLAY ANY SORT OF INTERMEDIARY ROLE, BUT THERE MIGHT NEVERTHELESS BE ADVANTAGE IN HAVING A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS NOT HOWEVER AN ANSWER: HE WOULD CONSIDER THE MATTER FURTHER. I REPEATED THE IMPORTANCE OF DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE URGENTLY TO SHAKE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

5. CHEYSSON REFERRED TO THE EFFORTS HE HAD MADE OVER THE WEEKEND IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE THE VOTES OF TOGO AND ZAIRE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID HE HAD ALSO TRIED WITH THE SPANIARDS, BUT FOUND THAT THEY WERE INCAPABLE OF LIFTING THEIR EYES FURTHER THAN GIBRALTAR. I AGAIN EXPRESSED OUR APPRECIATION OF FRENCH EFFORTS.

6. I SPOKE SIMILARLY BUT BRIEFLY TO BEREGOVY, SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE ELYSEE. HE SAID THAT FRANCE WAS DOING WHAT WAS TO BE EXPECTED OF A GOOD ALLY. I CONFIRMED IN REPLY TO A QUESTION THAT IF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES FAILED TO SECURE ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL THE USE OF FORCE WAS NOT EXCLUDED. FRETWELL.