

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/S AM D (STANDARD DIST.+A.D. FI.)

HD/DEFENCE D

^{hd sed}
~~HD/NEWS D~~

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/CONS DEPT

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

DIO CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

(COPIES PASSED TO THE EMERGENCY STAFF AND MOD SITCHEN).

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 070048Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1147 OF 6 APRIL

FALKLANDS: MIPT

1. WHEN WE WERE DISCUSSING THE US ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARGENTINIANS, HAIG SAID, WITH STRONG SUPPORT FROM ENDERS WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING, HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS FOR THE AMERICANS NOT TO TILT TOO OPENLY TOWARDS OUR SIDE BECAUSE IF THEY DID THIS THEY WOULD LOSE CREDIBILITY WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. HAIG BELIEVED THAT THE AMERICANS ALONE COULD EXERT INFLUENCE IN BUENOS AIRES.

2. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT AMERICAN INFLUENCE COULD BE PARAMOUNT THERE. IT WAS TRUE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO AVERT THE ARGENTINE INVASION, BUT HE HAD GOT INTO TOUCH WITH GALTIERI ONLY SHORTLY BEFORE THE LANDINGS AND THERE WAS NO CHANCE AT THAT STAGE OF STOPPING THE ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTION. BUT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO AMERICAN PRESSURE. THE ARGENTINE REGIME WAS IN DIRE ECONOMIC

FLASH

FALKLAND ISLANDS
ADVANCE COPIES

25
~~26~~
(25)

SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLER)
MR PERETZ) TREASURY
MR HAWTIN)
MR ILETT)

Typhits

HAWAII

MT

See para 3

~~DID NOT MEAN THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO~~
AMERICAN PRESSURE. THE ARGENTINE REGIME WAS IN DIRE ECONOMIC
STRAITS AND VULNERABLE TO ALL MANNER OF PRESSURES THAT THE
AMERICANS COULD BRING TO BEAR ON THEM.

I SAID THAT I PRESUMED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT BE LETTING ANY
FURTHER ARMS DELIVERIES GO TO ARGENTINA AND HAIG CONFIRMED
CATEGORICALLY THAT THIS WAS SO.

3. I SAID THAT I HAD LISTENED TO THE ARGUMENT ABOUT CREDIBILITY WITH
THE ARGENTINIANS BUT, ON THE BASIS OF MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOUTH
AMERICANS, I HELD THE VIEW THAT WHAT WOULD MAKE AN IMPACT UPON
THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD NOT BE NICENESS ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS
BUT PRESSURE FROM THEM BACKED BY THE FEAR OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF
BRITISH MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. ALTHOUGH, THEREFORE I UNDERSTOOD
WHY THE AMERICANS WANTED TO AVOID TAKING SIDES ON THE ISSUE OF
SOVEREIGNTY, I DID NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD HELP TO EXERT
INFLUENCE ON THE ARGENTINIANS IN TRYING TO BRING THEM TO A
NEGOTIATION, WHICH WAS WHAT HAIG WANTED, BY SIMPLY BEING
NEUTRAL.

4. HAIG SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED WITH MY VIEW ABOUT HUMAN NATURE.
RETURNING TO THE ISSUE OF HOW TO HEAD OFF A BATTLE HAIG SAID
THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE NOW ALREADY WORRIED.
THE DILEMMA WAS THAT IF WE SUNK THE ARGENTINE NAVY THAT WOULD BE
THE END OF GALTIERI: BUT IT WOULD ALSO BE THE END OF GALTIERI IF
HE WAS OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ISLANDS WITHOUT ANY PROMISE
OF A NEGOTIATION THAT CONTAINED PROMISE FOR ARGENTINE IN THE
FUTURE. HE ASKED ME FOR ANY IDEAS WE MIGHT HAVE OF WHAT SORT
OF APPROACH MIGHT SQUARE THE CIRCLE. I REPEATED OUR VIEW ABOUT
THE NEED AT THIS STAGE TO PUT PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW
AND EMPHASISED THE CRUCIAL ROLE THAT THE AMERICANS COULD PLAY
IN THIS.

5. HAIG SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY SAW OUR POINT THAT WE COULD NOT BE
PARTIES TO ANY DISCUSSIONS SO LONG AS THE ARGENTINE PRESENCE
REMAINED ON THE ISLANDS. BUT PERHAPS THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES
COULD DO SOMETHING BY SUGGESTING THAT IF THE ARGENTINIANS WITHDREW
THE AMERICANS WERE CONFIDENT THAT THERE COULD BE FURTHER TALKS.
I SAID THAT THAT WAS ANOTHER MATTER. I WOULD CERTAINLY BE IN TOUCH
WITH HIM AGAIN BUT I ASKED THAT THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE FOR HIM
TO LET US KNOW HOW HE GOT ON WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. IT DID NOT
LOOK TO ME AS THOUGH THEY WOULD SHOW MUCH SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY AT
THIS STAGE UNTIL THE YEAST OF THE APPROACHING BRITISH NAVAL
PRESENCE HAD HAD TIME TO WORK UPON THEM. TO WHICH HAIG REVERTED
TO THE ARGUMENT THAT HE MADE THROUGHOUT THAT HE WAS REALLY WORRIED
BY THE NARROWNESS OF THE WINDOW AND THE NEED THEREFORE TO GET

PRESENCE HAD HAD TIME TO WORK UPON THEM. TO WHICH HAIG REVERTED
TO THE ARGUMENT THAT HE MADE THROUGHOUT THAT HE WAS REALLY WORRIED
BY THE NARROWNESS OF THE WINDOW AND THE NEED THEREFORE TO GET
SOME SORT OF NEGOTIATION GOING.

6. IT WAS LEFT THEREFORE THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH AGAIN AFTER HE
HAD TALKED WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. HE WAS DUE TO GO WITH THE
PRESIDENT TO THE WEST INDIES ON 7 APRIL BUT HE WAS READY TO RETURN
ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, AND EVEN NOT GO AT ALL IF HIS PRESENCE WAS
NEEDED ELSEWHERE TO DEAL WITH THIS MATTER WHICH WAS OF THE HIGHEST
PRIORITY.

7. IN REPORTING ALL THIS TO YOU IN THIS SOMEWHAT DISCURSIVE WAY
I SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT HAIG ADMITTED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ALOUD.
HE ASKED THAT NO NOTES SHOULD BE TAKEN. HE DID NOT CLAIM TO BE
PUTTING FORWARD ANY SPECIFIC IDEAS. HE WAS SIMPLY TRYING TO TEST
INITIAL REACTIONS. I DID NOT THINK THAT HE WAS UNAWARE THAT MUCH
OF WHAT HE SAID WAS ILL-FORMED. IT WOULD I THINK BE WRONG TO
CRITICISE THE SOMEWHAT RANDOM NATURE OF THIS REMARKS OR TO ANALYZE
THEM IN DETAIL.

HENDERSON

NNNN