

FLASH

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(25)

PS

S/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/S AM D (STANDARD DIST.+A.D. FI.)

HD/DEFENCE D

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HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/CONS DEPT

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

DIO CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

(COPIES PASSED TO THE EMERGENCY STAFF AND MOD SITCHEM).

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 070045Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NO 1146 OF 6 APRIL

FALKLANDS

1. I SAW HAIG TODAY AT HIS REQUEST AND CONVEYED YOUR MESSAGE AND SUPPORTING POINTS (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 653).

2. HAIG SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR LATER TODAY AS WELL AS THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THEY CARRIED MUCH WEIGHT, IT WAS GALTIERI WHO MATTERED, BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN WITH THEM. LATER, OTHER CHANNELS MIGHT HAVE TO BE FOUND.

3. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD FIRST THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE EXPEDIENT TO WAIT A LITTLE TIME BEFORE TRYING TO SET SOME NEGOTIATION IN TRAIN SO AS TO LET THE IMPACT OF OUR NAVAL DEPLOYMENT AND EVIDENT MILITARY DETERMINATION SINK IN ON THE ARGENTINIANS. BE HE WAS NOW COMING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WINDOW WITHIN WHICH IT WOULD BE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

ADVANCE COPIES

SIR K COUZENS)

MR LITTLER)

MR PERETZ)

MR HAWTIN)

MR ILETT)

TREASURY

Ty Mills

hd w/aj

MILITARY DETERMINATION STRIKE IN ORDER TO BE HEARD NOW
COMING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WINDOW WITHIN WHICH IT WOULD BE
POSSIBLE FOR USEFUL ACTION TO BE TAKEN WAS A VERY NARROW ONE AND
THAT THEREFORE SOME ACTION MUST BE TAKEN SOON. HE WAS THINKING IN
TERMS OF SOME SORT OF MEDIATION AND, APPARENTLY THINKING OUT
ALoud, SURMISED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO THINK OF
NEGOTIATING WITH US AND THE ARGENTINIANS SOME MIXED ADMINISTRATION
TO RUN THE ISLAND.

4. I SAID THAT I MUST CLARIFY OUR ATTITUDE TO AVOID ANY RISK OF
MISUNDERSTANDING. HMG COULD NOT ENTER INTO ANY NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT
THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS UNTIL ARGENTINE TROOPS HAD BEEN
WITHDRAWN. THE SAME WOULD BE TRUE OF THE US ADMINISTRATION MUTATIS
MUTANDIS IF US TERRITORY WAS OCCUPIED. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CUBANS
WITH SOVIET SUPPORT OCCUPIED PUERTO RICO, THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT
BE READY TO ENTER INTO A NEGOTIATION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ISLAND
WHILE CUBAN TROOPS WERE STILL IN OCCUPATION.

5. IT SEEMED TO ME INAPPROPRIATE TO THINK IN TERMS OF SOME
MULTILATERAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLAND. WE WERE PREPARED TO
TALK ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLAND AND ITS RELATIONS WITH
ARGENTINA ONCE ARGENTINE TROOPS HAD WITHDRAWN AND OUR ADMINISTRATION
HAD BEEN RESTORED.

6. HAIG SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SEE HOW GALTIERI COULD SURVIVE IF
HE SIMPLY HAD TO TAKE AWAY ARGENTINE TROOPS WITHOUT GETTING
ANYTHING IN RETURN. I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT OUR PURPOSE TO HELP
GALTIERI SURVIVE. IT WAS HE WHO HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THE PRESENT
OCCUPATION IN ORDER TO DETRACT PUBLIC OPINION FROM ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES.

7. I ASKED HAIG TO UNDERSTAND THE STRENGTH OF BRITISH OPINION.
THERE CAN SCARCELY HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE SINCE 1939 UPON WHICH THE
BRITISH FELT SO STRONGLY, AND THIS FEELING RAN ACROSS PARTY LINES.
NO GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN COULD POSSIBLY CONTEMPLATE A NEGOTIATION
INVOLVING THE ARGENTINIANS WHILE THEY REMAINED IN OCCUPATION OF
THE ISLAND. IF THE QUESTION WAS ASKED WHY WE BOTHERED SO MUCH ABOUT
2000 PEOPLE THE OTHER END OF THE WORLD, A POINT THAT HAD BEEN MADE
TO ME IN MANY PUBLIC INTERVIEWS, THE ANSWER WAS THAT THE AMERICANS
SHOULD BEAR IN MIND HOW STRONGLY THEY FELT ABOUT 52 HOSTAGES IN
IRAN: WHAT WAS AT ISSUE HERE WAS WHETHER IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE
DIFFERENCES WERE GOING TO BE SETTLED BY FORCE AND WHETHER THE
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH THE US HAD PIONEERED WAS
GOING TO BE OVERTHROWN. HAIG THEREFORE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT OF OUR
DETERMINATION TO GO THROUGH WITH THIS OPERATION AND OUR ABILITY
TO DO SO. HAIG SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD. HE WAS COMPLETELY

GOING TO BE OVERTHROWN. HAIG THEREFORE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT
DETERMINATION TO GO THROUGH WITH THIS OPERATION AND OUR ABILITY
TO DO SO. HAIG SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD. HE WAS COMPLETELY
AWARE OF THE STATE OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION ON THIS ISSUE. HE WAS
DETERMINED, AS WAS THE PRESIDENT, TO DO EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE TO
HELP THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. I MUST NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE PERSONAL
INVOLVEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT IN THIS MATTER. HE WAS TOTALLY AWARE
OF THE PROBLEMS AND VIEWS OF THE PRIME MINISTER ON THIS ISSUE. QUOTE
WE ARE DETERMINED THERE SHALL NOT BE ANOTHER SUEZ UNQUOTE, HE
SAID.

8. BUT THE DIFFICULTY WAS HOW TO GET THE ARGENTINIANS OUT. HE
ACCEPTED IT NOW AS A FACT THAT THEY MUST BE GOT OUT BEFORE THE
BRITISH COULD ENTER A NEGOTIATION. BUT, AGAIN THINKING ALOUD, HE
WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO APPOINT A
COMMISSION COMPRISING SAY, SOME DISTINGUISHED BUT IMPARTIAL
AMERICAN FIGURE, A CANADIAN, SOME LATIN AMERICAN AND ONE OR TWO
OTHERS WHO MIGHT ACT AS INTERMEDIARIES AND SERVE AS SOME KIND OF
INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

9. I SUGGESTED THAT TWO MATTERS SEEMED TO BE AT ISSUE IN WHAT HAIG
WAS SUGGESTING. THE QUESTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLAND
WAS A PERFECTLY STRAIGHTFORWARD ONE. THE ADMINISTRATION MUST BE
RETURNED TO US, THERE WERE AFTER ALL NO ARGENTINIANS TO SPEAK OF
ON THE ISLAND. THE QUESTION OF ADMINISTRATION RAISED NO PROBLEMS.
THE OTHER MATTER WAS THAT OF THE FUTURE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ISLAND.
IT MIGHT BE THAT A GROUP OF WISE MEN COULD COME UP WITH
SUGGESTIONS ABOUT THIS, BUT THE KEY NEED AT THE MOMENT WAS FOR
THE AMERICANS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINIANS LEAVING THEM
IN NO DOUBT THAT THEY MUST WITHDRAW IF THEY WERE TO AVOID A BLOODY
BATTLE; ONCE THEY HAD WITHDRAWN THERE MIGHT BE METHODS BY WHICH
THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE ISLAND COULD BE DISCUSSED.

10. HAIG THEN OFFERED IDEAS ABOUT INVOLVING THE OAS. I SAID THAT
THIS WOULD BE TOTALLY DEPLORABLE. THE AMERICANS, SCARCELY LESS
THAN WE, WERE REGARDED AS ANGLO-SAXON GRINGOS BY THAT ORGANISATION
AND WE WOULD GET NOWHERE BY INVOLVING THEM. NOR, I SAID, WOULD
THERE BE ANY POINT IN BRINGING IN THE UNITED NATIONS AGAIN. WE
HAD GOT A VERY SATISFACTORY VOTE WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND
IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BASE OURSELVES ON THIS RESOUNDING DEMAND FOR
ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. TO TRY TO INVOLVE THE UNITED NATIONS FURTHER
WOULD ONLY BE LIKELY TO INCURE A SOVIET VETO.
PLEASE SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

HENDERSON