3.0908307 Valid 8/4) FALKLAND ISLANDS WANCE COPIES: PS No. 10 DOWNING ST. PS/LPS PS/CHANCELLOR 30/ PS/LORD TREFGARNE SIR K COUZENS H.M. Tsy PS/FUS MR LITTLER PR GIFFARD MR HAWTIN MR WRIGHT MR PERETZ MR ILETT KE YDYRS MR MCINTYRE ME UPE YR GILLYORE Kiss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En HD/SAED (FC DIST + A/D F/I) HD/DEF D DIO CABINET OFFICE FD/NEWS D ED/UND Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office HD/PLANNING STAFF MNS. FULLER SAPU ED/HEGD

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Cabinet Ofice

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY Ø9Ø83ØZ

PM WASHINGTON Ø9Ø1Ø5Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 12Ø7 OF 8 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, BONN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK,
ROUTINE OTHER EC POSTS, UKMIS GENEVA, UKDEL OECD, TOKYO, OTTAWA,
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON

FALKLANDS : EC COOPERATION.

RESIDENT CLERK

- 1. AT MY SUGGESTION, THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR SUMMONED A MEETING TODAY OF EC COLLEAGUES TO DISCUSS THE FALKLAND CRISIS. I BRIEFED THEM ON OUR LATEST STEPS AND ON THE RESPONSES TO OUR REQUESTS FOR SIMILAR ACTION (YOUR TELNO 72 TO BRUSSELS). I EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW HER FORCES, WELCOMED THE VERY HELPFUL REACTIONS FROM OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS AND SUGGESTED A PRESS RELEASE TO SHOW SOLIDARITY.
- 2. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENCY WOULD ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT (TEXT IN MIFT) WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE DEMAND FOR FULL AND IMMEDIA-

(TEXT IN MIFT) WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE DEMAND FOR FULL AND IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. APART FROM SOME HESITATION FROM THE IRISH AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE PRECEDENT BEING THERE WAS SUPPORT FOR THIS STEP FROM MY COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES. I AM ENSURING THAT THE STATEMENT IS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE U S AND BRITISH PRESS HERE.

- 3. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE MAKING A STRONG DEMARCHE TODAY IN BUENOS AIRES, CONDEMNING THE INVASION, INSISTING ON A PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES, AND EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR RESOLUTION 502 TO FORM THE BASIS OF ANY SOLUTION.
- 4. CONSIDERABLE INTEREST WAS EXPRESSED, ESPECIALLY BY THE FRENCH, IN THE U S ATTITUDE TO THE CRISIS AND HAIG'S DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES. I NOTED THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT (AS REPORTED BY GELB IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES MY TELNO 1193). BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD DEMONSTRATED HIS STRONG FEEL—INGS ON THE SUBJECT, AND HAIG RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES AT STAKE. THE UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT FROM CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS FOR OUR RESPONSE HAD BEEN STRIKING, AND THE REACTION OF U S PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION HAD BEEN MORE THAN FAVOURABLE. I SAID THAT HAIG WOULD FIND CONFIRMATION IN LONDON THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BUT COULD NOT ACQUIESCE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND WOULD ONLY BE READY TO NEGOTIATE IF THE ARGENTINIANS WITHDREW. WE HOPED THAT HE WOULD IMPRESS ON B A THE NEED FOR THEM TO ACCEPT THE U N RESOLUTION, AND WOULD BRING HOME TO THEM THE RESULTS OF THEIR MISCALCULATIONS AND THE FORCE OF OUR OWN DETERMINATION.
- 5. SOME COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES SPECULATED ABOUT ARGENTINA TURNING TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR ASSISTANCE IF SHE FELT LET DOWN BY THE U.S. HOWEVER THEY NOTED THE HEAVY DEPENDENCE OF ARGENTINA ON TRADE AND CREDIT FROM THE WEST, AND AGREED THAT OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO FOLLOW HER LEAD IF SHE DID MOVE TOWARDS MOSCOW.
- 6. WE SHALL BE HAVING ANOTHER COMMUNITY MEETING HERE AFTER HAIG'S RETURN FROM BUENOS AIRES.

HENDERSON