

ADVANCE COPY

PS/MR. Hurd
PS/MR. ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

DRY 200800Z

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
HD/DEF D
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER ~~SAPU~~ CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

DIO
SIR R. Armstrong DIO
Cab. Office

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

NYFO 004/20

00 F C O DESKBY 200800Z

GRS 450

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 200800Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 200039Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 500 DATED 19 APRIL 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 488 (NOT REPEATED): FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SENT FOR MRS KIRKPATRICK, MYSELF AND ROCA (ARGENTINA) SEPARATELY THIS AFTERNOON (19 APRIL). HE GAVE EACH OF US A COPY OF THE PAPER IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. AS YOU CAN SEE IT IS WELL AND CAREFULLY DRAFTED IN TERMS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS FEEDING IN THESE IDEAS CONFIDENTIALLY IN CASE THEY MIGHT BE OF USE TO HAIG ON HIS MISSION. HE WAS NOT INFORMING ANYONE ELSE, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND (AT MY URGING) WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE PAPER LEAKING. HE ASSURED ME

~~EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE PAPER LEAKING.~~ HE ASSURED ME THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF CUTTING ACROSS WHAT HAIG WAS DOING BY STIMULATING PREMATURE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. I SAID THAT I WAS GLAD TO KNOW THAT HIS JUDGEMENT AND THAT OF EVERYONE ELSE OF GOOD WILL IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS THAT HAIG SHOULD BE LEFT A CLEAR FIELD WITHOUT ANY ACTION IN THE COUNCIL. I MUST HOWEVER TELL HIM THAT, EVEN IF HAIG FAILED, HE OR DELEGATIONS SUCH AS IRELAND OR UGANDA OR ZAIRE SHOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY RUSH TO THE COUNCIL WITH WELL MEANING IDEAS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT. OUR POSITION WAS THAT THERE WAS A MANDATORY RESOLUTION WHICH ARGENTINE MUST IMPLEMENT. WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY UN INVOLVEMENT WHICH WOULD SIMPLY HAVE THE EFFECT OF PUTTING RESTRAINTS ON OUR RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER AND ALLOWING THE SITUATION TO DRIFT, THUS ENABLING ARGENTINA TO CONSOLIDATE HER GAINS. I MADE CLEAR THAT ANY SUCH MOVE MIGHT WELL BE REJECTED BY US AND THE PROSPECTS WOULD THEREBY BE IRRETRIEVABLY DAMAGED, IF AT SOME FUTURE DATE SUCH ACTION SEEMED APPROPRIATE. I THEREFORE URGED HIM THAT ANYONE THINKING OF CALLING THE COUNCIL, FOLLOWING A FAILURE OF HAIG'S MISSION, SHOULD NOT DO SO WITHOUT GENUINE PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH ME. I SAID THAT I WAS NOT BOTHERED SO MUCH ABOUT ADVERSARY DELEGATIONS. THEY WERE LIKELY TO PUT DOWN PROPOSITIONS DRAFTED IN LANGUAGE WHICH I WOULD FIND IT EASY TO REJECT. WHAT I WANTED TO AVOID IF POSSIBLE WAS HAVING TO REJECT WELL INTENTIONED MOVES WHICH WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO MY GOVERNMENT. BUT, FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE, WE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO DO SO IF WE JUDGED IT NECESSARY.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOOK ALL THIS VERY WELL AND SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO PUT PRESSURE ON ME TO ACCEPT UN INVOLVEMENT.

PARSONS

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