

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

36 + 7  
(28)

PS (6)  
PS/MR HVED (3)  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RICHMOND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST. —

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAmD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/PLANNING~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff.MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 232045Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 109 OF 23 APRIL  
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK

MY TELNO 108

FALKLANDS: BRAZILIAN ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA

1. AT THE END OF MY MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER I ASKED HIM STRAIGHT OUT ABOUT BRAZIL'S POLICY ON GIVING MILITARY SUPPORT TO ARGENTINA.
2. GUERREIRO SAID THAT BRAZIL WOULD NOT OF COURSE HELP BY SENDING TROOPS BUT WAS READY TO SUPPLY EQUIPMENT. THE BRAZILIANS WERE MOTIVATED BY THE VIEW THAT IF THEY DID NOT HELP THEY MIGHT CREATE RESENTMENT IN ARGENTINA AGAINST BRAZIL, WHICH COULD LAST GENERATIONS. WHEN I PRESSED HIM FURTHER, HE ADMITTED THAT EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE NON-LETHAL BUT IT WOULD NOT BE QUOTE DECISIVE UNQUOTE EITHER.
3. MY NAVAL ATTACHE HAS REPORTED SEPARATELY (NOT TO ALL) REGARDING THE POSSIBLE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE SUPPLIED.

HARDING