

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS (6)
~~PS/MR HURD~~ (3)
 PS/MR ONSLOW
~~PS/MR BIRKEND~~
 PS/PUS
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
 HD/DEF D
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
~~HD/NEWS~~

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
 SIR K COUZENS
 MR LITTLER
 MR HAWTIN
 MR PERETZ
 MR ILETT
 MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE
 SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE
 SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK sent

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 232000Z FCO AND WASHINGTON
 FM UKMIS NEW YORK 232005Z APR 82
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 543 OF 23 APRIL 1982
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

VISIT OF DEPUTY LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION.

1. FOLLOWING CALLS ON THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND BRIAN URQUHART, MR DENNIS HEALEY GAVE INTERVIEWS TO BBC AND ITN AND SPOKE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE.
2. MR HEALEY'S MAIN POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:
 - (A) HIS TALK WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD BEEN HELPFUL. THE UN SECRETARIAT WERE WORKING HARD ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING SHOULD A REQUEST BE MADE FOR THE UN TO TAKE A ROLE, WHETHER THROUGH PROVIDING A TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION FOR THE ISLANDS, A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, OR A NEW MEDIATOR IF HAIG FAILED;
 - (B) HAIG'S EFFORTS OFFERED THE BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HELP HIM. HE HOPED THAT HAIG WOULD INCLUDE IN HIS PROPOSALS A SUGGESTION THAT THE UN SHOULD ASSIST IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS FOLLOWING AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. A PROPOSAL FOR A UN ROLE IN THE

- THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS FOLLOWING AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. A PROPOSAL FOR A UN ROLE IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION COULD BREAK THE PRESENT DEADLOCK:
- (C) AT THE UN, MR HEALEY HAD FOUND GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO TAKE ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES WHILE HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED. HOWEVER, HE CONSIDERED IT VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT, IF HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN, BRITAIN SHOULD ASK THE UNITED NATIONS TO PROVIDE A NEW MEDIATOR. IF WE DID NOT DO THIS, SOMEONE ELSE WOULD:
- (D) A UN ADMINISTRATION WOULD PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBLE WAY OF CONSULTING THE ISLANDERS ON THEIR VIEWS:
- (E) MR HEALEY WARNED THE UNITED STATES AGAINST MAKING THE SAME MISTAKE IN THEIR DIPLOMATIC APPROACH THAT THE BRITISH HAD MADE IN THEIR EARLIER HANDLING OF THE CRISIS. JUST AS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE FOR THE UK TO SEND A SMALLER NUMBER OF VESSELS AT AN EARLIER STAGE, IT WOULD BE LESS COSTLY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO APPLY MAXIMUM PRESSURE TO THE ARGENTINES NOW THAN TO HAVE TO COPE WITH THEM IF A WAR BROKE OUT. PRESSURE SHOULD INCLUDE MEASURES ON THE LINES OF THOSE TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.
- (F) IF FIGHTING BROKE OUT, THE LABOUR PARTY'S CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT WOULD DEPEND ON THE WAY HOSTILITIES HAD COME ABOUT. THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN RIGHT TO SEND A TASK FORCE. BUT FORCE SHOULD ONLY BE USED WITH GREAT CARE AND AS THE VERY LAST RESORT IF NEGOTIATIONS FAILED. IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO USE FORCE ON ANY SCALE SO LONG AS A GENUINE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS CONTINUING:
- (G) THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT REJECTED HIS SUGGESTIONS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT, BUT HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING THEM SERIOUSLY. MR HEALEY DENIED THAT HE WAS UNDER-CUTTING THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS IN HIS MISSION TO NEW YORK. THE LABOUR PARTY HAD GIVEN CLEAR SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, HE CONSIDERED IT VERY IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE UN IN THE FOREFRONT OF OUR EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY AS SCR 502 HAD BEEN A GREAT SOURCE OF STRENGTH:
- (H) A MEETING OF THE PARLIAMENTARY LABOUR PARTY ON 22 APRIL HAD GIVEN UNANIMOUS BACKING TO HIS MISSION. HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS A "TINY MINORITY" IN THE LABOUR PARTY WHICH DID NOT SUPPORT THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT, BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS ALSO A SIMILARLY TINY MINORITY IN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY (MENTIONING SIR ANTHONY MEYER'S OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF FORCE).