

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR ~~RIPKIND~~
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR McINTYRE
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
HD/DEF D
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/~~INFO~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

~~RESIDENT STAFF~~

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Siten and CinC Fleet)

Prime Minister

Denmark related about

*South Georgia but uncertain about
an attack on the Falklands.*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM COPENHAGEN 261230Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 96 OF 26 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 106 TO ATHENS, 296 TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND 100
TO ANKARA: SOUTH GEORGIA.

1. I SPOKE TO PERMANENT SECRETARY ON RECEIPT YESTERDAY OF YOUR SECOND TUR AND FOLLOWED UP (BEFORE NEWS OF REOCCUPATION OF SOUTH GEORGIA) WITH A NOTE OF POINTS IN FIRST TWO TURS. JOERGENSEN ASSURED ME THAT MFA WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO BE HELPFUL.
2. THIS MORNING I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE (THIRD TUR) TO MR KJELD OLESEN. AS I WAS SEEING HIM FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE MY RETURN FROM LEAVE, I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE THANKS FOR THE SUPPORT DENMARK HAS GIVEN US SO FAR, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE CONTINUED IN THE NEW PHASE. IN THE LIGHT OF MR OLESEN'S STATEMENT LAST NIGHT (MIFT NOT TO ALL) WHICH HAD EMPHASISED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF BOTH PARTIES TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS AND NOT TO USE FORCE, I POINTED OUT THAT YOU HAD AGAIN RENEWED YOUR COMMITMENT TO SEEKING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. I WENT ON TO EMPHASISE THE ADVANTAGE TO THE AGGRESSOR OF A SITUATION IN WHICH

EMPHASISE THE ADVANTAGE TO THE AGGRESSOR OF A SITUATION IN WHICH CONTINUED FOOT DRAGGING SIMPLY LEFT HIM IN OCCUPATION AND IN SELF-DEFENCE. I ARGUED, IN PARTICULAR, THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE SUPPORT GIVEN US SO FAR IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO HEED THE WARNING GIVEN BY THE REOCCUPATION OF SOUTH GEORGIA. I HOPED MR OLESEN MIGHT AT LEAST FEEL ABLE TO SPEAK TO THIS LAST POINT.

3. MR OLESEN REAFFIRMED THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION RESTED ON SCR 502 WHICH, INTER ALIA, CALLED ON BOTH PARTIES TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE. HE REHEARSED THE LINE HE HAD TAKEN IN PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES IN SECURING AGREEMENT TO THE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 113 INCLUDING THE ARGUMENT THAT ECONOMIC PRESSURE WAS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE. HE WAS, HE SAID, RELAXED ABOUT THE SOUTH GEORGIA ACTION. IF WE WERE TO GO FURTHER, FOR EXAMPLE BY ATTACKING THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THEMSELVES, AND THIS WERE TO LEAD TO REAL WAR, HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT THE DANISH ATTITUDE WOULD THEN BE. THE US POSITION, AS IT EVOLVES IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT. MR OLESEN ENVISAGED A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE MEASURES BUT INSISTED THAT ALL MEANS SHOULD BE USED TO AVOID OPEN CONFLICT.

4. AT THE END OF OUR TALK MR OLESEN SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE DANISH GOVT. HAD SUPPORTED BRITAIN AND STILL DID SO. THEY SAW IT, HOWEVER, AS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO MOBILISE ALL POLITICAL WISDOM TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. HE DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH WOULD WEAKEN DANISH SUPPORT, BUT NOR COULD HE DEPART FROM THE BASIS OF DANISH POLICY AS EXPLAINED IN PARLIAMENT.

WARBURTON

NNNN

SENT AT 26/1312Z JK