

TYPISTS

DESKBY 261500Z

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RICHARD  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/REGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/ CABINET OFFICE

SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

LDW NR 473/26

00 FCO DESKBY 261500Z

00 UKMIS NEW YORK

00 UKREP BRUSSELS

00 WASHINGTON

GR 810

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 261500Z

FM TOKYO 261315Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 199 OF 26 APRIL

RFI IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS AND WASHINGTON

SAVING ALL EC POSTS

MY TELNO 198: FALKLAND ISLANDS: JAPANESE POSITION

1. WHEN I SAW KATO, THIS EVENING HE READ ME THE TEXT OF A SECOND

*MJ*

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY

Prime Minister

The Japanese go some way towards or point to economic sanctions but not for now.  
APR 26/82

1. WHEN I SAW KATO, THIS EVENING HE READ ME THE TEXT OF A SECOND PERSONAL LETTER FROM MR SUZUKI TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE HANDED OVER BY MR HIRAHARA LATER TODAY. AFTER REITERATING THE JAPANESE POSITION AND REGRETTING THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA THE LETTER SAID THAT THE JAPANESE WERE MEETING OUR REQUESTS BY:-

(A) WARNING JAPANESE BUSINESS NOT TO UNDERMINE THE ECONOMIC MEASURES TAKEN BY THE EC AGAINST ARGENTINA

AND (B) REAFFIRMING THAT NO APPLICATIONS FOR THE PROVISION OF NEW EXPORT CREDITS TO ARGENTINA WERE EXPECTED IN VIEW OF THE TENSE SITUATION.

2. I SAID THAT WE WERE GLAD TO RECEIVE THIS NEW LETTER BUT THOUGH WELCOME, DID NOT "MEET OUR REQUESTS" IN FULL AS THE LETTER SUGGESTED. WE STILL HOPED THAT JAPAN WOULD STOP IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA AND PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINE REGIME TO WITHDRAW.

3. KATO SAID THAT THEY HAD ALREADY SENT INSTRUCTION TO LONDON TO SAY THAT THEY COULD AGREE IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE WORDING FOR YOUR STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON EXPORT CREDITS. THEY WERE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE USE OF THE PHRASE "GROWING CONSENSUS" SINCE THIS IMPLIED PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD NOT IN FACT TAKEN PLACE. I SAID THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF SEMANTICS.

4. KATO THEN WENT ON TO STRESS THE MEASURES WHICH JAPAN HAD SO FAR TAKEN. HE LISTED THESE AS:-

(A) JAPAN'S VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 3 APRIL:

(B) NISHIBORI'S SPEECH AT THE UN:

(C) THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SUMMONING OF THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR ON 12 APRIL AND THE REPRESENTATIONS THEN MADE:

(D) SUZUKI'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF 12 APRIL:

(E) JAPAN'S RECONFIRMATION IN THAT LETTER THAT SHE STRICTLY OBSERVED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-EXPORT OF ARMS TO ARGENTINA:

(E) JAPAN'S RECONFIRMATION IN THAT LETTER THAT SHE STRICTLY OBSERVED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-EXPORT OF ARMS TO ARGENTINA:

(F) THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S ORAL STATEMENT AT THAT TIME THAT NEW EXPORT CREDITS WERE UNLIKELY TO BE EXTENDED

(G) SAKURAUCHI'S STATEMENT IN THE DIET ON 19 APRIL:

(H) SUZUKI'S PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI OF 24 APRIL STRONGLY URGED THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502

(I) SAKURAUCHI'S FURTHER STATEMENT ON 26 APRIL (MY TEL NO 197):

(J) THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S NEW STATEMENT ON EXPORT CREDITS (SEE ABOVE)

(K) SUZUKI'S SECOND PERSONAL LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

5. I TOOK UP WITH KATO THE REFERENCE IN SAKURAUCHI'S STATEMENT (MY TELNO 197) TO "THE IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES". I SAID THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 WAS THE FIRST REQUIREMENT. KATO REPLIED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT SAW THE UN RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE AND HE STRONGLY EMPHASISED THE MFA VIEW THAT THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS HAD BEEN CAUSED BY ARGENTINA WHO HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO USE FORCE. THE MFA COULD BE QUOTED ON THIS.

6. I THEN SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF A PRESS REPORT WHICH SUGGESTED THAT SUZUKI HAD EXPRESSED REGRET THAT BRITAIN SHOULD HAVE RETAKEN SOUTH GEORGIA BY FORCE WHILE THE HAIG MISSION WAS STILL IN PROGRESS. THE MFA SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN MISQUOTED AND THAT ALL HE HAD SAID WAS THAT "A MILITARY CLASH IS REGRETTABLE". KATO ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE UK'S ACTION OVER SOUTH GEORGIA.

7. KATO SAID THAT JAPAN WOULD SUPPORT A PROPOSAL TO RECONVENE THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ASKED

(A) WHY THE UK HAD NOT GONE BACK TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

(B) WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE REPORTING TO THE U N

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THE MEASURES IT WAS TAKING UNDER ARTICLE 51:

ON (A) I EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE VALUE OF THIS IN VIEW OF THE  
SOVIET AND CHINESE ATTITUDES. KATO SUGGESTED THAT WE  
SHOULD CHALLENGE THE SOVIETS TO VETO.

ON (B) I SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD COMPLY WITH  
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UN CHARTER.

B. COMMENT. THE JAPANESE HAVE NOT YET GONE AS FAR AS WE  
WOULD LIKE AND THE JAPANESE PRESS CONTINUE TO PUT THE EMPHASIS  
ON THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT BYBOTH SIDES. BUT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  
HAVE NOWO GIVEN US SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT NOT ONLY OVER CREDITS BUT  
IN PUTTING DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA AND OUR FRIENDS  
ESPECIALLY IN THE MFA ARE TRYING TO BE HELPFUL. WHILE WE SHOULD  
NOT LET THE JAPANESE THINK THAT WE ARE YET FULLY SATISFIED  
I HOPE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL FEEL ABLE TO SEND A  
RELATIVELY WARM REPLY TO MR SUZUKI.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO EC POSTS

CORTAZZI

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