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SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT

The attached paper issued at 1730 hours on Saturday 1 May 1982 contains suggested lines to take on the following:

1. Raid on Port Stanley airport
2. Mr Pym's Visit to Washington
3. Mr Pym's Visit to New York
4. Role of the UN
5. Costa Mendez

Cabinet Office

1 May 1982

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## Raid on Port Stanley Airport

1. The following announcement was issued by the MOD at 1550 hours:

"Vulcan aircraft refuelled by Victor tankers attacked the Port Stanley airfield during the night. Subsequently at dawn Sea Harriers carried out further attacks. Both operations were successful. All aircraft and personnel involved have now returned. There are no [British] casualties."

Further details of the operations will be released later.

## Line to take

Should not have been a surprise to anyone. As Mr Pym said yesterday evening we have to take whatever steps we judge necessary to secure and hold the Total Exclusion Zone. We gave over two days warning of our intentions. We stated specifically that we would close Port Stanley airport and that aircraft on the ground would be liable to attack. Shows we mean business.

- Argentine reports of Harriers shot down?

Nonsense.

- Does this mean we have abandoned search for peaceful solution?

No. The enforcement of the TEZ which will isolate the occupying forces is the next turn of the screw in our policy of applying military and economic pressure to secure Argentine withdrawal which remains a prerequisite for negotiations on long-term solution.

- Responsibility for escalation?

Responsibility for the whole situation lies with Argentines. They committed the aggression when they invaded the Falklands. They have refused to comply with the Security/Council Resolution which calls on them to withdraw and have turned down Mr Haig's proposals. They have been using this time to reinforce their troops on the Falklands. We have been left with no alternative but to step up military measures in right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

### Mr Pym's Visit to Washington

2. Mr Pym is going to Washington for consultation with Mr Haig in the new circumstances created by the US decision to come down on the side of Britain. We are grateful to Haig for his remarkable efforts, and delighted by new US support. Right in the circumstances to 'take stock together' and to consider how best to carry forward our efforts to secure Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands. Quite different from the last visit. Not a negotiating session. A consultation between friends and allies.

#### - US sanctions?

Delighted with the measures already announced. Political impact in Argentina certain to be significant. Withholding of military exports and credit and willingness to supply 'materiel support for British forces' amount to unambiguous and full-hearted support. Will no doubt be discussing this - and other measures which the Americans might consider in due course - during visit.

#### - Have you asked for military help?

No. President Reagan and Mr Haig have made it quite clear that there will be no direct US military intervention but that they are willing to respond positively to requests for supplies, equipment, etc. Cannot discuss publicly any details.

### Visit to New York

3. Mr Pym is taking the opportunity of visit to Washington to meet UN Secretary-General in New York. His first meeting with Mr Perez de Cuellar. He will put the British position to him and consult him on the possibilities and constraints of the UN in this context, but has no specific requests or proposals to make.

### Role of the UN

4. We went to the UN as our first act. Argentine invasion was in defiance of appeal of President of Security Council. The Council has spoken and the first priority is to implement Security Council Resolution 502 which determines that Argentine aggression was a breach of international peace and security. (which leaves the UK the right of self-defence under Article 51) and demands the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands. Further UN roles not excluded but must be realistic about the difficulties.

- Replace Mr Haig by UN mediation, good offices etc?

Difficult to see how any conceivable alternative could have as much chance of success as Mr Haig with his great authority and particular relationship with both parties.

UN mediation likely to be encumbered with constraints and on past form likely to be slow. And time is short.

- New Security Council Resolution, eg on sanctions?

The Council has spoken. Must implement Resolution 502. Sanctions would be very slow to bite, and in any event it is likely that Russians will block any measures against Argentina.

- UN presence on the Islands in the interim period?

Unfortunately we have not yet got to that stage.

- Why not go to the ICJ?

Here again we are not yet at the stage when this would become an option. But Argentina does not recognise compulsory jurisdiction of the court and has refused when we have tried in the past to submit on sovereignty over the Dependencies. Moreover, she refused to accept the result of arbitration of the Beagle Channel when the ruling went against her. The precedents are therefore not encouraging.

In summary, we cannot accept procedures which would leave the aggressor holding sway in the Islands while long drawn out negotiations proceed. Immediate Argentine withdrawal the indispensable first priority. British strategy remains unchanged: the mobilisation of pressures - political, economic and military - to induce Argentina to withdraw with minimum use of force; while keeping open the channel for diplomatic communication. Meanwhile we tighten the screw (eg Stanley airport). We must go on hoping that the Junta will realise they have to obey SCR 502 and that we will not abandon our rights.

Costa Mendez (Reports of remarks yesterday in New York)

5. Always difficult to be sure how much weight to attach to Argentine statements. Complex decision making process in Buenos Aires, contradictory signals and frequent changes of mind. It is no use the Argentine Foreign Minister pretending that the government is willing to implement Security Council

Resolution 502 in its entirety if at the same time he reaffirms that sovereignty is not negotiable. The Argentine position has been throughout that, whatever arrangements are made, they must lead ineluctably to Argentine sovereignty regardless of the wishes of the people. That is intolerable. Argentine statements should be judged by that criterion.