

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby FLASH
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1 ZCZC
 2 GRS
 3 CONFIDENTIAL
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 6 FM FCO 061215Z MAY 82
 7 TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
 9 AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON
 10 REPEATED IMMEDIATE LIMA
 11 MIPT: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSALS ON FALKLANDS
 12 Following is draft reply to Secretary-General:
 13 As you know I have been considering very carefully the ideas
 14 about the Falkland Islands which you put to me in New York
 15 last weekend. I accept the general approach embodied in your
 16 ideas. Indeed the elements for a solution which you mention
 17 are close to those which have been the basis of Britain's
 18 efforts for a negotiated settlement since the present crisis
 19 started in early April.
 20 2. Your ideas were naturally stated briefly and in general
 21 terms. I should like in this reply to explain the British
 22 position and offer comments on the elements needed for a
 23 settlement. I think you will see that our views are fully
 24 compatible with yours.
 25 3. I must first reiterate that the present crisis has arisen

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File number	Dept Planning	Distribution LIMITED HD/SAMD HD/DEF D HD/PLANNING STAFF HD/UND
Drafted by (Block capitals) C L G MALLABY		COPIES TO: PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL PS/HOME SECRETARY PS/S OF S DEFENCE PS/CHANCELLOR (TREASURY)
Telephone number 233 4333		PS/CHANCELLOR(DUCHY OF LANCASTER) PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG PS/SIR M PALLISER
Authorised for despatch		PS/PUS MR GIFFARD MR WRIGHT MR GILLMORE MR URE
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	MR WADE-GERY) CABINET MR FULLER) OFFICE DIO)

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2 because Argentina illegally used force to prosecute a claim,
3 to the Falkland Islands when active negotiations were already
4 in progress. The United Nations Security Council, in its
5 mandatory Resolution No 502 which my government at once
6 accepted, set out more than a month ago the requirements for
7 ending the crisis. It remains imperative that this resolution
8 be implemented without delay.

9 4. In order to bring about this implementation, and to avoid
10 further bloodshed, Britain is willing to accept and immediately
11 implement an interim agreement which would prepare the way for
12 a definitive settlement.

13 5. Such an interim agreement could provide for a ceasefire to
14 come into effect as soon as possible after Britain and
15 Argentina had stated formally in writing that they accepted the
16 interim agreement. Instructions for a ceasefire could be
17 issued immediately after conclusion of that agreement, to come
18 into effect as soon as both parties could guarantee compliance
19 by their forces.

20 6. But such a ceasefire cannot simply leave Argentina in
21 illegal occupation of the Islands, in contravention of
22 resolution 502 and with the ability to continue to build up the
23 occupation forces. Implementation of the ceasefire must
24 therefore be unambiguously linked to the commencement of
25 Argentine withdrawal, which as you recognise is the priority
26 element in any agreement. Withdrawal would be completed
27 within a fixed number of days. The British forces would stand
28 off at a reasonable distance from the Falkland Islands, thus
29 providing mutual withdrawal of the forces of both sides.

30 7. After mutual withdrawal, the two sides would suspend the
31 exclusion zones now in force. Steps would be taken to lift the
32 economic sanctions introduced in connection with the present
33 crisis.

34 8. As regards the transitional arrangements, the United

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2 Kingdom would be prepared to accept an interim administration
3 of the Islands, to be undertaken by a Contact Group of a small
4 number of states other than Britain and Argentina, which would
5 act in consultation with the elected representatives of the
6 population of the Islands. The same Contact Group could verify
7 the withdrawal from the Falkland Islands and the non-return of
8 forces pending a definitive settlement.

9 9. Britain would be ready with Argentina to acknowledge the
10 existence of different and conflicting views regarding the
11 status of the Falkland Islands. We would be willing to engage
12 in negotiations, without prejudice, for a definitive agreement
13 on the status of the Islands and to accept a target date -
14 perhaps one year later - for conclusion of an agreement which
15 would accord with the wishes of the Islanders. We should be
16 willing to accept that the Contact Group mentioned above should
17 have a role in relation to these negotiations.

18 10. I believe that the views that I have expressed accord fully
19 with your own ideas. Indeed they have the effect of
20 amplifying your suggestions. Let me conclude by repeating that
21 the United Kingdom stands ready to consider all constructive
22 suggestions for a United Nations role in future arrangements
23 concerning the Falkland Islands.

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