SCHFICENTIAL

FOUKMIS NEW YORK Ø81839Z MAY 89

TC FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 679 OF 8 MAY

AND TO FLASH BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.





MY TEL NO 674: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

ACCOMPANIED BY RAFEE AHMED AND ALVARO DE SOTO, PERUVIAN
CAREER DIPLOMAT, WHO HAS RECENTLY BEEN ACTING AS THE G77
SPCKESMAN ON DEEP SEA MINING AT UNLOSC BUT WHO JOINED THE
SECRETARIAT ON 1 MAY AS PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT AND
IS A WELCOME ADDITION TO HIS FALKLANDS TEAM. PEREZ DE CUELLAR
WENT THROUGH EACH OF THE POINTS IN HIS AIDE MEMOIRE OF 2 MAY,
DESCRIBING THE POSITION AS HE NOW SAW IT IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR MESSAGE
OF 6 MAY AND HIS TWO CONVERSATIONS WITH ROS, THE ARGENTINE DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER.

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED WITH THE CONCEPT THAT HIS PROPOSALS WERE QUOTE PROVISIONAL MEASURES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES UNQUOTE. I CONFIRMED THAT WE AGREED WITH THIS. BUT I SAID THAT WE MUST HAVE 100 PERCENT PRECISION FROM THE ARGENTINES ON THE POINT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ROS HAD INDICATED THAT THE ARGENTINES ENVISAGED A WRITTEN AGREEMENT: THEIR SIGNATURE WOULD GIVE US THE PRECISION WE NEEDED. I SAID THAT IT WOULD DEPEND WHOSE SIGNATURE WAS ON THE AGREEMENT. ALL PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS HAD FOUNDERED AT THE LAST MINUTE ON ARGENTINE INSISTENCE THAT THEIR CLAIM ON SOVEREIGNTY SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. I HAD BEEN DISTURBED BE PRESS REPORTS THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD SAID THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST LEAD IRREVERSIBLY TO ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY. IF WE WERE TO REACH AGREEMENT AND THEN COSTA MENDEZ WERE TO SAY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IN THE ARGENTINE VIEW THE AGREEMENT NEANT THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY HAD BEEN ACCEPTED, I WOULD HAVE TO DENY THIS AND THE AGREEMENT WOULD FALL APART. DE SOTO SUGGESTED THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD CONTAIN A PROVISION THAT HEITHER SIDE WOULD CLAIM THAT THE AGREEMENT MEANT THAT THAT SIDE'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY HAD BEEN ACCEPTED. THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA. I THINK THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS HOISTED ON BOARD HOW CRUCIAL THIS POINT IS FOR US AND THE DANGER THAT THE GENERALS IN BUENCS AIRES WILL RENEGE ON IT AT THE LAST MOMENT.

3. AS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMULTANEITY (IE THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS AT SUB-PARAS (A) TO (E) OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S AIDE MEMOIRE WOULD BEGIN AT THE SAME TIME), PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ARGENTINA ACCEPTED IT IN TOTO. THE UK ACCEPTED IT IN RESPECT OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AND THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT WE DID NOT EXCLUDE IT IN RESPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. BUT HE JUDGED FROM PARA 7 OF YOUR MESSAGE THAT WE WOULD PREFER SUSPENSION OF THE EXCLUSION ZONES AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS TO COM AFTER (REPEAT AFTER) WITHDRAWAL HAD TAKEN PLACE. I SAID THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEITY NEEDED MORE EXACT DEFINITION. WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE SOME TIME AND THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME KIND OF PHASING. I COULD NOT BE PRECISE ABOUT WHEN IN THE WITHDRAWAL AND REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS THE EXCLUSION ZONES WOULD BE LIFTED. BUT I SUGGESTED THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF SIMULTANEITY COULD BE MET IF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S NEGOTIATIONS LED TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT WITH A DETAILED SCHEDULE OR TIMETABLE OF WHEN THE VARIOUS STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT (WITHDRAWAL, REDEPLOYMENT LIFTING OF EXCLUSION ZONES AND SANCTIONS, INTRODUCTION OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, BEGINNING OF SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, ETC). PEREZ DE CUELLAR SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS: AHMED SEEMED LESS SURE. 4. THE NEXT POINT WAS THE DATE OF QUOTE TIME T UNQUOTE, IE THE POINT AT WHICH SIMULTANEIOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN THE AGREEMENT WOULD BEGIN. THE ARGENTINES SUGGESTED THAT IT SHOULD BE 24 HOURS AFTER SIGNATURE. I SAID THAT THIS SOUNDED REASONABLE BUT THAT I WOULD OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS. 5. ON THE DATE FOR THE COMPLETION OF ARGENTINE AND UK WITHDRAWAL, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE PREPARED TO BE

PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE. I SAID THAT I WOULD NEED INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT TOO, BUT THAT I BELIEVED THAT IN PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS 14 DAYS HAD BEEN MENTIONED AS THE PERIOD FOR COMPLETION OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. THERE WOULD BE COMPLICATED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PHASING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH TASK FORCE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON WHAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US IN THIS RESPECTS.

6. ON THE TERMINAL DATE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, ARGENTINA HAD PROPOSED 31 DECEMBER 1982 AND YOU HAD SUGGESTED QUOTE PERHAPS ONE YEAR UNQUOTE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD VALUE YOUR REACTION TO THE ARGENTINE PROPOSALS.

7. ON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AND BOTH AGREED THAT THE INTERIM ADIMINISTRATION SHOULD BE MEITHER ARGENTINE NOR ERITISH. I INTERRUPTED TO CUESTION THIS LAST POINT: IT ZZ BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S PARTY).

NOR ERITISH. I INTERRUPTED TO CUESTION THIS LAST POINT: IT . ESPENDED ON HOW ONE DEFINED OUTTE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION UNGUSTS. DEEZ DE CUELLAR WENT ON TO SAY THAT ARGENTINA FAVOURED QUOTE AN EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE UNQUOTE, WHEREAS YOU HAD PROPOSED A CONTACT GROUP OF STATES ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. I REPEATED THAT WE NEEDED TO DEFINE WHAT WE MEANT BY QUOTE ADMINISTRATION UNQUOTE. I DESCRIBED THE THREE LAYERS OF GOVERNMENT THE ISLANDERS HAD ENJOYED BEFORE THE INVASION (IE THE GOVERNOR, THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL). WHAT DID QUOTE AN EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE UNQUOTE MEAN IN RELATION TO THEM? COULD THE SECRETARY-CENERAL PLEASE OBTAIN CLARIFICATION FROM THE ARGENTINES? I COULD ASK YOU WETHER YOU WERE PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO ACCEPT AN EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE BUT FOR US THIS WOULD BE A CRUCIAL QUESTION AND I DID NOT THINK THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WOULD FEEL ABLE TO ANSWER IT WITHOUT GREATER PRECISION ABOUT WHAT WAS INTENDED. A PROBLEM IN EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN ARGENTINE INSISTENCE ON DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION IN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS. DID THEY NOW INTEND THAT A UN ROLE WOULD EXCLUDE THE COUNCILS? OR WERE THEY FOR INSTANCE THINKIN THAT UN NOMINEES SHOULD REPLACE THE PREVIOUS NOMINATED MEMBERS AND THE GOVERNOR (WHICH SEEMS TO BE THE IDEA THAT AHMED FAVOURS)? PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO FIND OUT MORE. 8. ON THE FORMAT AND THE VENUE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WANTED THEM TO BE CONDUCTED BY EITHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR A REPRESENTATIVE APPCINTED BY HIM AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE HELD IN NEW YORK. YOU, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD SUGGESTED THE CONTACT GROUP. I SAID THAT I WOULD SEEK YOUR VIEWS. MY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT NEW YORK SHOULD IF POSSIBLE BE AVOIDED BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURES WHICH WOULD BE GENERATED HERE ON THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. 9. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING ROS AGAIN AT 1930Z AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME AT 2130Z TODAY. HE HOPED THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN SOME REACTIONS FROM YOU BY THEM. I EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD RAISED QUESTIONS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO H.M. GOVERNMENT, THAT YOU WERE OUTSIDE BRUSSELS AND THE PRIME MINISTE AT CHEQUERS, AND THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN ANY RESPONSE OF SUBSTANCE BY 2130Z. BUT I WOULD REPORT TO YOU EVERYTHING HE HAD SAID.

10. I SHALL SEND MY SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS LATER TODAY, AFTER MY SECOND MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR. I REALISE THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FOCUS ON THESE QUESTIONS IN TIME FOR THAT MEETING. BUT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO MAINTAIN THE IMPRESSION OF A POSITIVE APPROACH TO HIS EFFORTS AND I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE THAT YOU OR OFFICIALS CAN LET ME HAVE BY 2130Z ON THE

RUESTIONS ON WHICH PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR DUR REACTION VIZ:

- (A) THE DATE OF QUOTE TIME T UNQUOTE:
- (B) THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF WITHDRAWAL:
- (C) THE PHASING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TASK FORCE:
- (D) THE TERMINAL DATE FOR DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS:
- (E) THE FORMAT AND VENUE FOR THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.

PARSONS

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INT QSL ARRESTS

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ZZ BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S PARTY).

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