

167
GRS 280

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 102340Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1690 OF 10 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONALS FOR AMBASSADOR)

YOUR TELNO 950: FALKLANDS

1. I RAISED THE SUBJECT OF A GUARANTEE WITH HAIG TODAY, BUT THIS WAS BEFORE I RECEIVED YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. HIS IMMEDIATE RESPONSE WAS TO SAY THAT THE U N COULD NOT GUARANTEE ANYTHING AND THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE COUNTRY THAT COULD DO SO. HE DID NOT VOLUNTEER READINESS ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS TO UNDERTAKE A GUARANTEE AND, ON THE BASIS OF OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT, I RATHER DOUBT WHETHER HE WOULD BE WILLING TO FOLLOW DOWN THIS LINE. THE TROUBLE AS YOU KNOW IS THAT A GUARANTEE OF THIS KIND WOULD REQUIRE THE SPECIFIC AUTHORISATION OF CONGRESS WHICH MIGHT NOT BE PLAIN-SAILING IN THE POST VIETNAM CLIMATE.

2. AS YOU KNOW THE WAY THE AMERICANS DEALT WITH THE GUARANTEE PROBLEM AT THE TIME OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE U.S./PERUVIAN PLAN WAS TO FINESSE IT BY TWO MEANS. THE FIRST WAS THE STIPULATION IN THE AGREEMENT THAT TROOPS SHOULD NOT ONLY BE WITHDRAWN BUT NOT REINTRODUCED. THE SECOND WAS THE COMMITMENT THAT THE CONTACT GROUP, OF WHICH THE U.S. WOULD BE MEMBERS, WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT NO ACTIONS WERE TAKEN WHICH CONTRAVENED THE AGREEMENT AND THAT ALL PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WERE RESPECTED.

3. IT IS A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT MATTER NOW IF WE ARE NOW THINKING OF GETTING THE U.S. TO MAKE SOME GUARANTEE RELATING TO A U N PLAN AND A U N FORCE.

4. ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS OF THE U N MUST CONTINUE AND MAY LEAD TO SOMETHING WORTHWHILE, THE PROSPECT OF A U.S. GUARANTEE IN MY VIEW CONTINUES TO DEPEND ON SOME MEASURE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ANY INTERIM SETTLEMENT.

HENDERSON

NNNN