

Argentina



CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 May 1982

Dear John,

Overtaken

MR 1/5

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Falklands: EC Import Ban

Foreign Ministers of the Ten were not ready at their weekend meeting in Belgium on 9 May to take a political decision to renew the EC's import ban until they saw how events moved this week. The Secretary of State considers that we should seek to influence the consideration which will now be given to this within the governments of our partners and recommends that the Prime Minister should send a message by telegram in the terms of the attached draft to her colleagues. The message should reach them before their Cabinet meetings and before the Franco-German summit meeting later this week, and so should get off, if possible, by lunchtime on 11 May.

The Presidency informed COREPER today that the Political Committee would meet at 4 pm on Saturday 15 May. If agreement to renew were reached, the implementing regulation would be discussed by COREPER at 7 that evening and again if necessary on the morning of Monday 17 May, and finally approved the same day by the ECOFIN Council. Should agreement to renew not be possible at the Political Committee, the Presidency would convene a special meeting of Foreign Ministers at 4 pm on Sunday 16 May.

Yours over,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

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DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~xxxx~~ ^{Message} / ~~letter~~ / ~~despatch~~ / ~~note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: **TEL. NO:**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
EC Heads of Government

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I welcome the reaffirmation by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten at Villers-le-Temple last weekend of the principles that have consistently guided their response to the Falklands crisis since the Argentine invasion, including condemnation of the Argentine aggression and early implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 502; they also strongly supported the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and stressed the need for a negotiated solution. Our Permanent Representative at the United Nations has for some days been in constant touch with the Secretary General of the United Nations and we are working with maximum energy and flexibility for a diplomatic settlement.

I wish I could say that there was any significant retreat from the intransigent attitude so far taken by the Argentines who have now rejected both the Haig and the Peruvian/US initiatives, and whose response to the UN Secretary-General is so far not encouraging. Events have shown from the beginning of this crisis that the Argentines will not give up their illegal military gains by mere

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Enclosures—flag(s).....

pressure of international opinion or denunciation at the United Nations. They continue flagrantly to disregard the mandatory resolution of the UN Security Council. I have no doubt that they are calculating that they can spin ~~on~~ ^{out} negotiations over a protracted period, while international pressure declines. Their objective is obviously to get a ceasefire which is not linked to withdrawal of their forces, and to declare that the outcome of any negotiations about the future of the Falkland Islands must be a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. They would thus be left in possession of their spoils. We shall know very soon whether Argentina can be brought to see reason in the Secretary General's negotiations. So long as the Argentines will not negotiate seriously, the only counter is the resolute maintenance of all possible means of pressure until they produce the desired effect. Argentina must be in no doubt about the resolve of the international community, which must be at least equal to that of Argentina both in intensity and duration.

It is this that justifies continued maximum pressure of all sorts - political, economic, diplomatic and military. Any let-up in any of these fields is likely to encourage the Argentines in their belief that if they can only hold out long enough they will attain their end. Reducing the non-military pressures must inevitably throw greater weight on the military ones and thus increase the likelihood of further conflict and further loss of life. The continuation of the EC measures, should events make this necessary, will thus be of vital importance in the weeks ahead. The European solidarity which they have been widely, and rightly, seen to signify

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will mark a historical development in the evolution of the European Community.

I hope very much that, should our hopes in New York be disappointed, your government will give the necessary instructions to your representatives at the weekend to renew the Community's import ban.