

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

x 38

5

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD(2)
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
 RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

FLASH

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 MR ILETT) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

[RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET]

Hd/eesd

SECRET

FM MOSCOW 121805Z MAY 82
 TO F L A S H FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 12/5

YOUR TELNO 278 : FALKLAND ISLAND.

1. NO DEPUTY MINISTER WAS AVAILABLE. I THEREFORE SPOKE TO SUSLOV IN HIS CAPACITY AS MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY COLLEGIUM AT 2130 LOCAL (1730Z) TODAY.
2. I HANDED HIM A SPEAKING NOTE CONTAINING PARA 2 OF YOUR TUR, OMITTING THE FINAL SENTENCE.
3. SUSLOV READ IT CAREFULLY AND REPLIED THAT HIS ANSWER WOULD BE THAT WHICH HE HAD GIVEN ME PREVIOUSLY, NAMELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.N. RESOLUTIONS AND DID NOT INTEND TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY. HE UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE TO THOSE CONCERNED AT A HIGH LEVEL.

4. SUSLOV WENT ON TO ASK WHETHER THIS WARNING AND EARLIER ONES MIGHT BE USED LATER TO JUSTIFY A DANGEROUS SITUATION CAUSED BY THE BRITISH SIDE. THE INFERENCE OF OUR MESSAGE WAS THAT WE SO UNDERESTIMATED SOVIET COMMON SENSE THAT WE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE COULD PROVOKE A DANGEROUS SITUATION. THE RISK DID NOT COME ONLY FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. BOTH SIDES NEEDED COMMONSENSE AND HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO AVOID A POSSIBLE INCIDENT. WERE WE SUGGESTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ACTING ILLEGALLY ?

5. IN REPLY I AGREED THAT COMMONSENSE WAS NEEDED ON BOTH SIDES. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MESSAGE WAS TO ENSURE THAT AN INCIDENT, WHICH COULD BE SERIOUS, DID NOT ARISE. WE WERE NOT ACCUSING THE SOVIET UNION OF ACTING ILLEGALLY NOR DID WE QUESTION THEIR SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. BUT IN A GRAVE SITUATION WE WANTED TO DO EVERYTHING TO AVOID AN INCIDENT.

6. IN FURTHER EXCHANGES THE FOLLOWING POINTS AROSE:

(A) I SAID THAT MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE REFERENCE TO 5-60 AND 5-70 DEGREES MEANT "BETWEEN 5 AND 60 DEGREES SOUTH AND 5 AND 70 DEGREES WEST."

(B) I ASSUMED - THOUGH IT WAS ONLY MY PERSONAL ASSUMPTION - THAT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBMARINES AND SURFACE VESSELS REFLECTED THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFICATION.

(C) SUSLOV SAID THAT HE WOULD MUCH REGRET IF AS A RESULT OF THIS AND MY EARLIER EXCHANGE WITH RYZHOV THERE WERE TO BE RECRIMINATIONS IN THE EVENT OF ANY INCIDENT. I REPLIED THAT THE PURPOSE OF MY WARNING WAS TO AVOID AN INCIDENT AND I WAS GIVING IT TO HIM IN WRITING.

(D) SUSLOV REPEATED THAT SPECULATION ABOUT SOVIET INTERFERENCE OR "SPECIAL INTERESTS" IN THE DISPUTE WERE WITHOUT FOUNDATION. ANY SUGGESTION OF IMPROPER SOVIET BEHAVIOUR WAS ALSO WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

7. AS SUSLOV DID NOT SUGGEST THAT WE WERE SEEKING INFORMATION ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS, I DID NOT USE THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF YOUR TUR.

8. IN A FINAL EXCHANGE I SAID THAT I WAS INSTRUCTED TO REPORT HIS REPLY. SUSLOV CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

8. IN A FINAL EXCHANGE I SAID THAT I WAS INSTRUCTED TO REPORT HIS
REPLY. SUSLOV CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

KEEBLE

NNNN