

OO WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GROUPS 502

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM DUBLIN 131635Z MAY 1982.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 13 MAY.

AND TO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNOS 142 AND 143: FALKLANDS: IRISH GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES.

1. ACTING HEAD OF CHANCERY WENT OVER THE TAOISEACH'S STATEMENT OF 11 MAY WITH O'TOOLE, DFA, MAKING CLEAR THE MANY POINTS ON WHICH WE COULD NOT ACCEPT ITS INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS OR OF BRITISH POLICY. IN PARTICULAR:
  - (A) TALKS OF "OPEN WAR" WAS A DANGEROUS EXAGGERATION:
  - (B) SIDES HAD BEEN TAKEN. SCR 502 HAD FOUND ARGENTINA'S ACTIONS DEEPLY DISTURBING: HER ARMED INTERVENTION HAD BEEN CONDEMNED IN THE PRESIDENCY STATEMENT OF 2 APRIL, REAFFIRMED BY THE COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 10 APRIL: THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT OF 10 APRIL HAD ALSO REFERRED TO ARGENTINA'S DIRECT DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
  - (C) CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINA HAD BEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF BRITAIN'S PREPARATION TO USE AND THEN HER USE OF LIMITED MILITARY MEASURES IN SELF-DEFENCE, FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE COMMONS ON 3 APRIL THAT A LARGE TASK FORCE WAS TO BE SENT, THROUGH THE VARIOUS DECLARATIONS SPELLING OUT TO ARGENTINA WHAT ACTIONS ON HER PART WOULD BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE. SCR 502 AND EC ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WERE COMPATIBLE WITH BRITISH MEASURES. TALK OF WHICH MEASURES COMPLIMENTED WHICH COULD BE MISLEADING WHEN TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT. BRITAIN'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE STEPS UNDER ARTICLE 51 WAS INDEPENDENT FROM THE COMMUNITY'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ECONOMIC MEASURES TO HELP ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE WITH SCR 522.



COMMUNITY'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ECONOMIC MEASURES TO HELP ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE WITH SCR 502.

(D) LOSS OF LIFE WAS REGRETTABLE BUT WAS THE DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF ARGENTINA'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ANY OF THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF SCR 502 AND HER SUBSEQUENT AGGRESSIVE DEPLOYMENTS AGAINST THE TASK FORCE.

(E) AT NO STAGE HAD IT BEEN TRUE THAT BRITAIN HAD GIVEN UP ON DIPLOMATIC AVENUES FOR PROGRESS, INCLUDING THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

2. O'TOOLE ACCEPTED THE FORCE OF THESE POINTS AND SAID HE WOULD PASS THEM TO MACKERNAN. BOTH WILL ATTEND THE POCO MEETING ON SATURDAY. HIS ONLY REJOINDER WAS TO SAY THAT THERE WAS A BALANCE BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY MEASURES. IF MILITARY MEASURES SEEMED DOMINANT, AS THEY HAD AT TIMES, THIS MADE JUSTIFICATION OF SANCTIONS HARDER FOR HIS GOVERNMENT.

3. O'TOOLE STRESSED THAT NEITHER THE TAOISEACH'S STATEMENT NOR HIS RADIO REMARKS (MY TELNO 145) ABOUT OTHER COMMUNITY DISPUTES HAD BEEN DRAFTED BY THE DFA. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON THE LATTER, HE AGREED THAT SANCTIONS AND FARM PRICES WERE QUITE DIFFERENT ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD TO EMPHASIS THAT VIRTUALLY ALL CABINET MEETINGS AT WHICH THE FALKLANDS HAD ARISEN RECENTLY HAD ALSO HEARD REPORTS FROM THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE ON THE CONTINUING AND COSTLY IMPASSE ON FARM PRICES.

4. O'TOOLE SAID NO FINAL IRISH DECISION ON SANCTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN BECAUSE THIS WOULD DEPEND ON HOW THE MEETING/MEETINGS WENT. IN PRACTICE POLICY WILL BE MADE BY THE TAOISEACH AND NOT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. I AGREE THAT OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE IRISH IS EXTREMELY LIMITED (YOUR TELNO 980 TO WASHINGTON). ANY FURTHER DIRECT UK APPROACH TO MR HAUGHEY IS MORE LIKELY TO INCREASE THE DANGER THAT HE WILL TAKE PRIDE IN GOING IT ALONE. I THEREFORE ENDORSE THE SUGGESTION THAT AMERICAN PRESSURE MIGHT HELP. AT THE WEEKEND MEETINGS I HOPE SOME OF OUR PARTNERS - LUXEMBOURG AND FRANCE SEEM TWO OF THE BEST CANDIDATES - COULD BE ASKED TO HELP. IF THE ITALIANS CAN BE BROUGHT ON BOARD EARLIER, THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE IRISH MIGHT ALSO BE BENEFICIAL.