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CONFIDENTIAL
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 1725 OF 12 MAY 1982,
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. I HAD A LENGTHY BUT INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION WITH HAIG ON THE SUBJECT OF THE GUARANTEE.
2. HE DID NOT SEEM TO THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE SUPERVISION OF THE TROOPS' WITHDRAWAL. THIS WOULD BE DONE UNDER UN AUSPICES AND THEY COULD DRAW ON AIR SURVEILLANCE AS THEY WISHED. I MENTIONED THE MFC AS A POSSIBLE PRECEDENT, WHICH HAIG ENTIRELY ACCEPTED. HE WAS SURE THAT AIRCRAFT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE.

3. A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT QUESTION AROSE IF THE CUT-OFF DATE HAD ARRIVED AND THERE WAS STILL NO LONG-TERM SETTLEMENT. HAIG HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE ATTITUDE OF THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT ON THIS. HE HAD SEEN NO REASON WHY INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD NOT THEN CARRY ON.

4. HAIG NEVERTHELESS SAW A PROBLEM IF THERE WAS NO SETTLEMENT ABOUT THE FUTURE AND IF THE ARGENTINIANS THEN THREATENED TO RETURN. HE SAID IT WOULD BE EASIER IF THE US WERE PART OF THE UN REGIME AND IT CARRIED ON. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINIANS MIGHT INITIALLY PROTEST ABOUT USA PARTICIPATION BUT WOULD IN THE END ACCEPT IT. IN HIS VIEW THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE BEST GUARANTEE. IT HAD TO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WERE THINKING OF THE US WOULD BE RESTORING ITS RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND WOULD BE PROVIDING MUCH-NEEDED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD NOT, IN SUCH A SITUATION, WISH TO ANTAGONISE THE USA BY ADOPTING SOME UNACCEPTABLE TACTICS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

5. HAIG AGREED THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS THIS MATTER FURTHER, ADDING THAT IT DEPENDED TO SOME EXTENT ON THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT. INDEED IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BE PRECISE ABOUT IT UNTIL WE KNEW WHAT THAT AGREEMENT WAS LIKELY TO BE.

HENDERSON

NMNN