

IMMEDIATE

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

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 PS/PUS  
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 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GILLMORE  
 MR URE  
 MR BARRETT  
 HS/S AM D  
 HD/DEF D  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
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PS/HOME SECRETARY

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PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

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PS/SIR M PALLISER )

PS/SIR A DUFF )

CABINET

MR WADE-GERY )

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 132210Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 740 OF 13 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 398; FALKLANDS: BRIEFING OF COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS.

1. BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, I HAD AGREED TO A REQUEST FROM MY BELGIAN COLLEAGUE TO BRIEF THE TEN AT 1830Z TODAY (13 MAY). I AM TO DO SO AGAIN AT 1930Z TOMORROW.

2. I SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHETHER OR WHEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S INITIATIVE WAS GOING TO SUCCEED. I WAS PROCEEDING WITH MAXIMUM URGENCY AND SEEING PEREZ DE CUELLAR TWICE A DAY ON AVERAGE. THERE WAS NO FOOT DRAGGING ON THE BRITISH SIDE, NOR, AS FAR AS I COULD JUDGE, ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE. A HOPEFUL SIGN WAS THAT ROS HAD ACCEPTED A FORMULATION ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION WHICH WE WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE TO ACCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF A FULL PACKAGE, PROVIDED THAT IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT ROS WAS ACTING WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE JUNTA. BUT IT WAS DISCOURAGING THAT ARGENTINE SPOKESMEN KEPT ON SAYING THE OPPOSITE IN PUBLIC. EVEN IF THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION WAS SAFELY OUT OF THE WAY, THERE

THAT ARGENTINE SPOKESMEN KEPT ON SAYING THE OPPOSITE. EVEN IF THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION WAS SAFELY OUT OF THE WAY, THERE REMAINED A WHOLE RANGE OF DIFFICULT PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED, ESPECIALLY:

(A) THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION: WE HAD ACCEPTED UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION IN PRINCIPLE BUT HAD TO MAKE SURE THAT THE ISLANDERS' ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES WERE PROPERLY FITTED INTO IT:

(B) THE TARGET DATE FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS: WE HAD TO BE SURE THAT IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY THE TARGET DATE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD CONTINUE IN FORCE: OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE A VACUUM, WITH THE RISK THAT GENERAL MENENDEZ WOULD COME MARCHING BACK: EQUALLY, THE ARGENTINES WERE RELUCTANT TO CONTEMPLATE A NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH COULD LAST ANOTHER 17 YEARS.

EACH MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL WENT DEEP INTO THE HEART OF THESE AND OTHER PROBLEMS. I DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WAS ANY IMMEDIATE RISK OF A BREAKDOWN. BUT THERE WAS MUCH HARD WORK AHEAD AND WE NEEDED A FEW MORE DAYS (NOT WEEKS, THOUGH).

3. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THIS WAS THE FULLEST BRIEFING I HAD GIVEN ANY OF MY COLLEAGUES. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD BEEN UNIQUELY CONSCIENTIOUS IN MAINTAINING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF HIS NEGOTIATIONS. I ASKED THEREFORE THAT MY COLLEAGUES SHOULD GIVE A VERY LIMITED DISTRIBUTION TO THEIR REPORTS. I THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S EFFORT WOULD STILL BE UNDER WAY WHEN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MET ON 15 MAY. I NEED NOT SAY HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS THAT OUR PARTNERS SHOULD HELP TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES.

4. I ANSWERED SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WHAT WAS OUR POSITION ON THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDERS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD (BELGIUM)?

I SAID THAT IF, IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WERE TO INSIST THAT THE ISLANDERS' WISHES SHOULD BE PARAMOUNT, WE WOULD BE OPEN TO THE CHARGE THAT WE OURSELVES WERE TRYING TO PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME ON SOVEREIGNTY. AT THE SAME TIME WE HAD TO REMEMBER THAT IT WAS THE FUTURE OF PEOPLE WHICH WAS AT ISSUE: THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS WERE OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE AND MUST BE RESPECTED: AND THERE HAD TO BE A MEANS OF ASCERTAINING THEM DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD.

(B) WAS NOT ARGENTINA FOOT DRAGGING BY INSISTING ON UN MEDIATION (BELGIUM)?

I SAID THAT OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE OF THE ARGENTINES NATURALLY MADE US SUSPICIOUS. BUT I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT ROS (ARGENTINA) WAS NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH. THE QUESTION MARK WAS OVER THE GENERALS IN BUENOS AIRES.

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- (C) WOULD NOT THE ONSET OF WINTER DETRACT FROM THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR MILITARY PRESSURE (LUXEMBOURG)?

I SAID THAT, THOUGH NOT A MILITARY EXPERT, I THOUGHT THAT THE WEATHER WAS NOT AS CENTRAL A FACTOR AS SOME COMMENTATORS SUGGESTED. THE ROYAL NAVY'S HOME, AFTER ALL, WAS THE NORTH ATLANTIC: IT WAS NOT A FAIR-WEATHER NAVY.

- (D) WHAT WOULD BE THE COMPOSITION OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION? WOULD THE UN SEEK ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES (FRG)?

I SAID THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO INTRODUCE OUTSIDE PARTIES: THAT WAS NOT THE PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM WAS HOW THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ISLANDERS WOULD FIT INTO THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. I DESCRIBED THE THREE LEVELS OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE ISLANDS (GOVERNOR; EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL). THE GOVERNOR MIGHT BE REPLACED BY THE UN ADMINISTRATOR: BUT IT WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE TO SUSPEND THE TWO COUNCILS, BOTH BECAUSE THE UN ADMINISTRATOR WOULD NEED THEIR HELP AND EXPERIENCE OVER THE PRACTICAL DETAILS OF ADMINISTRATION AND BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO ASCERTAIN THE ISLANDERS' VIEWS ABOUT THEIR FUTURE. A WIDE DIFFERENCE REMAINED HERE.

- (E) HOW MUCH OF A PROBLEM WAS THE PHASING AND MONITORING OF WITHDRAWAL (IRELAND)?

I SAID THAT AGREEMENT HAD NOT YET BEEN REACHED ON PHASING, THOUGH IT WAS FAR FROM BEING THE MOST DIFFICULT POINT. MONITORING WAS A PROBLEM: WE WERE DISCUSSING IT WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WHO HAD IDEAS: AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE SEEMED THE BEST POSSIBILITY.

- (F) WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TOMORROW (FRG)?

I SAID THAT I WAS CONVINCED THAT ANY FORMAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE COUNCIL, WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY INVOLVE A ROW, WOULD KILL THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS. I HOPED THAT TOMORROW'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE AS BRIEF AS POSSIBLE.

- (G) WAS THERE ANY RISK THAT CONTINUING MILITARY ACTIVITY WOULD CAUSE ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER TO BREAK OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS (IRELAND)?

I SAID THAT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF THIS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL TOOK THE SAME VIEW AND HAD SO INFORMED THE PRESS (MY TELNO 737).

- (H) WAS THERE A MOMENT BY WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO END THE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE WE COULD NOT CONTINUE TO SUSPEND "OTHER ACTIVITIES" (BELGIUM)?

I SAID NO, THOUGH I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER THE PARTIES OR THE SECRETARY GENERAL WANTED NEGOTIATIONS TO DRAG ON INDEFINITELY.