

**259. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Ankara<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1982, 0247Z

Tosec 70052/130920. For the Secretary from Acting Secy. Subject: Meeting With Henderson.

1. Nicho came in this afternoon<sup>2</sup> to brief me on where things stand. Basically he confirms that it is clear the two parties are far apart on a number of key issues despite the fact that the Argentines did make an important move on sovereignty two days ago.<sup>3</sup>

2. The specific issues which remain undecided are what happens if there is no agreement by December 31st, the Argentine insistence on free transit from the mainland, the Argentine inclusion of South Georgia and Sandwich Islands, and the formula for consulting the Islanders. On this last point he said Perez has come up with a formula which

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982-07/31/1982) (4). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> May 13.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 246.

the British are not very keen on which would allow consultations with equal numbers of Islanders and Argentinian residents.

3. He said it is also not clear how the UN administration of the Island which Perez proposes would work.

4. Nicho also said that the formula for the modalities for withdrawal are not agreed; the Argentines insisting the British must withdraw 2000 miles while they withdraw only to the mainland. The UK believes however that if agreement is reached on other elements of the package, the withdrawal modalities will fall into place.

5. Henderson said it was not clear to him what Perez's next move would be. He has heard that the SYG may be preparing a paper on what kind of package he thinks is possible, which paper he might present to the two parties as early as Friday or Saturday.<sup>4</sup> However Henderson said that with the two sides still so far apart, Perez may decide not to do so.

6. Henderson also said the British continue to question whether Ros in New York has authority to speak definitively for Buenos Aires.

7. Henderson stressed that the mood in London is "very bloody-minded". The debate in Commons today was particularly rough with lots of criticism of FCO weakness and willingness to negotiate away the British position.<sup>5</sup> Apparently there was also criticism of the rumored possible inclusion of the Germans in the contact group. Nicho said there was some concern in London about our attitude, with some questioning whether we might be tilting back towards Buenos Aires. (He raised with me, as I gather he had with you, several recent public statements). I assured Henderson that this was not the case and told him you would be sending letters as requested by Pym to the EC,<sup>6</sup> encouraging the maintenance of sanctions. He was pleased to hear this.

8. Henderson said the British are still not clear on what the Argentine strategy is. They suspect Buenos Aires is still playing with them and stringing the British along. This he stated London will not allow; military action in that event would be very likely. He stressed this point several times.

9. Henderson said if there is military action London expects there will be a call for a Security Council meeting out of which might emerge a resolution calling for a ceasefire with no provision for withdrawal. He noted that the British would in that event veto the resolution and would expect us to do so as well.

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<sup>4</sup> May 14 or 15.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 257.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 258.

10. Nicho was warm—even effusive—in his praise for your efforts throughout the crisis. He and I agreed to see each other again Friday to compare notes.

**Stoessel**