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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1757 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS

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1. I HAD A MEETING THIS MORNING WITH STOESSEL AND EAGLEBURGER. BREMER (HAIG'S ASSISTANT) WAS ALSO THERE. EAGLEBURGER TOLD ME AFTERWARDS THAT THE CONTENTS OF OUR CONVERSATION WOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE WHO HAD ACTUALLY BEEN PRESENT, BY WHICH HE MEANT THAT ENDERS HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY LEFT OUT.
2. STOESSEL SAID THAT HAIG HAD BEEN IN TOUCH FROM ANKARA BECAUSE HE WAS CONCERNED AT YESTERDAY'S DEVELOPMENTS, IE JEANE KIRKPATRICK'S INTERVENTION LEADING TO THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRIME MINISTER. STOESSEL AND EAGLEBURGER BOTH ASSURED ME THAT THEY HAD WORKED HARD ON THE PRESIDENT AND WERE CONFIDENT THAT BY THE TIME HE PHONED THE PRIME MINISTER, HE WAS IN NO DOUBT THAT IT WAS NOT WE WHO WERE BEING INTRANSIGENT. IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY DOUBTS REMAINING IN THE PRESIDENT'S MIND, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD DEALT WITH THEM.
3. STOESSEL WENT ON TO SAY THAT HAIG HAD ASKED THEM TO LET ME HAVE HIS LATEST THOUGHTS ON THE SITUATION AND ON OUR NEGOTIATING STANCE, WHICH WERE AS FOLLOWS:
 - (I) WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS NOT WE WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE, OR HELD RESPONSIBLE, FOR ANY BREAKDOWN IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS IN NEW YORK. I SAID THIS WAS INDEED OUR AIM.
 - (II) WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE BASED ON PARITY OF TIME IN TERMS OF THE ABILITY OF BOTH SIDES TO REINSERT THEIR FORCES. THE US WAS WILLING TO GIVE WHATEVER HELP MIGHT BE REQUIRED IN TERMS OF VERIFICATION.
 - (III) THE FOCUS OF DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND NOT THE DEPENDENCIES. THIS HAD ALSO BEEN THE VIEW OF PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO OF BRAZIL.
 - (IV) THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA SHOULD BE THE CURRENT NEUTRAL FORMULA PUT FORWARD IN NEW YORK ON TUESDAY (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 720)

IN NEW YORK ON TUESDAY (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 72E).

(V) AS REGARDS CONSULTATION WITH THE ISLANDERS, HAIG THOUGHT THAT THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE US/PERUVIAN TEXT: "ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POPULATION OF THE ISLANDS" WAS A GOOD FORMULATION AND THE BEST WE COULD HOPE TO GET.

(VI) AS REGARDS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, THERE SHOULD BE SOME KIND OF NEUTRAL FORMULA ON THE LINES THAT HE HAD FIRST PROPOSED IN LONDON, EG FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WOULD BE ENCOURAGED IN AN ORDERLY WAY, WITH THE CONSENT OF EACH PARTY REQUIRED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC STEPS. THE UN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION COULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FORMULATING SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THIS FORMULATION WOULD PUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING SUGGESTIONS IN THE HANDS OF THE UN BUT WOULD GIVE US A VETO SHOULD THE ARGENTINIANS PERSUADE THE UN TO PUT FORWARD IDEAS WHICH WOULD CLEARLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. HAIG'S IDEA SEEMS TO BE THAT THIS LANGUAGE MIGHT BE INCORPORATED IN A SIDE LETTER RATHER THAN IN THE MAIN TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT.

4. I SAID THAT WE HAD NO GUARANTEE THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD STICK TO THE FORMULA ON SOVEREIGNTY WORKED OUT IN NEW YORK. INDEED, PUBLIC REMARKS BY GALTIERI AND IGLESIAS ALREADY PUT THIS IN DOUBT. BUT THERE WERE OTHER VITAL ISSUES, INCLUDING, NOT JUST THE KEY ONES OF THE ROLE OF THE ISLANDERS AND THE NEED TO PREVENT THE ARGENTINIANS FROM SIMPLY SWAMPING THE ISLANDS WITH THEIR OWN PEOPLE, BUT HOW WE COULD ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NOT SIMPLY A CUT OFF POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OR SOME THEORETICAL EXTENSION OF THE NEGOTIATING PERIOD WHICH COULD BE OVERRIDDEN BY ARGENTINA. WE NEEDED SOME GUARANTEE THAT ARGENTINA COULD NOT ORDER THE UN OUT AT THE END OF THE YEAR AND REOCCUPY THE ISLANDS. FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW THE US/PERUVIAN PLAN HAD BEEN IDEAL BECAUSE THE PRESENCE OF A CONTACT GROUP, INCLUDING THE US, HAD EFFECTIVELY PROVIDED THE GUARANTEE THAT WE NEEDED. STOESSEL AND EAGLEBURGER STRONGLY AGREED. HOWEVER, EVEN IF WE COULD GET BACK TO THE IDEA THAT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF A CONTACT GROUP OF COUNTRIES, RATHER THAN UN OFFICIALS, THEY DOUBTED WHETHER THE US WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE UNDER A UN PLAN BECAUSE OF ITS SUPER POWER STATUS. EAGLEBURGER MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE KIND OF GUARANTEE THAT WAS IMPLICIT IN THE US PRESENCE AS PART OF A CONTACT GROUP OF COUNTRIES WAS AS FAR AS THEY COULD GO. A SEPARATE, PRIVATE, US MILITARY GUARANTEE WOULD RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES IN CONNECTION

EAGLEBURGER MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE KIND OF GUARANTEE THAT WAS IMPLICIT IN THE US PRESENCE AS PART OF A CONTACT GROUP OF COUNTRIES WAS AS FAR AS THEY COULD GO. A SEPARATE, PRIVATE, US MILITARY GUARANTEE WOULD RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES IN CONGRESS.

5. DURING OUR TALKS, HAIG TELEPHONED FROM ANKARA ASKING TO SPEAK TO ME. HE SAID THAT, IF IT WOULD HELP, HE COULD MEET YOU IN LUXEMBOURG EARLIER ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON THAN AT PRESENT PLANNED (I BELIEVE YOU WERE DUE TO MEET AT 1900). HAIG WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO DO THIS AND IF IT CAN BE FITTED IN WITH THE TIMETABLE OF YOUR MEETING WITH EC COLLEAGUES I RECOMMEND THAT YOU RESPOND POSITIVELY. STOESEL SEPARATELY GAVE ME A COPY OF THE VERY STRONG AND HELPFUL LETTER WHICH HAIG HAS SENT TO COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS URGING THEM TO RENEW THE IMPORT BAN. I UNDERSTAND A COPY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO YOU IN LONDON.

HENDERSON

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