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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 140300Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 140115Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 749 OF 13 MAY 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY I P T: FALKLANDS

1. MY THEATRICAL PERFORMANCE THIS MORNING HAS HELPED US TO GET THROUGH ANOTHER DAY. THE PRICE OF COURSE WAS EXPECTATION THAT WE WILL COME UP WITH SOMETHING ON THE DIFFICULT SUBJECTS TOMORROW (14 MAY).

2. I AM WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE ARE ON TWO TRACKS - GENUINE SEARCH FOR AGREEMENT AND, IF NO AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS TO COLLAPSE WITH US IN THE LEAST DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION. I AM ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO BUY AS MUCH TIME AS WE CAN.

3. AS REGARDS THE LATTER TRACK, THERE IS NO HOPE OF OUR BEING ABLE TO CLAIM, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS COLLAPSE, THAT JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING WAS UNSATISFACTORY BECAUSE OF ARGENTINE OBEDURACY. EVERYONE HERE KNOWS TOO MUCH. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE VACUUM POINT

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ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND NOBODY WOULD BELIEVE THAT WE COULD NOT HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON SUCH MATTERS AS WITHDRAWAL, CEASEFIRE, ETC: THE ARGENTINES ARE MAKING THE MOST OF THEIR "MAJOR CONCESSION" ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT. HENCE, IT WOULD BE KNOWN THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD FAILED OVER SOUTH GEORGIA OR THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OR BOTH. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, BY FAR THE LESS DISADVANTAGEOUS BREAK-POINT WOULD BE THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WITH ALL ITS CONNOTATIONS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL PROGRESS UNDER ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER, RIGHTS OF PEOPLES ETC. EVEN OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD FAILED BECAUSE OF OUR REFUSAL TO REMOVE A SMALL MILITARY GARRISON FROM SOUTH GEORGIA.

4. IF I RETURNED TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOMORROW WITH NO CHANGE IN OUR POSITIONS ON THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND SOUTH GEORGIA, MY JUDGEMENT IS THAT HE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY TRANSMIT OUR POSITIONS TO ROS. THERE WOULD THEN BE A SERIOUS RISK THAT ROS WOULD DECIDE THAT THE MOMENT HAD COME TO BREAK AND TO WRONG-FOOT US IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON GROUNDS OF GENERAL OB DURACY, HAVING URGED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL (WHO NEED NO SUCH URGING) TO INITIATE MANDATORY CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. HE COULD TRIGGER THIS OFF THROUGH THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TOMORROW AFTERNOON. I REGARD THIS RISK AS VERY REAL, SINCE I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT THE MAIN ARGENTINE TRACK IS NOW TO WRONG-FOOT US IN THIS WAY, EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY STILL BE KEEPING OPEN A MINOR TRACK WHICH COULD LEAD TO A GENUINE AGREEMENT IF THEY COULD EXTRACT ENOUGH FROM US. THERE IS THE ACCOMPANYING DANGER THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR, SEEING THAT THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO PARTIES WERE TOO WIDE TO BRIDGE ON THESE QUESTIONS, WOULD ABANDON HIS IDEA OF PRESENTING A MEDIAN PAPER AND THROW HIS HAND IN, OR AT LEAST NOT MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO PREVENT ROS FROM ACTING AS I HAVE SUGGESTED HE MIGHT.

5. THIS LEADS ME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, HAVING JUST MANAGED TO HOLD THE LINE TODAY BY A THEATRICAL PERFORMANCE ON THE VACUUM (NOT WITHOUT ITS SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT), I COULD NOT REASONABLY HOPE TO DO THE SAME TOMORROW BY STALLING ON BOTH THE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS AND TRYING TO GAIN ANOTHER DAY EG BY ADDRESSING THE TECHNICALITIES OF WITHDRAWAL, WHICH IS ABOUT THE ONLY SUBSTANTIVE POINT ON WHICH I MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING NEW TO SAY.

6. I MUST THEREFORE AGAIN FACE YOU WITH A DIFFICULT DECISION. BUT I HAVE A MODIFIED TACTIC TO PROPOSE. PROVIDED THAT WE COULD ENGAGE THE GEARS ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND WITHDRAWAL, THUS LEAVING ONLY INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AS A MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK (THE LEAST DISADVANTAGEOUS ONE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IF THE BREAK COMES), I BELIEVE THAT I COULD PERSUADE PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO COME FORWARD WITH HIS PAPER, LEAVING THE PARAGRAPH ON INTERIM ADMINISTRATION BLANK ON THE GROUND THAT THIS WAS SUCH A VITAL POINT TO US FROM THE GOVERNMENTAL, PARLIAMENTARY, AND ISLANDER POINTS OF VIEW, THAT WE NEEDED TO SEE THE REST OF THE PACKAGE IN TOTO BEFORE COMING TO A FINAL DECISION ABOUT WHAT WE COULD ACCEPT ON THIS QUESTION. ROS WOULD NOT FIND IT EASY TO DEPLOY THE TACTICS IN PARA 4 ABOVE IF THIS WAS OUR POSITION.

7. TO MAKE THESE TACTICS WORK MEANS THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE NOW TO MAKE A CONCESSION ON SOUTH GEORGIA, PERHAPS ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 6 (1) OF MY TELEGRAM NO 733. IF WE WERE PREPARED TO DO THIS, I IMAGINE THAT THIS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR US TO ACCEPT, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, THE SECRETARIAT CONCEPT OF A RECTANGLE FOR WITHDRAWAL RATHER THAN A CIRCLE OR CIRCLES. IF WE COULD ACCEPT THIS CONCEPT IN PRINCIPLE, WE COULD THEN ARGUE FIERCELY FIRST TO REJECT UNEQUAL WITHDRAWAL AS PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARIAT (MY TELNO 731, PARAGRAPH 6 (B)) AND SECONDLY TO RECONSTRUCT THE RECTANGLE IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO LEAVE US AT A DISADVANTAGE.

8. I MUST HAVE ANOTHER ROUND WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOMORROW, BUT I AM NOT ASKING YOU TO LET ME HAVE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE THE INFORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AT 2000Z. PROVIDED THAT I COULD GIVE AN ASSURANCE THAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE ON THE WAY, THE FACT THAT THEY HAD NOT ARRIVED BY 2000Z MIGHT ENABLE US TO GET THROUGH THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITHOUT SERIOUS PROBLEMS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD GET AWAY WITH AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE COUNCIL TO MAKE SERIOUS TROUBLE IF IT WAS KNOWN THAT I WAS ON THE POINT OF MAKING AN IMPORTANT COMMUNICATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

9. FOR THE MOMENT, THERE IS NO NEED TO PURSUE THE QUESTION OF MY FLYING HOME, WHICH THE PUS AND I DISCUSSED ON THE TELEPHONE. I MAY REVERT TO THIS AS A LAST DITCH PLOY TO BUY MORE TIME.