


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14 MAY 1982

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 141930Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 752 OF 14 MAY.
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON.

MY TELS NO'S 748 AND 749: FALKLANDS.

1. FOLLOWING MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PUS THIS MORNING (14 MAY) I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL. I SPOKE WITH CONSIDERABLE VIGOUR AND EMOTION. I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD BEEN CALLED BACK FOR URGENT CONSULTATIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. I WOULD BE BACK IN NEW YORK ON MONDAY MORNING. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THESE CONSULTATIONS BEING COMPLETED BEFORE THEN I.E. ENABLING ME TO GET BACK ON SUNDAY. I URGED HIM NOT TO PRESENT HIS PAPER UNTIL HE HAD SEEN ME ON MY RETURN. IT WAS VITAL THAT MY MINISTERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WITHOUT FURTHER PREJUDICE FROM ANY SIDE. I URGED HIM TO CONVINCe ROS THAT WE WERE NOT PLAYING GAMES, THAT MY RETURN TO LONDON WAS NOT A PLOY DESIGNED TO BUY TIME, AND THAT IT WAS IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST TO SIT TIGHT AND AWAIT MY RETURN.

2. I ADDED THAT I WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON. ATTEMPTS MIGHT BE MADE TO PERSUADE ME TO ACCEPT A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT CALLING FOR MILITARY RESTRAINT OR SOMETHING OF THE KIND. AS HE KNEW, I WOULD HAVE TO REFUSE THIS FLATLY. SUCH AN ATTEMPT MIGHT CONCEAL A STRATEGY TO FORCE US IMMEDIATELY INTO OPEN COUNCIL EITHER THIS EVENING (UNLIKELY) OR TOMORROW (SATURDAY). IF THIS HAPPENED, I WOULD NOT RETURN TO LONDON AND MY GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO TURN ITS ATTENTION TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HIS INITIATIVE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY COLLAPSE AND WE WOULD NEVER KNOW IF IT WOULD HAVE SUCCEEDED. HE AND EVERYONE ELSE CONCERNED WOULD HAVE TO LIVE WITH THIS THOUGHT FOR THE REST OF THEIR LIVES.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR RESPONDED ADMIRABLY TO THIS ORATION. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT THINK OF PRODUCING HIS PAPER UNTIL AFTER HE HAD DISCLOSED THE SITUATION WITH ME ON MY RETURN. HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO HOLD EVERYTHING OVER THE WEEKEND. HE WOULD SEE ROS PRIVATELY AND FELT SURE THAT HE COULD CONVINCe HIM TO DO THE SAME.

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4. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD GIVEN ROS A HARD TIME YESTERDAY ON THE QUESTION OF ISLANDER PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. HE HAD TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT ANY DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY COULD ACCEPT THAT PEOPLE SHOULD BE ROBBED OF THEIR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, AND THAT THERE COULD BE PARITY OF REPRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF NEARLY 2,000 PEOPLE ON THE ONE HAND AND ABOUT 30 ON THE OTHER. HE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT THE BRITISH MIGHT ACCEPT ONE ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR BUSINESS COMMUNITY BEING INCLUDED IN WHATEVER STRUCTURE WAS AGREED. ROS HAD TAKEN THIS WELL. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD THEREAFTER RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A LATIN AMERICAN FRIEND OF HIS WHO WAS VERY CLOSE TO THE ARGENTINE DELEGATION. THIS PERSON OBVIOUSLY KNEW EXACTLY WHAT WAS GOING ON. HE HAD TOLD PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT HE WAS SURE THAT ARGENTINA WOULD SEE REASON ON THIS POINT.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE MIGHT HAVE A MORE DEFINITIVE MESSAGE FOR ME ON THIS QUESTION BEFORE I LEFT FOR THE AIRPORT TONIGHT. IF NOT, HE MIGHT TELEPHONE ME AT MY LONDON HOUSE TOMORROW (SATURDAY) MORNING.

6. SO FAR SO GOOD. I WILL REPORT THE SECURITY COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LEAVING FOR THE AIRPORT.

PARSONS

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