

**266. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Hayward) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger<sup>1</sup>**

JCSM-108-82

Washington, May 15, 1982

SUBJECT

Falklands Crisis (U)

1. (S) While the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the policy of providing materiel assistance to the United Kingdom in connection with the Falklands crisis, they are increasingly concerned about the long-term impact on our relations within the Hemisphere resulting from the changing nature and greater degree of assistance requested. Clearly, the crisis will make it more difficult to pursue US regional security policies on a coalition basis and will provide the Soviets and Cubans additional opportunities to undermine hemispheric collective security with weapons, advisors, and significantly increased influence. Finally, the perception of an unlimited US commitment may provide the British with little incentive to negotiate a prompt resolution of the issue.

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully reviewed the list of weapons, equipment, and supplies requested by the United Kingdom.<sup>2</sup> The early requests involved relatively small quantities, with emphasis on logistical support. The current requests are characterized by more visible and considerably greater quantities of lethal weapons and could lead to direct involvement of US combat support forces. For example, the two fully abeam underway replenishment capable oilers and the prototype ARAPAHO containerized aviation facility vessel could directly involve operational support by US elements. The 20,000 SSQ41B sonobouys and 200 Mk-46 Mod 2 ASW torpedoes to combat two Argentine diesel submarines and 300 AIM-9L air-to-air missiles<sup>3</sup> (when coupled with the 200 AIM-9Ls recently purchased and their additional 750 AIM-9Hs) to destroy less than 140 Argentine fighter/attack aircraft, seem far in excess of numbers required.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-84-0003, Argentina (Jan-15 May) 1982. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Weinberger saw it on May 17. A note in an unknown hand at the top of the memorandum reads: "CC—hand-delivered to Bill Clark 5/17."

<sup>2</sup> A possible reference to a paper, dated May 14, summarizing new British requests for matériel support, outstanding requests, and requests recently completed as of that date. Iklé sent a copy of the paper to Weinberger under a May 14 covering memorandum. A stamped notation on the covering memorandum indicates Weinberger saw both the covering memorandum and the paper on May 17. Both are *ibid*.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 264 and 265.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that the NSC address, as a matter of priority, the US policy of arms and equipment transfer to the United Kingdom in connection with the Falklands crisis with full consideration of its impact on our longer term hemispheric security interests.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**T.B. Hayward**

*Admiral, U.S. Navy*

*Acting Chairman, JCS*