

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 181728Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1796 OF 18 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

FALKLANDS

1. I SAW STOESEL TODAY. HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED THE TEXT OF OUR PAPER BUT HAD HAD VERY LITTLE COMMENT ABOUT IT FROM HAIG WHO RETURNS HERE THIS EVENING.
2. WHAT HAIG HAD REPORTED SUGGESTED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS MUCH CHANCE OF THE ARGENTINES AGREEING. STOESEL SEEMED TO THINK THAT THE RESULT OF THE WEEKEND MEETINGS IN THE UK HAD BEEN TO PUT TOGETHER A PRETTY TOUGH TEXT.
3. I TOOK HIM THROUGH THE LONG PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION AND THE FLEXIBILITY WE HAD SHOWN, ON MUCH THE SAME LINES THAT PARSONS TOOK WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AS REPORTED IN UKMIS TELEGRAM NO 765. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT ALTHOUGH PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD NOT PASSED JUDGMENT ON OUR PAPER HE HAD WONDERED, THINKING ALOUD, WHETHER HE COULD NOT PRESENT IT AS HIS OWN DRAFT TO BUENOS AIRES. THIS SHOWED THAT HIS INITIAL REACTION WAS TO REGARD OUR PAPER AS VERY REASONABLE.
4. STOESEL THEN STARTED SPECULATING ABOUT WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN WHEN THE DEADLINE OF MID-DAY ON 19 MAY EXPIRED. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT MIGHT WANT TO BE ACTIVE AGAIN AND ASKED ME WHETHER WE WOULD WANT HAIG AT THAT STAGE TO COME FORWARD WITH ANOTHER PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATION. I SAID, MOST EMPHATICALLY NOT. WE HAD BEEN NEGOTIATING FOR 6 AND A HALF WEEKS NOW AND IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE NOT PREPARED TO TALK ON ANY BASIS THAT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO US. STOESEL INTERJECTED THAT HE THOUGHT THE MILITARY LEADERS IN BUENOS AIRES WERE NOW IN A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY COULD ACCEPT NOTHING. I REITERATED THAT THERE WAS NOW A CONSIDERABLE TIME PRESSURE AND THAT WE COULD NOT BE KEPT HANGING ABOUT WHILE ARGENTINA PROCRASTINATED YET FURTHER. THE MOMENT FOR FURTHER U S INTERVENTION MIGHT COME AFTER THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION. AT SOME STAGE THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME NEGOTIATION DEALING WITH EITHER THE SURRENDER OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES OR THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS.

5. STOESEL ACCEPTED THIS. HE WILL TALK ACCORDINGLY TO HAIG WHEN HE GETS BACK. STOESEL ADDED THAT OVER THIS LAST WEEKEND THERE HAD BEEN SOME AGITATION IN THE WHITE HOUSE IN FAVOUR OF FURTHER LAST MINUTE ACTIVITY BY THE PRESIDENT, IE TELEPHONE CALLS OR MESSAGES. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD DISCOURAGED THESE SUCCESSFULLY, REMINDING THE WHITE HOUSE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF 13 MAY, BASED AS IT WAS ON THE MISAPPREHENSION THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING AND THAT AN AGREEMENT COULD ONLY BE REACHED IF THE BRITISH MOVED A LITTLE WAY, HAD NOT BEEN A GREAT SUCCESS. I SAID THAT I WAS PLANNING TO SEE CLARK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND STOESEL ADVISED ME TO DO THIS. HE THOUGHT THERE WAS STILL A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF ILLUSION IN THE WHITE HOUSE. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF REFERRING TO THE PROXIMITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO LONDON. HIS REMARKS BETWEEN NOW AND THEN RELATING TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WOULD BE NOTED WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION IN THE UK. STOESEL SAID THAT THESE OFF-THE-CUFF OBSERVATIONS WERE A REAL DANGER AND HE ADVISED ME TO WARN CLARK ABOUT THEM WHICH I WILL CERTAINLY DO.

6. STOESEL CONFIRMED TO ME THE ASSURANCE THAT HAIG GAVE YOU IN HIS MESSAGE OF 30 APRIL THAT THE U S WILL VETO ANY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT DOES NOT CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL AS WELL AS A CEASE FIRE.

HENDERSON

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