


10 MAY 1982

SECRET

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FROM UKWIS NEW YORK 160008Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C S
TELEGRAM NUMBER 777 DATED 12 MAY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON



FALKLAND ISLANDS: CONTINGENCY PLANNING AT THE UN

1. I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING THE ACTION WE SHOULD TAKE, WITH INEVITABLE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IN MIND, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS END AT MIDDAY NEW YORK TIME ON WEDNESDAY.
2. MY FIRST THOUGHT HAD BEEN THAT, AS SOON AS THE TEXT OF OUR DRAFT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN LONDON (I UNDERSTAND, ON 20 MAY), I SHOULD CONVEY IT FORMALLY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ASK HIM TO HAVE IT CIRCULATED AS A DOCUMENT OF THE COUNCIL, THE OBJECT BEING TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE COUNCIL HOW FAR WE HAD BEEN PREPARED TO GO IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. ON REFLECTION, HOWEVER, I SEE DANGERS IN THIS COURSE. TO GIVE OUR DRAFT FORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL STATUS WOULD CREATE THE RISK THAT IT WOULD BECOME A KIND OF BENCHMARK FOR A SOLUTION, JUST AS SCR 242 HAS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND SCR 435 FOR NAMIBIA. IT IS EVEN CONCEIVABLE THAT SOMEONE MIGHT PROPOSE THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD FORMALLY ENDORSE OUR PROPOSALS AS THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT. THIS WOULD BE THE LAST THING WE WOULD WANT IF, MEANWHILE, WE HAD SUCCESSFULLY RECOVERED THE ISLANDS: THAT WOULD CREATE A NEW SITUATION IN WHICH, I IMAGINE, YOUR IDEAS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN THE DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT. MY CONSIDERED ADVICE THEREFORE IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT FORMALLY CIRCULATE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT HERE, THOUGH I WOULD DRAW ON IT IN THE DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MAKE COPIES AVAILABLE ON REQUEST TO OTHER DELEGATIONS.
3. SECONDLY, I HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN CONSIDERING HOW WE COULD RETAIN THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AFTER A BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR DECIDES THAT THERE IS NO FURTHER HOPE FOR HIS INITIATIVE, HE WILL SO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INITIALLY IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS (PERHAPS ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON). DO-GOODERS HERE, LED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, DOBB (IRELAND) AND HISIBORI (JAPAN) AND ABETTED BY THE RUSSIANS AND DE PINIES (SPAIN), WILL TRY TO FILL THE RESULTING DIPLOMATIC VACUUM BY A FORMAL MEETING OF

OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, DORR (IRELAND) AND HISIBORI (JAPAN) AND ABETTED BY THE RUSSIANS AND DE PINIES (SPAIN), WILL TRY TO FILL THE RESULTING DIPLOMATIC VACUUM BY A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL (PROBABLY ON THURSDAY) AT WHICH THEY ARE LIKELY TO PROPOSE A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON "MOTHERHOOD" LINES, COMBINING A CALL FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 WITH A DEMAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS. DORR HAS PROBABLY ALREADY PREPARED SUCH A TEXT. WE MAY BE FAIRLY ISOLATED IN OPPOSING IT AND WE WOULD HAVE TO TRY TO LIMIT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE THE DAMAGE TO OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION FROM VETOING AN OSTENSIBLY "MOTHERHOOD" DRAFT. I THINK THAT THE BEST WAY OF DOING THIS WILL BE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WHAT APPEARS TO BE "MOTHERHOOD" IS IN FACT A WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING, IN THAT IT WOULD ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR HOLD ON THE ISLANDS CONTRARY TO SCR 502, WHILE TYING OUR HANDS.

4. I WOULD PROPOSE TO DEMONSTRATE THIS IN THE FOLLOWING WAY. AS SOON AS THE COUNCIL'S FORMAL PROCEEDINGS BEGIN, I WOULD TABLE IN PROVISIONAL FORM ("IN BLUE") THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM BUT NOT ASK FOR AN IMMEDIATE VOTE ON IT. THE DRAFT SETS OUT IN RESOLUTION FORM OUR BASIC POSITION ON A CEASEFIRE, NAMELY THAT IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT A CONCOMITANT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

5. TABELING SUCH A DRAFT AT THE OUTSET OF THE COUNCIL'S FORMAL MEETING WOULD ENABLE ME TO STEAL A MARCH ON DORR, WHOSE NORMAL PRACTICE IS TO PRE-NEGOTIATE HIS DRAFTS BEFORE FORMALLY TABELING THEM. IN THIS CASE, HE WOULD BE CONCERNED TO AVOID A BRITISH VETO AND WOULD PROBABLY GET BOGGED DOWN IN CONSULTATIONS TO TRY TO DEVISE A DRAFT IN WHICH WE COULD AT LEAST ACQUIESCE. IF I TABELED FIRST, MY DRAFT, EVEN THOUGH TABELED "IN BLUE", WOULD HAVE PRIORITY OVER HIS WHEN IT EVENTUALLY CAME TO A VOTE. AT THAT STAGE FOUR THINGS MIGHT HAPPEN:

- (A) HE AND HIS SUPPORTERS MIGHT DEFEAT US ON A PROCEDURAL MOTION THAT THEIR DRAFT SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY;
- (B) OUR DRAFT MIGHT BE VOTED ON BUT FAIL FOR WANT OF NINE VOTES;
- (C) OUR DRAFT MIGHT GET NINE VOTES BUT BE VETOED BY THE RUSSIANS;
- (D) OUR DRAFT MIGHT BE ADOPTED.

I REGARD (D) AS TOO MUCH TO HOPE FOR UNLESS MEANWHILE THE ARGENTINES HAVE COMMITTED SOME ACT WHICH AROUSES WIDE INTERNATIONAL INDIGNATION. I AM FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT OUR DRAFT WOULD FAIL FOR ONE OF THE THREE REASONS (A) - (C), PROBABLY (B). BUT WHATEVER HAPPENED, OUR VETO OF DORR'S "MOTHERHOOD"

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6. THE OBVIOUS GAP IN A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES IS THAT IT SAYS NOTHING ABOUT INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND COULD THEREFORE BE HELD TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE TERMS OF OUR DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT, THE DETAILS OF WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL EVEN THOUGH IT HAD NOT BEEN CIRCULATED FORMALLY. I WOULD PROPOSE TO SAY TO ANYONE WHO MADE THIS POINT THAT THEY WERE NOT COMPARING LIKE WITH LIKE. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT HAD BEEN AN ATTEMPT BY US, IN GOOD FAITH, TO PRODUCE AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE NEED FOR US TO GET THE ARGENTINES OFF THE ISLANDS BY FORCE AS WE ARE ENTITLED TO DO UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THAT EFFORT HAD BEEN REBUFFED BY THE ARGENTINES. NOW MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WERE PRESSING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. WE SHARED THEIR DESIRE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER CASUALTIES. BUT A CEASEFIRE BY ITSELF WOULD SIMPLY HELP THE ARGENTINES. THE PURPOSE OF MY DRAFT WAS TO ILLUSTRATE THE ONLY CONDITIONS ON WHICH WE COULD ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE.

7. I HAVE CONSIDERED THE IDEA OF PROVIDING FOR UN SUPERVISION OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, BUT CONCLUDE THAT WHILST ATTRACTIVE IN UN TERMS IT COULD BE AN UNNECESSARY COMPLICATION, ESPECIALLY ONCE HM FORCES HAVE LANDED.

8. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER YOU SEE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, AND, IF NOT, WHETHER I MAY HAVE DISCRETION TO TABLE IT WHEN THE MOMENT SEEMS RIGHT. IF THE FLOY IS TO SUCCEED, IT IS OF COURSE ESSENTIAL THAT NO MENTION SHOULD BE MADE OF IT IN ADVANCE TO ANYONE, NOT EVEN THE AMERICANS OF OUR OLD COMMONWEALTH AND EC PARTNERS.

9. I SHOULD ADD THAT THE PICTURE MAY HAVE CHANGED RAPIDLY BY TELEVISION (WEDNESDAY) OR THURSDAY. THE TIMINGS I HAVE ANTICIPATED

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9. I SHOULD ADD THAT THE PICTURE MAY HAVE CHANGED RAPIDLY BY TOMORROW (WEDNESDAY) OR THURSDAY. THE TIMINGS I HAVE ANTICIPATED FOR THE COUNCIL MEETINGS, INFORMAL AND FORMAL, MAY SLIP. BUT I STILL NEED URGENT DISCRETION FOR MY TACTICS IF I JUDGE THEM TO BE APPROPRIATE.

PARSONS

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