

GRS 520

CONFIDENTIAL

DESLBY 212830Z

FM MOSCOW 202010Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 290 OF 20/5



YOUR TEL NO 90 TO ABIDJAN : FALKLANDS

1. I HAD PROVISIONALLY ARRANGED TO SEE DEPUTY MINISTER RYZHOV AT 1700 HOURS LOCAL TODAY. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF YOUR TUR I WAS UNABLE TO REARRANGE MY APPOINTMENT WITH RYZHOV FOR LATER IN THE EVENING AND INSTEAD SAW SUSLOV, HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT AT 2200 HOURS LOCAL TONIGHT. I GAVE HIM COPIES OF THE DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT AND OF THE MEMORANDUM, EMPHASISING THAT THE PURPOSE OF MY CALL WAS TO KEEP THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT INFORMED OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS. I THEN TOOK SUSLOV THROUGH THE MAIN POINTS OF THE MEMORANDUM.

2. SUSLOV, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS DEPUTY SEMEONOV, ASKED ABOUT THE LATEST SITUATION. I SAID THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD MADE FURTHER SUGGESTIONS BUT, GIVEN THE HARDENING OF THE ARGENTINE POSITION, IT WAS CLEAR THAT FURTHER NEGOTIATION WOULD BE FRUITLESS. SUSLOV AND SEMEONOV SAID THAT THEY HAD JUST HEARD NEWS ON MOSCOW RADIO THAT BRITISH TROOPS WERE ALREADY LANDING IN THE FALKLANDS. I SAID THAT I WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS.

3. SUSLOV THEN READ WHAT HE CALLED AN ORAL STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE FOLLOWING LINES (HE DID NOT HAND OVER A TEXT)

WE REGRET THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS DECIDED SHARPLY TO ESCALATE MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC INSTEAD OF CHOOSING THE PATH TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. SUCH A COURSE WILL LEAD TO FURTHER HUMAN CASUALTIES AND MATERIAL LOSSES AND WILL CREATE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC A NEW HOTBED OF TENSION. THIS CAN ONLY AROUSE OUR CONCERN. AS HAS ALREADY BEEN STATED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE BRITISH SIDE, THE SOVIET UNION IS AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. AS BEFORE, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE ANGLO/ARGENTINE DISPUTE CAN BE FOUND BY PEACEFUL MEANS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND THAT THIS WOULD MEET THE INTERESTS OF BOTH BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. WE EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE BRITISH SIDE WILL WEIGH THESE CONSIDERATIONS CAREFULLY,



DISPUYING COMMON SENSE, AND SUPPORT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH ARGENTINA.

4. I NOTED THAT THE CRUCIAL POINTS OF THIS STATEMENT WERE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE AND FAVOURED A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. IF THEY LOOKED AT THE HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE AS SET OUT IN THE MEMORANDUM IT WOULD BE CLEAR WHO HAD FIRST USED FORCE AND WHO HAD GENUINELY WORKED FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THE SOVIET UNION SAID THAT IT HAD A PRINCIPLED FOREIGN POLICY. OUR MEMORANDUM SHOWED CLEARLY HOW ARGENTINA AND THE UK RESPECTIVELY OBSERVED THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. WE KNEW THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT KNEW AND THE WORLD AT LARGE KNEW WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATION LAY.

5. IN CONCLUSION, SUSLOV REPEATED THAT THE DISPUTE SHOULD BE SETTLED PEACEFULLY, THAT THERE WERE NO SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE REGION, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT INTERFERING IN THE DISPUTE.

6. I HAVE SINCE INFORMED MOST MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH PRESS CORPS THAT WE HAVE HANDED OVER A TEXT OF THE DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT TO THE MFA AND HAVE BRIEFED THEM OFF THE RECORD ON THE BACKGROUND. WE HAVE ALSO GIVEN THEM COPIES OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH WE INTEND TO SEND TOMORROW TO SELECTED SOVIET JOURNALISTS TOGETHER WITH THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE TODAY.

KEEBLE

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