

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 527 OF 20 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE TO ABIDJAN WASHINGTON UKRAINS NEW YORK ATHENS

BRUSSELS UKREP BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG

ROME DUBLIN AND BONN

YOUR TEL NO 90 TO ABIDJAN: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I SPOKE ACCORDINGLY TO GUTMANN, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE QUAI. (WE LEFT COPIES AT THE ELYSEE BUT THERE IS NO SENIOR OFFICIAL THERE TODAY.)

2. GUTMANN MADE THREE SUGGESTIONS:

(A) THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER HOW TO HANDLE THE DEBATE WHICH MAY SOON BECOME INEVITABLE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, PARTICULARLY IF BRITISH TROOPS LAND IN THE ISLANDS. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER THE UK AS A PARTY TO THE DISPUTE WOULD ENJOY A RIGHT OF VETO. HE WONDERED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF A CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ARGENTINIAN OFFER TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS UN ASPECTS FURTHER WHEN WE HAD FORMED A VIEW:

(B) THAT POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE TEN MIGHT MEET. NOT ALL OF THE TEN WERE ENTIRELY CONVINCED BY THE BRITISH CASE: SOME HAD OFFERED SUPPORT OUT OF FRIENDSHIP RATHER THAN BECAUSE THEY ENDORSED THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE UK-BASED ITSELF. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KEEP THEM AS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH DECISIONS AS POSSIBLE. FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK ON MONDAY BUT AN EARLIER MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS MIGHT BE DESIRABLE: IT WAS FOR THE UK TO DECIDE WHETHER TO PROPOSE ONE:

(C) REFERRING TO MITTERRAND'S SUGGESTION AT HIS LUNCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 17 MAY, HE SPECULATED WHETHER SOME BROAD GESTURE FROM THE COMMUNITY TO LATIN AMERICA MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HELP MEND FENCES AT A VERY EARLY STAGE AFTER ANY MILITARY ACTION.

3. GUTMANN SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM MITTERRAND AND CHEYSSON, WHO ARE DUE TO ARRIVE IN ABIDJAN TOMMOROW. HM AMBASSADOR ABIDJAN MIGHT LIKE TO MAKE THE RELEVANT TEXTS AVAILABLE TO THE FRENCH.

FRETWELL