

Argentina

Mr Fearn,
Emergency Unit

cc: Private Secretary
PS/Mr Onslow
Mr Bullard
Mr Giffard
Sir I Sinclair
Mr Wright
Mr Gillmore
Mr Mallaby, Planning Staff
Mr Williams, UND
Mr Fenn, News Dept
Mr Weston, Defence Dept
Mr MacInnes, Information Dept
Lord N Gordon Lennox
Sir M Palliser, Cabinet Office
Mr Coles, No 10
Mr Webb, MOD

*A.S.C. 26/5**f.a.*

FALKLANDS: POSITION AT THE UN

1. Sir A Parsons telephoned just after 6 o'clock this evening to say that the morning in New York had been taken up with an extensive wrangle amongst the members of the Security Council about a proposal from Mrs Jeanne Kirkpatrick that there should be a closed meeting of the Security Council to consider the Falklands crisis. After a two hour debate this had been rejected and a formal meeting of the Security Council will now be held at 2.30 pm New York time (7.30 pm BST) at the proposal of Argentina and Panama, with the support of Spain and the Soviet Union.
2. At this meeting the Secretary General is likely to begin by delivering his report. This will be followed by statements from Argentina and Sir A Parsons (who will speak for about 40 minutes). Argentine tactics are not clear yet: they may not loose off all their ammunition since Costa Mendez (and the Foreign Ministers of Panama and Venezuela) will be arriving in New York on Saturday.
3. Nonetheless against the widespread - and excited - assumption in New York that a massive invasion is under way in the Falkland Islands, the chances that a resolution calling for a cease fire will be put forward are high. Sir A Parsons will veto any unacceptable resolution, eg one calling simply for an unconditional cease fire. He will not accept anything without reference back to London. If a resolution is put which might be acceptable, with or without further amendment, he will veto if the Security Council refuses to give him time to consult London.


4. As part of his tactics Sir A Parsons thought it might be sensible for him to have up his sleeve the text of the kind of resolution we might be able to accept. He would not put this forward himself, but use it to indicate what we might accept and by implication what we could not. It could be on the following lines:-

- (i) a reiterated demand for the immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces;
- (ii) as a first step towards a peaceful solution the cessation of all firing and hostile action at a time to be specified by the Security Council, subject to written confirmation from Argentina that they will withdraw their forces, have begun to do so and will complete the withdrawal by a specific time in accordance with (i);
- (iii) the Secretary General to work to this effect.

After discussion here the PUS told Sir A Parsons that this seemed sensible. He should preferably try to seek instructions if he needed to table this resolution in order to secure priority. Sir A Parsons said he only intended to use it in an illustrative way.

5. Sir A Parsons judges that for the time being Security Council discussions are likely to be disorderly and demeaning and he does not recommend that Mr Pym should at present contemplate going to New York himself.

21 May 1982



R A Burns
PS/PUS