

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2063 OF 24 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS
BONN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO OSLO
OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON TOKYO ROUTINE STRASBOURG LISBON MADRID
UKMIS GENEVA

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION:

MEETING OF MINISTERS OF THE TEN, BRUSSELS 24 MAY 1982

FALKLANDS

SUMMARY

1. MINISTERS AGREED TO EXTEND THE IMPORT BAN FOR AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD UNTIL THE SITUATION SHOULD PERMIT ITS REMOVAL; THIS TO BE DONE ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE DECISION AT LUXEMBOURG ON 17 MAY. THE COMMISSION WILL NOW PUT A FORMAL PROPOSAL TO COREPER AND THE DECISION WILL BE TAKEN AS A 'A' POINT IN THE COUNCIL.

2. THE PRESIDENCY IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS WILL CONFIRM THE TEN'S POSITION AS STATED AT LUXEMBOURG, AND IN PARTICULAR THEIR WISH TO SEE SCR 502 IMPLEMENTED AND THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS.

DETAIL

3. MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION WAS BRIEF AND THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT. FOR THE UK YOU RECALLED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF 21 MAY AND THE DOCUMENT PUBLISHED BY THE UK WHICH DEMONSTRATED HOW FAR THE UK HAD BEEN PREPARED TO GO IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THIS WAS NOT THE END OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. WE WERE READY TO TALK AT ANY TIME. HOWEVER THE ARGENTINE POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED IN ANY IMPORTANT WAY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WITHOUT SOME SIGN OF CHANGE THERE COULD BE NO HOPE OF A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT. THE MILITARY POSITION WAS WELL KNOWN. THE UK HAD USED MINIMUM FORCE IN ITS LANDINGS AND HAD SUFFERED LESS DAMAGE THAN EXPECTED.

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4. GLESEN (DENMARK) SAID THAT THE DANISH SANCTIONS BILL WAS BEFORE PARLIAMENT TODAY. IT IMPOSED NO TIME LIMIT. HE SUGGESTED THE COMMUNITY SHOULD DO THE SAME. CHEYSSON (FRANCE) AGREED. IT WOULD BE "SHOCKING" FOR THE COMMUNITY TO SUGGEST THAT IT EXPECTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE AS MUCH AS A MONTH TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE INSISTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DECLARATION TODAY BY THE TEN SINCE THIS WOULD EITHER CONSIST OF BANALITIES OR WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A POSITION ON QUESTIONS SUCH AS CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WERE DELICATE AND WERE CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

5. OTHERS WERE CONTENT TO ACCEPT AN EXTENSION OF A MONTH, OR INDEFINITELY, VAN DER STOEL (NETHERLANDS) EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD BUT WITHDREW THIS WITHOUT PROTEST. ONLY COLOMBO (ITALY) WANTED A DECLARATION WHICH HE SAID SHOULD UNDERLINE THE POLITICAL UNITY OF THE TEN. IT WAS THEREFORE AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENCY SHOULD SPEAK BRIEFLY TO THE PRESS ON THE LINE IN PARA 1.

6. IN AN EARLIER MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE BULLARD GAVE A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE SITUATION, INCLUDING THE VARIOUS INITIATIVES FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION AND THE POSITION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE ASKED THAT MORE OF THE TEN SHOULD SPEAK THERE SO AS TO GIVE THE DEBATE A BETTER BALANCE. HE STRESSED THAT THE UK'S LANDING HAD CHANGED THE SITUATION FUNDAMENTALLY AND THOUGH THE UK REMAINED WILLING TO NEGOTIATE THE NEW SITUATION WOULD NEED TO BE REFLECTED IN ANY TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE.

7. OTHERS SAID THAT THEIR VIEWS WERE NOT CHANGED ON SANCTIONS AS WELL AS OTHER ASPECTS. ANDREANI (FRANCE) ASKED IF THE UK THOUGHT THE RESULTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS HAD COMPLETELY DISAPPEARED. HE ASKED HOW THE UK WOULD REACT TO A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION REFERRING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TALKS AND CALLING FOR THE PARTIES TO BUILD ON THE RESULTS OF THESE. OTHERS ECHOED THIS QUESTION.

8. BULLARD AND OTHERS SPEAKERS DREW ATTENTION TO THE UNDESIRABLE POLARISATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA WHICH SEEMED TO BE CREEPING INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. (IRELAND) STRESSED THAT THE IRISH APPROACH

8. BULLARD AND OTHERS SPEAKERS DREW ATTENTION TO THE UNDESIRABLE POLARISATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA WHICH SEEMED TO BE CREEPING INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. MACKERNAN (IRELAND) STRESSED THAT THE IRISH APPROACH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS TO TRY TO MOVE TOWARDS A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AS A BASIS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE REAFFIRMATION OF SCR 502 A, DIRECT OR INDIRECT CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, A FORMAL MANDATE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS AND POSSIBLY TO REPORT BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT ALREADY ACHIEVED IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TALKS. IN REPLY BULLARD POINTED OUT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TALKS HAD RESULTED IN AGREEMENT ONLY ON A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH COULD SET A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATION. THE MAIN POINTS OF SUBSTANCE WERE STILL FAR FROM SOLUTION WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD ADMITTED FAILURE. THE COST TO THE UK IN EFFORT AND LIVES OF THE MILITARY OPERATION COULD NOT BE IGNORED. IT WAS NOW DIFFICULT FOR EXAMPLE TO EXPECT THE UK TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM THE ISLANDS LEAVING ONLY A SMALL LIAISON OFFICE AS PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS NOT MEETING AT UK REQUEST AND THE UK WAS NOT CONVINCED ITS ACTIVITIES COULD BE HELPFUL. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND BEEN ABLE HITHERTO TO ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY WITHOUT A SPECIFIC SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE.

FCO ADVANCE TO:-

FCO - PS, EMERGENCY ROOM, CROWE, YOUNG (ECD(E)), PS/PUS
PS/MR ONSLOW

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