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MY TELEGRAMS NOS 842 AND 843: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

1. SINCE MY TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE WERE DRAFTED OTUNNU (UGANDA) AND I HAVE HAD TWO TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE NON ALIGNED MEMBERS (EXCLUDING PANAMA) WERE ANNOYED WITH DORR FOR GOING AHEAD AND TABLING A DRAFT WHICH HE AND EVERYONE ELSE KNEW THAT WE WOULD VETO. THE THREE AFRICANS, JORDAN AND GUYANA WERE DESPERATELY ANXIOUS TO AVOID A DEADLOCK IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A MAJOR ROW GENERATED BY THE LATIN AMERICANS IN AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

THIS YOULD ONLY POLAPISE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REGIONS, BENEFIT THE RADICALS AND DAMAGE ANY PROSPECT THERE MIGHT BE OF A PEACEFUL OUTCOME TO THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE SHOPT AND LONG TERM. THEY HAD ACCORDINGLY WORKED OUT THE AMENDMENTS BELOW TO DORR'S DRAFT.

IF, AS HE WAS AT PRESENT INSISTING, DORR WOULD NOT BE DRIVEN OFF, THEY MIGHT TABLE THESE AS AMENDMENTS IF THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF THEIR BEING ACCEPTABLE TO US.

2. THE AMENDMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
SUBSTITUTE FOR OPERATIVE 3 THE FOLLOWING NEW LANGUAGE:
''URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION WITH A VIEW TO ENDING
THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
(ISLAS MALVINAS)''.

AMEND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 TO READ:

"REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE, INCLUDING IF NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DESPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS TO MAINTAIN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE".

DORR'S OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5 WOULD ALSO BE AMENDED TO REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ON HIS EFFORTS WITHIN A LIMITED PERIOD, SAY TWO OR THREE DAYS.

3. OTUNNU URGED ME TO PUT THESE AMENDMENTS TO YOU AND I AGREED TO DO SO. I SAID TO HIM, SPEAKING VERY FRANKLY, THAT I THOUGHT HE WAS SETTING THE SECRETARY—GENERAL AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK WHICH THE LATTER WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO UNDERTAKE. I HAD TOLD PEREZ DE CUELLAR AS RECENTLY AS THIS MORNING (24 MAY) THAT, FOR US, A CEASEFIRE COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IF COMBINED WITH IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, AND THAT THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL WAS A NON-STARTER. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THIS POSITION WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA AND WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO CHALK UP A SECOND FAILURE. MEANWHILE, THE CONFLICT WOULD CONTINUE.

4. TUNNU TOOK MY POINT BUT ARGUED THAT A BRIEF TIME LIMIT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT MIGHT ENCOURAGE PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO HAVE ONE MORE GG: A FORMAL MANDATE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT GIVE HIM FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT: AND WE WOULD AT LEAST POSTPONE THE HORRORS OF AN IEMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

5. CTUNNU HAS SINCE TELEPHONED ME FOR A THIRD TIME TO SAY THAT PANAMA (RELUCTANTLY) AND THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS (INCLUDING COSTA MENDEZ) WOULD ACCEPT THE IRISH DRAFT WITH THESE AMENDMENTS. I DO NOT REGARD THIS AS EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH: THE MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITY IS THAT THEY WANT TO GET OUT OF THE UN QUICKLY BECAUSE THEY ARE BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE THE VOTES TO JACK UP AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY FOLLOWING A UK VETO AND/OR THAT THEY WANT THEIR HANDS FREE FOR THE RIO TREATY MEETING DUE TO START ON 27 MAY.

6. HOW SHOULD WE REACT TO THESE CLEVERLY DRAFTED AMENDMENTS WHICH I BELIEVE ARE GENUINELY INTENDED TO GET EVERYONE CUT OF THE PRESENT MESS IN THE COUNCIL WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY LOCMING AHEAD? TO BE THOROUGHLY CYNICAL, THEY WOULD NOT TIE OUR HANDS. IT IS IMPLICIT IN THE NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 THAT THE HOSTILITIES WOULD CONTINUE WHILE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUED HIS MISSION AND, IF HIS MISSION FAILED, THE QUESTION OF UN OBSERVERS WOULD NOT ARISE. ON THE OBVIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION WOULD FAIL, WE WOULD OF COURSE BE BACK IN THE COUNCIL BY THE END OF THE WEEK.

7. IF WE DECIDED TO SUPPORT A DRAFT RESOLUTION SO AMENDED, I WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO MAKE AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE COVERING THE FOLLOWING POINTS. FIRST., I WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE 4TH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AS IN THE IRISH DRAFT (MY TELNO 832)

AND LITH THE LAST PHRASE IN OPERATIVE PAPA 2, ON THE LINES.

I PEOPOSED FOR DEALING WITH THE JAPANESE DRAFT - PAPAGRAPH 7.

OF MY TELNO 842 I WOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAP THAT, MILE THE SECRETARYGENERAL PURSUED HIS MISSION, WE WOULD BE IN NO WAY INHIBITED
FROM TAKING MILITARY ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF
THE CHARTER.

8. AS SEEN FROM THIS END, THIS WOULD BE A CLEVER WAY OF GETTING OUT OF THE COUNCIL WITHOUT A VETO, AT LEAST FOR SOME DAYS. HOWEVER, IF YOU WILL FORGIVE ME GOING BEYOND MY BRIEF, YOU MIGHT FEEL THAT OUR SUPPORT OF SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD REVIVE PRESSURE ON US AT HOME TO SUSPEND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE SECRETARY—GENERAL A CHANCE (COSTA MENDEZ WOULD BE BOUND TO SAY AFTER THE VOTE THAT ARGENTINA WOULD DO SO. I COULD OF COURSE DEAL WITH THIS EASILY). OBVIOUSLY THIS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE SINCE IT WOULD ONLY BENEFIT ARGENTINA.

- 9. TO SUM UP, I NOW NEED THE FOLLOWING LIST OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR WHAT WILL PROBABLY BE A FAIRLY MESSY DAY:
- (1) CONFIRMATION THAT I SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE IRISH DRAFT AS IT STANDS WITH AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE AS IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY TELNO 842.
- (II) CONFIRMATION THAT I SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE PANAMANIAN DRAFT WITH AN APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION OF VOTE (OTUNNU TELLS ME THAT THE PANAMANIANS EVEN ILLUECA HAVE DECIDED NOT TO PURSUE THEIR DRAFT, BUT WE CAN NEVER EXCLUDE SUCH A CONTINGENCY).
- (111) INSTRUCTIONS ON THE JAPANESE DRAFT.
- (IV) INSTRUCTIONS ON THE IRISH DRAFT, AS AMENDED BY THE NON ALIGNED. IF YOU THINK THAT SUPPORT FOR THIS DRAFT WOULD OFFER AN ACCEPTABLE WAY OUT OF OUR PROBLEMS HERE, AT LEAST FOR A SHORT TIME, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I COULD HAVE INSTRUCTIONS BY 1400Z 25 MAY, SO THAT I CAN MUDDY DORR'S WATERS AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

PARSONS