


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ACTION

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26 MAY 1982

OO UKMIS NEW YORK
OO WASHINGTON
GRS 773
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DESKBY 261830Z
FM FCO 261659Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE BOGOTA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 109 OF 26 MAY 82



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INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, BRASILIA, LIMA
FALKLAND ISLANDS: JOINT APPROACH OF PRESIDENTS OF COLOMBIA,
BRAZIL AND PERU

1. THE COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME TODAY TO DELIVER AN ORAL MESSAGE ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENTS OF COLOMBIA, BRAZIL AND PERU. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT HAD SOUGHT TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION THROUGHOUT THE PRESENT CRISIS, DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES THIS HAD CAUSED IT IN A LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO HIM (MY TELNO 108, NOT TO ALL), PRESIDENT TURBAY HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENTS OF BRAZIL AND PERU, WHO HAD AGREED TO PUT FORWARD SOME IDEAS ON AN INFORMAL BASIS THROUGH THE AMBASSADOR. THE THREE GOVERNMENTS HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THE UK'S POSITION, WHICH HAD BEEN CLEARLY SET OUT. THEY WERE HOWEVER CONCERNED TO AVOID FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE AND AT THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND RELATIONS. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS, THERE WOULD BE STRONG PRESSURES AT THE RIO TREATY MEETING ON 27 MAY TO TAKE RADICAL POSITIONS AGAINST THE UK.
2. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS TIME TO ALLOW PRESSURES TO BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON ARGENTINA TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH THE UK COULD ACCEPT. IT WAS RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD NECESSARILY INVOLVE A WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES. BUT SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE TIME TO NEGOTIATE AND ARRANGE. THE THREE GOVERNMENTS THEREFORE WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER WE COULD CONSIDER AGREEMENT TO A SUSPENSION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE DAYS, DURING WHICH TIME THE MILITARY STATUS QUO WOULD REMAIN (WITH A BAR ON MILITARY SUPPLY DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, PRESSURE

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COULD BE EXERTED ON ARGENTINA AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE. THERE WAS NO WISH TO EMBARRASS US BY PUTTING FORWARD FORMAL PROPOSALS AT THIS STAGE. THE IDEA WAS ONLY TO SUGGEST A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE UK ITSELF TO BUILD ON.

3. I SAID THAT I MUCH APPRECIATED THE EFFORTS MADE BY COLOMBIA, BRAZIL AND PERU TO ASSIST IN A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. WE OURSELVES HAD NOT CLOSED ANY DOORS. BUT WE HAD ALWAYS MADE QUITE CLEAR THE ESSENTIAL LINK BETWEEN CEASEFIRE AND ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. IF THERE WERE TO BE A CEASEFIRE NOW, THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. OUR FORCES WERE ON BRITISH SOVEREIGN TERRITORY AND ARGENTINA WAS THE INVADER. IT WAS HOWEVER IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CONSIDER A FIVE-DAY CEASEFIRE, EVEN WITHOUT ANY RE-SUPPLY TO THE ARGENTINE FORCES, IF THIS WERE NOT LINKED FIRMLY AND IRREVOCABLY TO ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS. THIS DID NOT REQUIRE PRIOR NEGOTIATION: THERE WAS NO REASON WHY SUCH A WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT BEGIN IMMEDIATELY IF ARGENTINA CHOSE. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY NO SIGN OF AN ARGENTINE CHANGE OF MIND: AND IN THE HIGHLY-CHARGED ATMOSPHERE IN BUENOS AIRES, IT WAS PROBABLY DIFFICULT FOR GALTIERI TO TAKE ANY SUCH DECISION.

4. I MADE CLEAR TO RESTREPO-LONDONO THAT WE WERE NATURALLY CONSCIOUS OF THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA ON THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. WE HAD NO WISH FOR THIS AND WE PLACED A HIGH VALUE ON OUR LONG-STANDING FRIENDLY TIES. OUR QUARREL WAS ONLY WITH THE ARGENTINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, NOT WITH THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE, NOR WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

5. RESTREPO-LONDONO UNDERTOOK TO REPORT BACK TO PRESIDENT TURBAY. HE LEFT WITH ME A SPEAKING-NOTE ON THE INFORMAL IDEAS OF THE PRESIDENT. TEXT IN MIFT.

6. GRATEFUL IF YOU, BRASILIA AND LIMA COULD KEEP US INFORMED OF REACTIONS. WE POINTED OUT TO RESTREPO-LONDONO THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AT PRESENT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ON WHICH A VOTE WAS TO BE TAKEN TODAY, COULD PROVIDE A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION AND HELP DETER THE ADOPTION OF RADICAL MEASURES AT THE RIO TREATY MEETING. YOU SHOULD TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY

TO EMPHASISE THAT WE FULLY SHARE THE CONCERN OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION. WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL IN TURN UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION. THE CRISIS IS NOT OF OUR MAKING. WE ARE USING THE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. THE PROBLEM COULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AT ANY TIME OVER THE PAST SEVEN WEEKS BY ARGENTINE READINESS TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502. WE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENTS CAN USE ALL THEIR INFLUENCE IN BUENOS AIRES TO PERSUADE ARGENTINA OF THE NEED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES, SO THAT PEACE CAN BE RESTORED.

7. ON PARA 4 OF LIMA TELNO 198 (NOT TO BRASILIA), THE COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY INTENTION OF PRESIDENT TURBAY TO TELEPHONE THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ASSUMED (AS DO WE) THAT THIS HAD BEEN OVERTAKEN BY HIS CALL ON ME TODAY.

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